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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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William D. Jackson — Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988

Robert David Johnson — The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy during the Cold War

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$10.50

Winter 1998–99

FEB 03 1999

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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR	DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY *Barnard College* *Columbia University*
MANAGING EDITOR	BONNIE B. HARTMAN
MANUSCRIPT EDITOR	JEAN HIGHLAND

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics, and international affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Regular membership: one year, $42.00; two years, $76.00; three years, $100.00; student, $27.00 a year. Libraries and institutions $169.00 a year. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8.00 additional per year. Volume 113 Number 4, Winter 1998–99. Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to Loren Morales, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

PREPARATION OF ARTICLE MANUSCRIPTS: *PSQ* is a fully refereed journal. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout in 12 point type and submitted in triplicate with a 200 word abstract. Place all tables, figures, and notes at the end of manuscript. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES: University Microfilms has *PSQ* on CD-ROM dating from 1989 in their *General Periodicals on Disc* and the *Social Science Index on Disc*. Information Access Company produces *PSQ* full-text on their *Academic Index* dating from 1993. JSTOR archives the full-text of *PSQ* articles and book reviews from 1886 to 1993 online at http://www.jstor.org.

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ORDERS: Back issues of *PSQ* may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $10.50. Reprints of articles are available from The Uncover Company at http://uncweb.carl.org or the toll free number: 800-787-7979.

Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

Visit our Home Page:
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CONTENTS

PSQ • Volume 113 • Number 4 • Winter 1998–99

Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy
BENJAMIN R. BARBER 573

The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era
PETER ANDREAS 591

Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988
WILLIAM D. JACKSON 617

The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy during the Cold War
ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON 645

Necessity in Foreign Policy
GREGORY A. RAYMOND 673

Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s
KAREN ORREN
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK 689

Book Reviews 703

Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received 752

Title Page and Contents of Volume 113 753

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BOOK REVIEWS

Vittorio Bufacchi and Simon Burgess, **Italy Since 1989: Events and Interpretations**; and Stanton H. Burnett and Luca Mantovani, **The Italian Guillotine: Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy's First Republic** — Joseph LaPalombara — 703

Geir Lundestad, **"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997** — James McAllister — 705

Pei-te Lien, **The Political Participation of Asian Americans**; and Angelo Ancheta, **Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience** — Claire Jean Kim — 706

Charles S. Maier, **Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany** — Melvin Croan — 708

Sarah E. Mendelson, **Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan** — Richard L. Russell — 709

Dennis J. Dunn, **Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow** — Cathal J. Nolan — 710

Sherry Glied, **Chronic Condition: Why Health Reform Fails** — Lawrence R. Jacobs — 712

Robert B. Hackey, **Rethinking Health Care Policy**; and Mark E. Rushefsky and Kant Patel, **Politics, Power, and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s** — Richard Himelfarb — 714

Timothy E. Cook, **Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution** — Jeffery J. Mondak — 716

David Thelen, **Becoming Citizens in the Age of Television: How Americans Challenged the Media and Seized Political Initiative during the Iran-Contra Debate** — David L. Paletz — 717

Robert V. Friedenberg, **Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns: Ballot Box Warriors** — Peter W. Wielhouwer — 718

Christine DeGregorio, **Networks of Champions: Leadership, Access, and Advocacy in the U.S. House of Representatives** — Georgia Duerst-Lahti — 719

Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, **The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour** — Kent Worcester — 720

Geoffrey Garrett, **Partisan Politics and the Global Economy** — William Roberts Clark — 722

David Callahan, **Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict** — Roy Licklider — 723

Gary W. Cox, **Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems** — Olga Shvetsova — 724

Peter Mair, **Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations** — John Carey — 725

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Paul C. Light, **The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995** B. Guy Peters 726

Steven Pinch, **Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision** David Dodenhoff 727

Libby Rittenberg, ed., **The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?** David Waldner 728

H. D. Forbes, **Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis** Daniel L. Byman 729

John Young, **Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991** Stephen F. Burgess 731

Edward P. Weber, **Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation** Christian Hunold 732

Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, eds., **Environmental Federalism** Denise Scheberle 734

Robert Singh, **The Farrakhan Phenomenon: Race, Reaction, and the Paranoid Style in American Politics** Hanes Walton, Jr. 735

Taylor Branch, **Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963–65** Steven F. Lawson 736

Henry A. Dietz and Gil Shidlo, eds., **Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America** Douglas Chalmers 737

Jeffrey W. Rubin, **Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitan, Mexico** Susan Eckstein 738

Merilee S. Grindle, **Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa** Leonardo A. Villalón 739

John M. Owen IV, **Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security** Mlada Bukovansky 740

Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, **Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict** Erik Gartzke 742

Itai Sened, **The Political Institution of Private Property** Timothy Frye 743

Lewis W. Snider, **Growth, Debt, and Politics: Economic Adjustment and the Political Performance of Developing Countries** Carol Wise 744

Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, **Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis** David S. Meyer 745

Andrew P. Dunne, **International Theory: To the Brink and Beyond** Patrick Thaddeus Jackson 746

Maureen Ramsay, **What's Wrong with Liberalism? A Radical Critique of Liberal Political Philosophy** John P. McCormick 748

Brian C. Schmidt, **The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations** Keith Krause 749

Gerald W. Creed, **Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reforms to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village** Muzaffar Assadi 750

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

BENJAMIN R. BARBER argues that although there is a Jeffersonian scenario in which new telecommunication technologies foster democracy and civil society, there are two other equally probable scenarios that are far less optimistic. Uses of technology that will nurture "strong" democracy require hard and imaginative work for which the political will does not yet appear to be present.

PETER ANDREAS examines the rapid escalation of U.S. immigration control efforts along our southwest border in recent years. He argues that enhanced border policing has less to do with actual deterrence and more to do with projecting an image of order and coping with the deepening contradictions of economic integration.

WILLIAM D. JACKSON analyzes Soviet assessments of the Reagan administration in the period 1985–1988 as revealed in recent memoirs by key Soviet officials and other Soviet documents. He concludes that a shift from the "outflanking" strategy aimed at the United States originally embraced by Gorbachev to a strategy of conciliatory engagement was closely linked to shifting assessments of the Reagan administration.

ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON discusses the forays of the Senate Government Operations Committee into foreign policy issues during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. He argues that the committee's expansion of its role provides one example of the way in which the altered committee structure of Congress enabled the legislature to influence international issues even during the height of the cold war.

GREGORY A. RAYMOND analyzes the justifications for foreign policy decisions that appeal to the exigencies of necessity. He shows how such appeals portray situations of limited options as if they were situations with no options and how decision makers use these appeals to insulate themselves from responsibility while, paradoxically, ennobling their actions.

KAREN ORREN and STEPHEN SKOWRONEK review the concept of regimes and the processes of regime formation in American national government in six recent works that discuss how liberal reform priorities of the 1930s were transformed into a coherent and stable system of national governance in the 1940s. The writers offer some general propositions about why political formations such as these congeal periodically in American political development and what they represent.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

Note: The Fall 1998 article by Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," incorrectly identified Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State in 1967. He was special envoy at that time.

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Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy

BENJAMIN R. BARBER

Modernity may be defined politically by the institutions of democracy, and socially and culturally by the civilization of technology. The relationship between democracy and technology remains ambiguous, however. Proponents of classical participatory democracy such as Jean Jacques Rousseau have generally understood the progress of science to be corrosive to the intimacy and equality of political relations. Proponents of the liberal open society such as Sir Karl Popper and Bertrand Russell, however, have posited a close connection between the spirit of science and the success of liberal democratic institutions.

About the future role of democracy in society we cannot be certain. Because it is a fragile form of social organization, its prospects are clouded. But we do know, however we organize our political world, that we shall live in a society dominated by technology. Indeed, the theme of technology and society has become sufficiently popular to make it a favorite both with academics and after dinner speakers.

Notwithstanding it being in vogue, the relationship between technology and democracy is a matter of genuine urgency for modern men and women. Will technology nourish or undermine democratic institutions? Is technological growth likely to support or corrupt freedom? Are we finally to be mastered by the tools with which we aspire to master the world? The scientistic wisdom suggests that science and technology, by opening up society and creating a market of ideas, foster more open politics; the Soviet experience with copying ma-

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BENJAMIN R. BARBER is Whitman Professor of Political Science and director of the Walt Whitman Center for the Culture and Politics of Democracy at Rutgers University. Among his many books are *The Conquest of Politics*, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*, and *A Place for Us*. This article is adapted from parts of his recently published book, *A Passion for Democracy: American Essays* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

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chines and computers is cited as an example. Yet technology coexisted with tyrannical government in Nazi Germany, and was made to expedite the liquidation of the Jews in a fashion that suggests its utility in rendering dictatorship more efficient. And the inversion of control that attends technocratic forms of society is well enough known to cause comment by the Prince of Wales: Prince Charles used his keynote address at the 350th anniversary of Harvard University to caution against the domination of society by technology, issuing a call to his listeners to restore "moral control over the things they make."

Moreover, such generalizations as we can hazard about the connections between technology and society must remain provisional in the face of the extraordinary rate of change typical of the evolution of modern science and technology. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has noticed in his *The Cycles of American History*, if we assume roughly 800 lifetimes separate us from the beginning of human life, there has been more change in the last two lifetimes than in the 798 that preceded them. Henry Adams had already observed at the beginning of this century that between the years 1800 and 1900, "measured by any standard known to science—by horsepower, calories, volts, mass in any shape—the tension and vibration and volume and so-called progression of society were fully a thousand times greater." Whilst for thousands of generations life for a cohort of grandchildren roughly resembled life for their grandparents, in our century there is enough change in a decade to confuse people in the fifteen years it takes to grow up.

The world's population took 10,000 years to reach a billion, around 1800. The second billion had arrived by 1900, the third by 1940, the fourth by 1960. Movable type appeared only four centuries ago, the steam engine in the eighteenth century, the telegraph in the nineteenth, and wireless at the beginning of the twentieth. The internal combustion engine, rocketry, and the typewriter came of age between the two World Wars, and television, microchips, and lasers are still more recent. The first computer built after the war filled a large room and performed less complex calculations for its ardent cybernetic attendants than a handheld instrument performs for students today.

The overall impact of these stunning developments over the last half millennium has been to shrink both time and space. Aristotle once observed that the ideal size for a democratic polity could be measured by the amount of land a man could traverse in a day—assuring that all citizens could attend a popular assembly. By this standard, Marshall McLuhan's global village is a reality that is confirmed anew each day by advances in satellite and laser optic communication and computer information systems and the spread of the internet. Technology shrinks the world, foreshortening space and conquering time. News that once took months or years to cross an ocean now flashes around the globe in seconds, and no people are more remote from the political present than the distance from a transistor radio or a short wave telephone. Orbiting satellites leave "footprints" that encompass the globe, overstepping national boundaries and treating national sovereignty like some charming vestige of a decrepit stone

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wall. The Vatican has embraced the innovations: indulgences are now granted via television to pious viewers hundreds of miles away. And even Jihadic warriors against modern technology use the worldwide web to get out their Luddite message.

We stand today on the threshold of a new generation of technology as potentially important to society as the printing press or the internal combustion engine. This technology is defined by computer chips, video equipment, electromagnetic tape, lasers, fiber optics, satellites, low-frequency transmission and, more significantly, by the revolution in information and communications made possible by *combining* these several low-price, high-speed, high-volume innovations. The possibilities for the mastery of time and space, and of knowledge and its transmission, offered by this complex, integrated technology seem almost limitless.

Can democracy, a form of government born in the ancient world and designed to bring small numbers of individuals with consensual interests together into a self-governing community where they might govern themselves directly, survive the conditions of modern mass society? Does technology help replicate the ancient conditions? Or does it underscore the distinctiveness of the modern condition? In 1752, Rousseau argued that the development of the arts and sciences had had a corrupting effect on politics and morals; has modern technology corrupted or improved our polity?

We know how profoundly simple innovations have affected social and political history in the past. Electric fences brought to an end two millennia of common grazing in Switzerland and altered the communal character of Swiss liberty; gunpowder revolutionized and ultimately democratized warfare, which was freed from the special skills of a warrior caste; the printing press destroyed both ecclesiastic and worldly priesthoods based on privileged knowledge and so, in undermining hierarchy, created the conditions for the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the democratic state; and, as George Ball said a decade ago in supporting the opening of a Fiat plant in the USSR, "the automobile is an ideology on four wheels."

Yet this is not to say that technology is wholly determining, that it overrides the plans, ideas, and institutions of man and writes its own history independent of human intentions. Where technology takes our political and social institutions will depend, in part, on where we take technology. Science and its products remain *tools*, and although the parable of the tools that come to enslave the tool-makers is an ancient one, it is not necessarily the only description of the modern technological dilemma. Rather, we must see technological determinism as one among a number of possible scenarios that depend at least in part on the choices we make about technology's use. If it enslaves us we will have chosen to act (or not act) in a fashion that permits our enslavement. I certainly do not share the neo-Luddite posture which makes the success of our free institutions depend on the suppression of technology. For better or worse, technology is with us; our fate will depend on how we use or abuse it. As with

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fire, gunpowder, and now atomic energy, all modern technology consists of discoveries that cannot be undiscovered, gifts of the gods that cannot be returned or exchanged. There is no way back to innocence for Prometheus; we are destined to learn to live with the booty of his visionary theft—or to die with it.

There are, in fact, at least three prospects for the future of technology and democracy—three scenarios of their relationship—that are within the realm of technological possibility. I will call them, rather fancifully, the Pangloss scenario, which is rooted in complacency and is simply a projection of current attitudes and trends; the Pandora scenario, which looks at the worst possible case in terms of the inherent dangers of technological determinism; and the Jeffersonian scenario, which seeks out the affirmative uses of the new technology in the nurturing of modern democratic life. In terms of the psychological moods they evoke, the three may be described as the posture of complacency, the posture of caution, and the posture of hope. We can aspire to hope and we should cultivate caution, but it is, of course, complacency that is most likely to attend and determine our actual future.

The Pangloss Scenario

Anyone who reads good-time pop-futurology knows the penchant of the future mongers for Panglossian parody. Their view of the future is always relentlessly upbeat and ahistorical, mindlessly naive about power and corruption as conditioners of all human politics. Both former Speaker Newt Gingrich and Vice President Al Gore are techno-zealots who seem to believe that computers for the poor and hard-wired schools will solve real social problems—that the technological present and the future it will naturally produce are wholly benevolent and without costs. Without either having consciously to plan to utilize technology to improve our lives, or having to worry about the insidious consequences of such usage, we can rely on market forces to realize the perfect technological society. The invisible hand governs this scenario, carrying with it the presumption that market incentives such as profitability and consumer interest will take technology in socially useful directions without planning of any kind.

Now it is certainly true that market forces push the new technologies in directions that serve corporate efficiency, media communications, and consumer entertainment, but it is not clear that they do anything for electoral efficiency, civic communication, or political education. The untoward fate of Warner-Amex's now nearly ancient "Qube" system—an innovation in interactive television that first promised interactive communication with the screen via a five-position module—offers a vivid illustration. Warner-Amex introduced the device into its Columbus, Ohio, cable system back in the 1980s but on a purely commercial basis. Its primary use was for quick question-answer polls, for so-called gong entertainment shows which permitted viewers to "gong" acts they did not like off the air; and for video shipping, banking, and home surveillance. Although Warner-Amex originally planned to introduce Qube into all of the

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major cities they were cabling in the 1980s, lack of consumer interest led them to cancel the project. The possibilities of the interactive use of Qube for electronic town meetings, voter education, and elections were never considered, and apparently will not be. With deregulation, the giveaway of digitalized broadcast spectra, and the privatizing Federal Communications Act of 1996, commerce has trumped civics and education. As private uses of the new technologies multiply, public uses vanish. Thus, although several Western nations have developed videotex services aimed at public information and the public weal, the USA continues to develop them exclusively for commercial (primarily corporate) purposes. Video teleconferences are regular features of corporate communications, but are only rarely resorted to in the civic realm (for example, the Los Angeles Televote conducted in 1982 or Minnesota E-Democracy, a popular civic web site in the 1990s). The privatization of the satellite business and its attendant modes of world communication have also thrust this important sector of the new technology into private hands. Recent failures in NASA's space program point in the same direction, have also promoted private-sector development, and what was once a public research venture is rapidly becoming the shuttle payload business. What Bob Dole called the "giveaway" of the century, placed digitalized spectra in the hands of private broadcasters for free!

Despite the absence of explicit political applications, the new technologies have had a certain market impact on political culture and economic and social structure. With the multiplication of communication spectra and the lowering of costs of hardware over the last two decades, traditional views of the airwaves as limited and therefore subject to private or (in the European case) public monopoly have been challenged. Spectrum scarcity meant government ownership in Europe and heavy government regulation in the USA. Spectrum abundance supposedly lessens the dangers of private monopoly and thus the need for public monopoly. A 1979 Supreme Court decision in the USA ruled that spectrum abundance had antiquated certain aspects of traditional Federal Communications regulations (the Federal Communications Act of 1934) rooted in the First Amendment—equal time, for example, or the "Fairness Doctrine," which has recently been abandoned. A new doctrine to protect freedom of information and privacy in the cable/satellite/laser age has yet to be developed. Combine the possibilities of over 200 discrete cable spectra, low-frequency and satellite broadcasting, and laser and fibre-optic technologies with the vertical integration of the new global communications monopolies like Murdoch's News Corporation, Disney's ABC, and Time-Warner's CNN, and the hold of government broadcast corporations on the airwaves is patently loosened.

For a while in the USA it appeared as though new cable networks like Ted Turner's and superstations that utilized satellite broadcast capabilities would offer a major challenge to the monopoly-like networks, and create a genuinely competitive market. Increasingly, the problem faced by democracies seemed no longer to be Big Brother (George Orwell imagined two-way television sur-

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veillance in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) but a host of complacent little cousins—a plethora of broadcasting sources that would inundate the public in programming and divide the population into a series of discrete markets, each one the particular target of new "narrowcasting" strategies. In a 1982 essay, I warned against the fragmenting effect this might have on the integral American nation which heretofore had been protected from regional parochialisms by the national hearthside of network television. At the same time, I suggested that the new technological diversity might, for the first time, allow information and communication sovereignty to pass from the hands of the producers with monopolies over limited spectra to consumers who, because they now had literally hundreds of choices, could assume genuine responsibilities for what they saw and listened to. Indeed, the new plenitude appeared to challenge national sovereignty too, for anyone with a satellite dish was now able to tune into broadcasts from around the world. Armed with a VCR, a cable hookup, a satellite dish, and a television set, consumers could construct a world of entertainment and information geared to their own tastes, their own schedules, and their own needs. To this degree, the new technologies, by favoring decentralization, the multiplication of choice, and consumer sovereignty, did inadvertently benefit democratic political culture.

But in the last few years, other less benevolent market forces have conspired to work against these developments. The theoretical availability of multiple spectra has not been matched by real program or information diversification, or by any real increase in the power of the consumer over programming. This is due in part to the uncompetitive character of the real markets in hardware, software, and programming, and a surge of corporate takeovers that has shrunk this market still more. A limited number of programming and software giants have emerged from the sorting out process as monopolistic purveyors of information, news, and entertainment. Despite the fact that outlets for their product have multiplied, there has been little real substantive diversification. Thus, despite the presence of hundreds of television channels, cable stations have remained content to mimic the networks, or run movies, or develop "narrowcast" programming aimed at special audiences (religious, Spanish-speaking, sports, etc.) in search of certain profits. Although consumers are freed from traditional time constraints by video recorders and can watch live, record programs to watch at a time of their choice, or rent or buy video cassettes or laser discs, the actual content available is pretty much identical with what was available on the networks ten years ago. Moreover, the development of programming remains in the hands of the same few production companies that have always controlled films and entertainment. Indeed, such independence as the networks possessed is being eroded by their corporate takeover and subordination to global companies that also own newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, film studios, sports teams, and theme parks. Murdoch, Disney, and Turner each own baseball teams and networks on which to show games. And

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each has gone global, competing for spectators in Teheran and Beijing as well as New York and London.

Elsewhere in the world, television companies (mostly national) take their cue from the English-speaking networks in the USA and the UK. Reruns of old suspense and comedy programs lead the schedule on most such networks (including those in countries with radical ideologies). Contradictions abound—*The Cosby Show* (about an average American black family) was the most watched program in pre-liberated South Africa; *Dallas* (about the sexual and business escapades of the rich and meretricious in Texas) is popular in the Third World; accented mini-series from the BBC and Thames Television continue to draw a rapt American viewing audience that cannot get enough of the Royal Family it abandoned two hundred years ago; and violent, racist films like *Rambo* are regularly shown in Asia (where Rambo's Asian enemies are made to seem Arab in the overdub) and, on easily available black market cassettes, in Russia, Pakistan, and Indonesia. No wonder Thomas L. McPhail entitled his book on international broadcasting *Electronic Colonialism*.

In fact, for all of its technological potential for diversification, the domination of these new technologies by the market (or by the corporate monopolies that the market conceals) assures that to a growing degree, the profit-making entertainment industry in the Anglo-American world will control what is seen, felt, and thought around the globe (the primary concern of my book *Jihad versus McWorld*). It is hardly surprising that nations elsewhere are demanding a new information order. Though this demand is often construed in the West (to a degree correctly) as resulting from the tyrannical impulse to control information, it must also be viewed as a desperate reaction to the market tyranny already being exercised over world communication by Anglo-American programming and software monopolies.

None of this denies the potential of the new technology for efficient planning and information enhancement. Teleconferencing, videotex, and the interactive possibilities of this technology are being systematically exploited in the commercial world by corporations bent on enhancing efficiency through enhancing information and communication. But this has meant that a technology whose cheapness and universality promises a new communicative egalitarianism is, in fact, replicating in the domain of information the inequality that otherwise characterizes market relations in the West. Increasingly a gap can be described between information-rich and information-poor segments of Western nations—the former, technologically literate and able to utilize the new technologies to gain mastery over their commercial and political environments; the latter, technologically illiterate and thrown more and more to the periphery of a society where power and status are dependent on information and communication.

I do not mean to suggest here a conscious attempt at control or at the sustaining of nonegalitarianism on the part of those who are major players in the "free" market—although the evidence presented here would not be inconsistent with such an interpretation. I do mean to say that even at its most innocent,

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the market is likely to have an impact on free and developing societies in ways unforeseen by the happy futurologists; that, at best, the market will do nothing for uses of the new technology that do not have obvious commercial or entertainment or corporate payoffs, and, at worst, will enhance uses that undermine equality and freedom. Nor has anything happened in the decade since I first advanced this skeptical thesis to suggest my pessimism was misplaced.

The Pandora Scenario

Pangloss is a peril to every society, but the greater danger to democracy comes from Pandora's scenario, which envisions what might happen if a government consciously set out to utilize the new technologies for purposes of standardization, control, or repression. Clearly the new technology, which facilitates centralization of control over information and communication, enables government to retain files and "keep tabs" on all computer and telephonic communications, and makes new kinds of surveillance possible, can be a powerful weapon in the hands of a controlling political or economic elite. Brute tyrants must control by brute force, which requires constant physical control over subjects; subtle tyrants possess their subjects' hearts and minds through the control of education, information, and communication and, thereby, turn subjects into allies in the enterprise of servitude. The new technologies enhance this subtle form of control and give government instruments of indirect surveillance and control unlike any known to traditional dictators.

Nor need abuses be planned by elites conspiring to repress. The citizens of Sweden recently learned that a number of young men had been the unknowing subjects of a twenty year longitudinal surveillance that, in the name of a social scientific project, "keeps tabs" on their economic, social, personal, and sexual lives—without their knowledge (let alone permission). Credit and insurance organizations in the USA and Europe are assembling mammoth information files on clients, files that are for the most part held and used at the company's own discretion without any government regulation. The Qube system offered a surveillance mode that transmitted electronic reports to a central office on the comings and goings of all residents; what and when they watched television, when lights went on and off, and so forth. Warner-Amex corporate officers "promised discretion"—a guarantee somewhat less ironclad than the Bill of Rights. Computer banking, increasingly common throughout Europe and the USA, leaves a permanent trail of files on financial transactions that permit those with access to learn the details of an individual's financial life.

Clearly the costs to privacy of the efficient operation of this new technology can be very high; neither can the individual be secured by traditional print media protections. The Fairness Doctrine, as developed by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, was not adapted to the new technology and has thus been laid aside. A number of commentators, including John Wicklein, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and David Burnham (erstwhile communications specialist for *The New*

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York Times), have decried the dangers to privacy and the individual posed by technological innovations. Fred Friendly, onetime head of CBS news, called for an "electronic bill of rights." Twenty years after his appeal, no such bill is in sight. On the contrary, privacy issues seem to have been privatized, left to the whims of bankers, merchandisers, and other commercial users of the new technology.

Moreover, despite the diversification of communications and information channels made possible by the new technologies, control and ownership of the corporations that manufacture hardware and software and create news, information, and entertainment programming remain in the hands of a few supercorporations that exercise an effective monopoly or, as in France (and despite the recent accrediting of a private television network), of a government monopoly. Between them, the conglomerates that now control hardware, software, programming, and financing control a preponderance of what is made and produced in the communications/information field. These media giants make nonsense of the theoretical diversification of the technology. While minor players like Apple can still play the game, the large corporations generally let them take the risks and then buy out or imitate the successes, or are taken over by them. The individual entrepreneur may still make a profit on his risk-taking, but the public is deprived of genuine competition or a real market choice. This is the essence of the U.S. government's current antitrust suit against Microsoft.

The entertainment business provides a powerful lesson. As the television industry takes over the film industry and the film industry takes over Broadway and the West End, the English-speaking theater ceases to exist as a cultural artifact and becomes another small cog in the great profit-making entertainment machine of the major media corporations. Shown on the hundreds of cable networks nowadays are mostly network reruns, third-rate movies never released to the theater chains, and sporting events. Innovation is commercially unviable and little supported. The "cultural" channels have mostly gone under for lack of funding, the public access channels are underutilized and unwatched (cable franchisers are often asked to put aside a channel for public access by the licensing municipality, but are never required to put aside funds to train people in the use of television, or to make available directorial and production support for groups wishing to avail themselves of public air time). Thus, no one watches. That's the market, say the cable companies (as if they would offer amateur underfunded programming of that kind to their paying viewers). The UK's Channel 4 is ingeniously financed and has developed some new programming, but it also specializes in upscale American prime-time programming (*Hill Street Blues*, *St. Elsewhere*, and *Cheers*, for example).

If then we measure power by the potential for monopoly and control over information and communication, it is evident that the new technology can become a dangerous facilitator of tyranny. Even in the absence of conscious government abuse, this potential can constrict our freedom, encroach on our privacy, and damage our political equality. There is no tyranny more dangerous

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than an invisible and benign tyranny, one in which subjects are complicit in their victimization, and in which enslavement is a product of circumstance rather than intention. Technology need not inevitably corrupt democracy, but its potential for benign dominion cannot be ignored.

The Jeffersonian Scenario

Despite the potential of the telecommunications market for inequality and of the technology it supports for abuse, the new technologies, in themselves, can also offer powerful assistance to the life of democracy. A free society is free only to the degree that its citizens are informed and that communication among them is open and informed. Although among the three scenarios sketched here, the Jeffersonian is the least probable and, given current trends, unlikely to become more probable, it remains both technologically feasible and politically attractive. As Nicholas Johnson, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) noted some time ago, "the ultimate promise of the new technology is the rebuilding of community." In this sense, a guarded optimism is possible about technology and democracy, but only if citizen groups and governments take action in adapting the new technology to their needs.

At the outset, I noted that democracy is a form of government that depends on information and communication. It is obvious then that new technologies of information and communications can be nurturing to democracy. They can challenge passivity, they can enhance information equality, they can overcome sectarianism and prejudice, and they can facilitate participation in deliberative political processes.

Traditional media emphasize active programming and passive spectatorship. The new technology's interactive capability permits viewers to become active both as choosers of what they watch and respondents to programming (via interactive television, information network hookups, and public access cable channels). The old picture of passive television viewers glued to their sets for seven docile hours of complacent viewing can now be challenged by active users of a complex computer/telephone/video set-up, who utilize the system to enhance their public and private lives. Linked together horizontally by a point-to-point medium like the internet, citizens can subvert political hierarchy and nurture an unmediated civic communication.

The educational potential of computer information networks and interactive television is very great and, when appropriately subsidized, allows equal access to information by all citizens. Computer terminals equipped with user-friendly programs and manned by user-friendly technicians, if housed at public libraries, town halls, and other public places, could place the world-wide-web's enormous banks of information available through computer networks at the disposal of the general public. Governments could offer their own networks providing information on employment, housing, zoning regulation, small business laws, and other matters of public concern. Private networks might be per-

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suaded to offer service to public terminals at cost as a *pro bonum* return on the profits their use of public airwaves and wire make possible. Anyone can create a website and initiate communication.

The possibilities of using the interactive capabilities of recent television and internet technology for civic education has been underexplored. Networks run instant telephone polls on controversial debates ("are you for or against a nuclear freeze?") after half an hour of opinionated sparring by warring "experts," but have not tried to structure several programs over time aimed at actually informing opinion and giving issues full deliberation. Yet the technology is there to do so. The few times that it has been used, it has achieved unusual successes. The experiment with a civic network that began as a senior citizen and shut-in network in Reading, Pennsylvania; the "televote" experiments in New Zealand, Hawaii, and Los Angeles; and the League of Women Voters' three state teleconferences in New York—New Jersey—Connecticut are but three examples of the technology's civic possibilities. More recently, "Project Vote Smart" has opened a much used internet voter information site.

A third use of the new technology has been implicit in electronic communications from the start of the radio and television era: the overcoming of regional parochialism, local prejudice, and national chauvinism. Technology has made the metaphor of the global village an electronic reality. Satellite "footprints" know no borders and individuals or communities with a satellite dish (and perhaps a descrambler) can tune in on the world. The world-wide-web, unlike the World Series, is actually world wide. It makes closed societies difficult to maintain, and information blackouts a contradiction in terms.

In order to be something more than the government of mass prejudice, democracy must escape the tyranny of opinion. Television often merely reinforces opinion and prejudice, but its global character and capacity for interactive communication also enable it to overcome them and sustain rational discourse and citizen education. It can, to be sure, permit instant plebiscites of the most dangerous kind where unthinking prejudices are numerically recorded to establish the momentary shape of mass prejudice on an issue (these plebiscitary dangers have been noted by various liberal critics of the new technology who, however, seem Luddite in their prejudice against alternatives uses). But it also permits ongoing communication and deliberation among individuals and (via electronic town meetings) communities that can inform and improve democracy.

Imagine a situation in which the state of California wishes to offer a referendum to its citizens on a law banning Sunday retail commerce. Normally, the private sector would go to work on voters, plying them with expensive advertisements portraying the loss to the economy of Sunday closings, and church and the retail industry would indulge in a war of publicists. Voters, having passively received this bounty of misinformation, would eventually be constrained to vote their prejudices (religion versus convenience) and the matter would be "democratically" resolved. Yet with the assistance of the new technologies a very different scenario can be imagined. Every township and municipality in

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California might, for example, call a town meeting to discuss an issue initially. The state might fund a neutral documentary maker to produce a one hour special on the issue, which might be shown on television prior to a debate by proponents of each side. A second set of town meetings would follow this, including a video hookup (teleconference) of urban and rural meetings to let different parts of the state understand how the issue was being discussed elsewhere. This could be followed by a final debate on television coupled with an interactive hookup permitting home viewers to pose questions to the "experts." Such a multiple-phase process involving information, adversarial debate, and the direct engagement by citizens within their local communities, and among the communities and the experts would offer genuine civic education. More public-regarding ways of looking at problems could emerge, and the final decision on the referendum would be both informed and more public-minded. The cumulative effect on the political competence of the electorate of a series of such procedures, replicated on different issues over several years, would be immense. The state of Oregon used a people's parliament method to develop a state health plan in the early 1990s: today we can technologically enhance that method with the internet.

The institutional tools necessary to realize this scenario are not beyond our reach. A "Civic Communicative Co-operative" in the USA would permit an independent public corporation to oversee civic uses of the new media, and perhaps establish a model program channel. Local municipalities responsible for franchising cable operators could insist on institutional networks, public access channels with personnel and technical support, and public information terminals as a condition of a cable franchise or a network license (most municipalities focus on the number and entertainment quality of program channels and rarely raise issues of civic education and information).

It is then the will and not the way that is missing at present. Certainly Thomas Jefferson would not be disappointed to learn that technology has made possible a quality and degree of communication among citizens and between citizens and bureaucrats, experts, and their information banks he could not have dreamed of. It was always Jefferson's belief that the inadequacies of democracy were best remedied by more democracy: that civic incompetence was not a reason to disempower citizens, but empowerment a remedy to redress incompetence.

Which Democracy? Progress for Whom?

The new technologies—not only television, including cable networks, but also computers and the internet—can potentially enhance lateral communication among citizens, can open access to information by all, and can furnish citizens with communication links across distances that once precluded direct democracy. Yet there is a formidable obstacle in the way of implementation of these technologies: unless we are clear about what democracy means to us, and what

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kind of democracy we envision, technology is as likely to stunt as to enhance the civic polity. Is it representative democracy, plebiscitary democracy, or deliberative democracy for which we seek technological implementation? The differences between the three are not only theoretically crucial, but have radically different entailments with respect to technology.

Do we aspire to further the representative system, a democracy rooted in the election of accountable deputies who do all the real work of governing? Most advocates of this form of indirect democracy are properly suspicious of the new technologies and their penchant for immediacy, directness, lateral communication, and undeliberativeness. Or is it plebiscitary majoritarianism we seek, a democracy that embodies majority opinions assembled from the unconsidered prejudices of private persons voting private interests? New technology can be a dangerously facile instrument of such unchecked majoritarianism: the net affords politicians an instrument for perpetual polling that can aggravate the focus group mentality that many rue as Dick Morris's political legacy. Will any politicians ever again gather the courage to lead in the face of a technology that makes following so easy?

Yet if we are in search of what I have called "strong democracy," a democracy that reflects the careful and prudent judgment of citizens who participate in deliberative, self-governing communities, we will need to tease out of the technology other capabilities. If democracy is to be understood as deliberative and participatory activity on the part of responsible citizens, it will have to resist the innovative forms of demagoguery that accompany innovative technology and that are too often overlooked by enthusiasts, and listen carefully to those like Theodore Becker and James Fishkin, who have tried to incorporate deliberative constraints into their direct democratic uses of the technologies.[1] In other words, it turns out there is no simple or general answer to the question "Is the technology democratizing?" until we have made clear what sort of democracy we intend. Home voting via interactive television might further privatize politics and replace deliberative debate in public with the unconsidered instant expression of private prejudices, turning what ought to be public decisions into private consumerlike choices; but deliberative television polling of the kind envisioned by James Fishkin can offset such dangers, while the use of the internet for deliberation across communities can actually render decision making less parochial.[2] In politics, fast is often bad, slow sometimes good.

[1] See Theodore Becker, "Televote: Interactive, Participatory Polling" in Becker and R. A. Couto, *Teaching Democracy by Being Democratic* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

[2] James Fishkin has devised a deliberative technique that brings citizens together for several days and permits them to interact with one another and with experts, so that their views are not merely registered but pondered and modified. In 1993, Channel Four in the United Kingdom broadcast an exemplary weekend of Fishkin's project; a similar broadcast was shown on public television during the 1996 American presidential elections. For details, see Fishkin's *Democracy and Deliberation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

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Strong democracy calls not only for votes but for good reasons; not only for an opinion but for a rational argument on its behalf. Those who once preferred open to secret ballots, who preferred open debate about well-grounded viewpoints to closed votes aggregating personal interests, will today prefer technologies that permit frank interactive debate with real identities revealed to technologies that allow game playing and privately registered, unsupported opinions.

Traditional proponents of Madisonian representative democracy are likely to find much of the new interactive technology intimidating, since it threatens to overwhelm what they regard as a pristine system assuring government by expert politicians with a free-for-all among "ignorant" masses who swamp the polity with their endless demands and overheated prejudices. Such critics already complain that traditional broadcast television is destructive of party identity and party discipline, and they will properly worry about technologies that further erode the boundaries between the governors and the governed. Plebiscitary democrats will be mindlessly enthralled by interactive instant polling and imagine a time when private consumers make precedent-shattering public choices with no more serious thought than they give to which button to hit when they are surfing a hundred-channel cable system. "Let's see," mutters the glib new net surfer, "do I want to play checkers or outlaw abortion? Do I prefer Sylvester Stallone to Bill Clinton? Shall we download the 'Playmate of the Month' or vote to expand NATO to the Russian border? Time for a mock battle with Darth Vader on my Star Wars simulation. . . . Or should I just declare war for real on Libya?" Deliberative democrats can only shudder at such prospects, insisting that they do more to destroy than to enhance democracy. Deliberation, on the other hand, does require intervention, education, facilitation, and mediation—all anathema to devotees of an anarchic and wholly user-controlled net whose whole point is to circumvent facilitation, editing, and other "top-down" forms of intervention.

Technology can then help democracy, but only if programmed to do so and only in terms of the paradigms and political theories that inform the program. Left to the market, it is likely only to reproduce the vices of politics as usual. How different is the anonymous flaming that typifies certain kinds of internet chatter from the anonymous vilification that characterizes talk radio and scream television? Will the newer technologies be any less likely to debase the political currency, any less likely to foster sound-bite decision making rather than sound political judgment?

By the same token, if those who deploy the technologies consciously seek a more participatory, deliberative form of strong democracy and a newly robust civil society, they can also find in telecommunications innovation an extraordinarily effective ally. The trouble with the zealots of technology as an instrument of democratic liberation is not that they misconceive technology but that they fail to understand democracy. They insist that market-generated technology can, all by itself and in the complete absence of common human willing and

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political cooperation, produce liberty, social responsibility, and citizenship. The viruses that eat up our computer programs, like sarin in the Tokyo subway, are but obvious symbols of technology's ever-present dark side, the monster who lurks in Dr. Frankenstein's miraculous creation.

With participatory interaction comes the peril of political and economic surveillance.[3] With interactive personal preference modules comes the risk of majoritarian tyranny. With digital reasoning comes the danger that adversarial modes of thought will inundate consensus and obliterate common ground. Computer literacy cannot finally exist independently of lifelong educational literacy. The age of information can reinforce extant inequalities, we have noted, making the resource- and income-poor the information-poor as well.[4] The irony is that those who might most benefit from the net's democratic and informational potential are least likely to have access to it, the tools to gain access, or the educational background to take advantage of the tools. Those with access, on the other hand, tend to be those already empowered in the system by education, income, and literacy.

And how easily liberating technologies become tools of repression. As consumers tell shopping networks what they want to buy and tell banks how to dispense their cash and tell pollsters what they think about abortion, those receiving the information gain access to an extensive computer bank of knowledge about the private habits, attitudes, and behaviors of consumers and citizens. This information may in turn be used to reshape those habits and attitudes in ways that favor producers and sellers working the marketplace or the political arena. Moreover, the current antiregulatory fever has assured that the new data banks being compiled from interaction and surveillance are subject neither to government scrutiny nor to limitation or control—a sunset provision, for example, that would periodically destroy all stored information.[5] The model of Channel One, an invidious classroom network founded by Chris Whittle's Whittle Communications (and now owned by the K-III Corporation), which extorts classroom advertising time from needy schools in return for desperately

[3] Precisely because it is interactive, new telecommunications technology "learns" about its users as its users learn about it. A system that "knows" what you buy, how you pay for it, what your consumer and political preferences are, and even (in programs providing home security) when you leave and when you come home, and which then stores and disseminates such information in the absence of any regulatory safeguards, is hardly a system political skeptics should trust.

[4] Robert Reich has drawn an American portrait in which privileged information/communication workers increasingly withdraw public support from the larger society as they move to insular suburbs, with private recreational, schooling, security, and sanitation services for their own walled communities, which the public at large can no longer afford. Their withdrawal (Reich labels it the politics of secession) leaves the poor poorer, the public sector broke, and society ever more riven by economic disparities that technology reinforces. Robert Reich, "The New Community" in *The Work of Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1991), chap. 23.

[5] An early and prophetic book about the problems of electronic surveillance is John Wicklein's *Electronic Nightmare: The Home Communications Set and Your Freedom* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981).

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wanted hardware, suggests that the public is likely to be served by the new technologies only in as far as someone can make serious money off it.[6]

It may be a cause of satisfaction, as Walter Wriston insists, that nowadays it is the citizen who is watching Big Brother and not the other way around. But if Big Brother is no longer watching you, nor is he watching those who *are* watching you, and even adversaries of regulation may find reason to be disturbed by that omission. If the classical liberal question used to be, who will police the police? the pertinent liberal question in today's McWorld ought to be, Who will watch those who are watching the watchers? Who will prevent the media from controlling their clients and consumers? Who will act in lieu of a government that has demurred from representing the public's interests? These are issues for democratic deliberation and decision, not for technological resolution. For technology remains a tool allied to particular conceptions of democracy; if we know what kind of democracy we want, it can enhance civic communication and expand citizen literacy. Left to markets, (and that is where it is presently being left), it is likely to augment McWorld's least worthy imperatives, including surveillance over and manipulation of opinion, and the cultivation of artificial needs rooted in lifestyle "choices" unconnected to real economic, civic, or spiritual needs.

If democracy is to benefit from technology then, we must start not with technology but with politics. Having a voice, demanding a voice, in the making of science and technology policy is the first step citizens can take in assuring a democratic technology.[7] The new technology is still only an instrument of communication, and it cannot determine what we will say or to whom we will say it. There is a story about the wireless pioneer Guglielmo Marconi who, when told by his associates that his new wireless technology meant he could now "talk to Florida," asked, presciently, "And do we have anything to say to Florida?" Enthusiasts exalt over the fact that on the net we can talk to strangers throughout the world. But many of today's problems arise from the fact that we no longer know how to talk to our husbands and wives, our neighbors and fellow citizens, let alone strangers. Will our blockages and incivilities locally be overcome by the miracles of long-distance computer communication? Will virtual community heal the ruptures of real communities? Will we do on our keyboards what we have notably failed to do face to face?

[6] Channel One currently is in about twelve thousand junior high and high schools. It loans free televisions, VCRs, and a satellite dish to schools (usually needy ones) willing to dish up two minutes of soft news, three minutes of commercials, and nine minutes of infotainment to its students during regular school hours. Channel One sells spots for up to $195,000 for a thirty-second ad, and has attracted many of the corporations on McWorld's frontier, including Pepsi and Reebok. In 1994, Chris Whittle sold the network for nearly $240 million to K-III, an "educational" publisher.

[7] This suggests that science and technology policy need themselves to be subjected to democratic scrutiny. Technology should not try to produce an appropriate democracy; democracy should try to produce an appropriate technology. Experts in technology are *not* experts in the appropriate public uses of technology. Richard Sclove's project on community science boards speaks to these issues: *Democracy and Technology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

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If in the coming millennium—a millennium in which technology is likely to dominate our lives as never before—we want democracy to be served, then the bittersweet fruits of science will have to be subordinated to our democratic ends and made to serve as a facilitator rather than a corruptor of our precious democracy. And whether this happens will depend not on the quality and character of our technology but on the quality of our political institutions and the character of our citizens.

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The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era

PETER ANDREAS

The conventional wisdom is that the almost universal embrace of open markets and the decline of geopolitical rivalry are eroding the significance of territorial controls. Echoing this view, Lawrence Herzog argues that, "The internationalization of the world economy . . . has led to an inevitable reshaping of boundary functions. The most obvious change has been the shift from boundaries that are heavily protected and militarized to those that are more porous, permitting cross-border social and economic interaction."[1]

While there is much truth in this claim, trends along the boundaries between developed and less developed countries suggest a more complex and paradoxical dynamic: the expansion of cross-border economic activity and the decline of geopolitical tensions are paralleled by a rapid expansion of border policing and rising tensions over prohibited cross-border flows. This is evident, most strikingly, along the United States-Mexico border and along the external borders of the European Union. These borders are increasingly protected and monitored, not to deter armies or impose tariffs on trade, but to confront a perceived invasion of "undesirables," particularly illegal immigrants, drug traffickers, and other clandestine transnational actors.

Curiously, the international relations literature has much to say about the economic and military border regulatory functions of the state, while remaining

[1] Lawrence A. Herzog, "Changing Boundaries in the Americas: An Overview" in Lawrence A. Herzog, ed., *Changing Boundaries in the Americas* (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1992), 5–6.

PETER ANDREAS is an Academy Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. He is co-author of *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial* and co-editor of the forthcoming volume, *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power.*

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largely silent on the policing function.[2] This is reflected in the two major subfields of the discipline, security studies and international political economy, both of which pay little attention to the policing dimension of borders and the clandestine dimension of cross-border economic activity.[3] Within security studies, this neglect is partly due to the dominance of structural realism, with its focus on interstate relations, particularly on the "high politics" of military conflict and cooperation.[4] In this framework, policing is considered "low politics." At the same time, cross-border economic activity that takes place outside the parameters of legal markets also lies largely outside the disciplinary parameters of international political economy.[5] This pattern is even evident in the extensive literature on transnational relations and interdependence, which despite emphasizing the proliferation and intensification of cross-border interactions, generally overlooks their clandestine side.[6]

The lack of attention to policing in much of the international relations literature is particularly puzzling given that policing is the "bedrock of sovereignty."[7] As a core component of the state's monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion, policing epitomizes sovereignty in action. "The state's prime 'function' has always been policing territory and people," notes Janice Thomson.[8] This is arguably even more true today. In an era when states are relaxing controls over cross-border economic exchange and military challenges to borders are declining, many states are expanding their efforts to police prohibited cross-border flows. Indeed, in some cases, security agencies, strategies, and technologies initially designed to deter military threats are now being adapted to police the clandestine activities of nonstate transnational actors. In other words, concerns over cross-border law evasions, not military invasions, are rising on the security agendas of many states. In these cases, the border

[2] For example, few articles are devoted to this topic in the leading international relations journals, such as *International Organization*, *International Security*, *World Politics*, and *International Studies Quarterly*. Important exceptions include Janice Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (Summer 1995): 213–233; Ethan Nadelman, "Global Prohibition Regimes," *International Organization* 44 (Fall 1990).

[3] Recent exceptions include Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ethan Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

[4] See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[5] But see H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

[6] See, for example, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[7] Janice Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (Summer 1995): 213–233.

[8] Ibid.

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regulatory apparatus of the state is being revamped, not retired: economic and military barriers may be falling, but police barriers are rising.

Focusing primarily on the United States-Mexico border, I examine one of the most prominent and politically sensitive border policing tasks: controlling illegal immigration. The rapidly expanding U.S. policing campaign on the southwest border contrasts sharply with the rhetoric and practice of U.S.–Mexican economic integration. The trend, it seems, is toward increasingly restrictive controls over unauthorized immigrant labor flows in the context of a general loosening of controls over cross-border economic activity. Even as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) promotes a de-territorialization of the economy, U.S. border control initiatives reinforce state claims to territorial authority. Thus, the apparent paradox of U.S.–Mexico integration is that a barricaded border and a borderless economy are being created simultaneously.

Enhanced border policing, I argue, has less to do with actual deterrence and more to do with managing the image of the border and coping with the deepening contradictions of economic integration. Even as the escalating border control campaign has generated some perverse and counterproductive consequences and has failed to significantly deter illegal immigration, it has been strikingly successful in terms of constructing the appearance of a more secure and orderly border.[9] At the same time, the policy focus on the border has drawn attention away from confronting a long-established and deeply-entrenched cross-border labor market that is an integral (even if clandestine) dimension of U.S.–Mexican interdependence. As the United States and Mexico have grown closer together in recent years, there has been an increasingly sharp tension between the push to open the border and liberalize markets and the push to close the border to immigrant labor. This in turn has further reinforced pressures to enhance border policing.

In the next section I outline the escalating border control campaign and then critically review its multiple consequences. I then point to some of the contradictions and tensions that arise from trying to police the border in an era of economic integration. Finally, I extend the analysis beyond the U.S.–Mexico border case to briefly explore the dynamics along Germany's eastern border—a border that has lost its military function but which is gaining an increasingly important policing function. While both the United States and Germany have intensified their border enforcement efforts, there are striking variations in

[9] For an earlier analysis that points to the significance of the image of border control, see Alejandro Portes, "Of Borders and States: A Skeptical Note on the Legislative Control of Immigration" in Wayne Cornelius and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya, eds., *America's New Immigration Law: Origins, Rationales, and Potential Consequences* (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1983). While not focusing on the border, criminologists have also emphasized the symbolic dimensions of policing. See, for example, Peter Manning, *Police Work* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1977).

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their approaches to immigration control that reflect distinct historical legacies, state capacities, regional contexts, and border image concerns.

The U.S. Border Control Campaign

As domestic pressure to "do something" about the influx of illegal immigrants[10] has intensified, the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.–Mexico border has become the focal point of political attention. Alan Simpson put it rather starkly when he was a Republican senator from Wyoming: "The first duty of a sovereign nation is to control its borders. We do not.... Uncontrolled immigration is one of the greatest threats to the future of this country."[11] Expressing similar alarm, California's Republican Representative Brian Bilbray has exclaimed that "we have travelled all over the world as a nation since 1914, securing the frontiers of other nations, but the greatest power in the world has not chosen to secure its own national territory."[12]

Although border control was a low priority for President Bill Clinton when he first took office (indeed, in early 1993 he recommended reducing the number of Border Patrol agents to save money), he soon became an enthusiastic proponent of stricter enforcement in order keep up with Republican initiatives in Congress. In late July 1993, Clinton held a news conference to announce aggressive new measures against illegal immigration, including the hiring of 600 more Border Patrol agents. While Clinton adopted the idea as his own, the proposal to add agents actually came from an amendment earlier in the month by Republican Representative Duncan Hunter of California. "We will make it tougher for illegal aliens to get into our country," Clinton promised. In announcing the increase, Clinton said, "It's certainly plain to anybody with eyes to see that the Border Patrol is drastically understaffed, breathtakingly understaffed."[13]

The build-up of policing along the southwest border quickly emerged as the centerpiece of the administration's immigration control policy. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—the parent agency of the Border Patrol—has become one of the fastest growing federal agencies. The INS budget has nearly tripled between FY 1993 and FY 1999 (from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion), and much of this growth has been targeted toward beefing up the Border

[10] The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that there are about five million illegal immigrants living permanently in the United States and that this number is growing by about 275,000 per year. Most of these immigrants are concentrated in seven states, with California absorbing 40 percent of the total. An estimated 54 percent of all illegal immigrants are from Mexico. William Branigin, "Illegal Immigrant Population Grows to 5 Million," *Washington Post*, 8 February 1997.

[11] Quoted in Carlos Rico, "Migration and U.S.–Mexican Relations" in Christopher Mitchell, ed., *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 256.

[12] "Border Security," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington DC, 10 March 1995.

[13] Fred Barnes, "No Entry: The Republicans' Immigration War," *New Republic*, 8 November 1993.

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Patrol. In FY 1997, the INS spent $800 million on southwest border enforcement, up from $400 million in FY 1993.[14] And the FY 1998 INS budget reflects a further increase of 9 percent over FY 1997. Between FY 1993 and the end of FY 1997, the size of the Border Patrol along the southwest border grew by 83 percent—from 3,389 agents to 6,213 agents. The deployment of new agents has been matched by an infusion of new equipment, including infrared night-vision scopes, low-light TV cameras, ground sensors, helicopters, and all-terrain vehicles.

Part of what makes the rapid expansion of the INS so remarkable is that it is occurring in an era of government down-sizing. At a time when many other federal agencies are struggling in the face of sharp budget cuts, the INS is struggling to manage its fast-paced growth. One reflection of this expansion is that the positions of border patrol agent and immigration inspector are now listed as two of the top-ten job growth areas in the federal government.[15] Indeed, in the scramble to meet its hiring targets, the INS has established an around-the-clock hotline for perspective Border Patrol applicants. Advertising agencies hired by the INS have even come up with a slogan to try to attract new recruits to the Border Patrol: "A career with borders but no boundaries."[16] Thus, while devolution (less federal spending and more freedom and responsibility for state governments) has become a popular political theme of the 1990s, current trends in immigration control push in the opposite direction. In this case, it seems, reinventing government is more about redeploying rather than reducing government.

The unprecedented build-up of border policing is scheduled to continue at a fast pace at least through the end of the decade. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, which the president signed in late September 1996, authorizes a near doubling of the size of the Border Patrol by the year 2001. The new law also promotes additional measures to secure the border, such as a sharp increase in penalties against immigrant smugglers and the building of a triple-layered fence along fourteen miles south of San Diego. The new fence was initially recommended in a study prepared for the INS by Sandia Laboratories (a national weapons lab). The Sandia study argued that, "The illegal aliens have shown that they will destroy or bypass any single measure placed in their path." The study therefore concluded that, "A three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights will provide the necessary discouragement."[17]

The 1996 immigration control legislation reinforces an INS border enforcement strategy called "prevention through deterrence."[18] Through more fencing,

[14] *Migration News*, November 1997.

[15] Leigh Rivenbark, "Help Wanted," *Federal Times*, 28 July 1997.

[16] Ibid.

[17] *Systematic Analysis of the Southwest Border*, vol. i (Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, January 1993).

[18] *Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond*, U.S. Border Patrol, July 1994.

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surveillance equipment, penalties, and law enforcement personnel, the objective is to inhibit illegal entry rather than having to apprehend entrants once they've crossed the border. Massive injections of law enforcement resources at the most popular points of unauthorized entry are designed to disrupt the human traffic, forcing crossers to attempt entry in more difficult, remote areas and at official ports of entry that the INS argues are easier to regulate. As a result, U.S. Border control strategists hope that many would-be border crossers are inhibited from trying; and those who try fail repeatedly, leading them to eventually give up due to frustration and lack of resources.

Such a strategy was first tested by the Border Patrol in El Paso in September 1993. "Operation Blockade" (later given the more diplomatic name "Operation Hold-the-Line") deployed 450 agents to cover a twenty-mile stretch of the border. As hoped, apprehensions dropped dramatically. The high-profile show of force in El Paso captured the attention of Washington, the media, and leaders in other border states. The political appeal of Operation Hold-the-Line was that the results were both immediate and highly visible. Thus, in 1994 the INS announced a much wider adoption of the "prevention through deterrence" strategy to concentrate on the main corridors of illegal entry along the border. In October 1994, "Operation Gatekeeper" was launched south of San Diego, and "Operation Safeguard" was initiated in Nogales, Arizona. While the first phase of Gatekeeper focused on the fourteen westernmost miles of the border, in October 1996 the INS announced an extension of Gatekeeper to include the sixty-six westernmost miles. Similarly, in January 1997, Operation Hold-the-Line was extended ten miles west into New Mexico. And in late August 1997, the INS announced the launching of "Operation Rio Grande" in east Texas, which will cost about $3.5 million and include setting up floodlights along thirty-one miles of the Rio Grande River.

As part of the border deterrence effort, controls at the official ports of entry have also been significantly tightened. Between FY 1994 and FY 1997, the number of INS port inspectors expanded from 1,117 to 1,865, representing a 67 percent increase. At some crossing points, such as Calexico and San Ysidro in California, the number of inspectors has more than doubled. Of the total number of INS port of entry inspectors in the country, 78 percent are now assigned to the southwest border—an increase from 54 percent in FY 1990. The increase in personnel has been matched by an increase in penalties: those who attempt entry through fraudulent document use are now being prosecuted for repeat violations, and vehicles may also be confiscated.[19]

The military has also played an important support role in the expanding border control campaign. Although prohibited from making arrests, the military assists the INS by operating night scopes, motion sensors, and communications equipment, as well as building and maintaining roads and fences. For example, along the border south of San Diego, army reservists have constructed

[19] *Migration News*, February 1997.

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a ten-foot high steel wall using 180,000 metal sheets originally designed for temporary landing fields during military campaigns such as Desert Storm. Mexicans call it the "iron curtain." Similarly, in Nogales, army engineers in 1994 and 1995 constructed a fifteen-foot tall fence that is nearly five miles long, extending from one end of town to the other. New border fencing is going up elsewhere as well. For example, in January 1996, construction began on a 1.3-mile-long fence in Sunland Park, New Mexico, the first fence of its kind in the state.

Technologies and equipment designed initially for military purposes are increasingly being adapted for border control. Magnetic footfall detectors and infrared body sensors, originally used in Vietnam, are deployed along various parts of the border. Experimental technologies previously off-limits to law enforcement are also being tested. In March 1995, a Border Research and Technology Center was opened in San Diego to facilitate the conversion of defense technologies for border enforcement. The Border Patrol, for example, is evaluating a photo identification system developed by Hughes Aircraft. According to Robert Bach of the INS, "The technology came out of the CIA and the Department of Defense. They used it, and it was made available to the INS." The system, he said, "is a clear example of this administration's initiatives to convert military and intelligence technology to domestic applications." Other devices include an electronic current that stops a fleeing car, a camera that can see into vehicles for hidden passengers, and a computer that checks commuters by voiceprint.[20]

Although the military has traditionally been reluctant to take on law enforcement tasks, the end of the cold war has generated greater enthusiasm for new missions. As one former U.S. Army officer has suggested, "With the military looking for a new job, a more easily accomplished mission for existing forces wold be patrolling the borders. It is, of course, absurd that the most powerful nation on earth cannot prevent a swarming land invasion by unarmed Mexican peasants. The U.S. Army is entirely capable of plugging the holes permanently, and border duty would be excellent military training."[21]

The shooting of a teenage Texas goat-herder by a marine along the border on 20 May 1997 prompted a temporary halt to Defense Department operations along the border. Some politicians, however, have been pushing for much greater military involvement. In June 1997, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to authorize the use of 10,000 soldiers to assist in securing the border against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Ohio Democratic Representative James Traficant, who introduced the legislation, argued that "If the Pentagon can send hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to protect our allies, it should be able to spare about 10,000 military personnel to protect America."[22]

[20] Sandra Dibble, "Star Wars Arrives at the Border: High Tech Developed by the Military, CIA May Aid Enforcement," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 18 March 1995.

[21] Christopher Bassford, "What Role for the Military Now?" *Newsday*, 17 September 1991.

[22] Quoted in Stephen Green, " House Authorizes Sending Up To 10,000 GI's to Border," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 21 June 1997.

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In a Texas poll in November 1997, the majority of respondents said they favored using troops to seal the border.[23] Countering political pressures to further militarize the border, some Clinton administration officials have recommended increasing the size of the Border Patrol to 20,000 agents.[24]

Nothing Fails Like Success/Nothing Succeeds Like Failure

Administration officials have repeatedly praised the results of their border deterrence strategy. In his January 1996 State of the Union address, Clinton highlighted his border enforcement record: "After years and years of neglect, this administration has taken on a strong stand to stiffen protection on our borders." The INS boasts that "The border is harder to cross now than at any time in history."[25] INS Commissioner Doris Meissner told a Senate committee in October 1996 that, "We have done more where border control is concerned in the last two to three years, than I think has been demonstrated over the last two to three decades."[26] According to Meissner, the border strategy is "showing dramatic success."[27] Commenting on the results of Operation Gatekeeper, Johnny Williams, the Border Patrol chief for the San Diego sector, states, "This is probably the single largest accomplishment in the Border Patrol's history."[28] Before Gatekeeper, he says, trying to control illegal immigration looked like "Custer's Last Stand."[29]

An evaluation of such upbeat claims of policy success reveals the peculiar nature of immigration control. Almost every indicator that administration officials point to as a sign of success can also be read as a sign of failure, and almost every indicator that points to failure is either downplayed or interpreted by administration officials as a sign of success. The ambiguity of the measures, combined with the heated political climate over immigration control issues, means that appearances matter enormously.

INS progress reports and press releases are most notable for what they do not say: there is no claim or evidence that overall levels of illegal immigration have actually declined as a result of tighter border controls. Regardless of the hardening of the border, there is little indication that large numbers of would-be crossers are giving up.[30] Most simply keep trying (sometimes being appre-

[23] Thaddeus Herrick, "Poll Finds Most Texans Want Troops on Border," *Houston Chronicle*, 16 November 1997.

[24] David LaGesse, "Border Residents Urge Removal of Military," *Dallas Morning News*, 16 July 1997.

[25] "Operation Gatekeeper: Two Years of Progress," Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington DC: INS, October 1996).

[26] Testimony of Doris Meissner before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, 2 October 1996.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Verne Kopytoff, "In Tijuana, Border Crackdown Hurts," *New York Times*, 28 August 1996.

[29] Author interview with Johnny Williams, 4 March 1997.

[30] See Wayne Cornelius, "Appearances and Realities: Controlling Illegal Immigration in the United States" in Myron Weiner and Tadashi Hanami, eds., *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens? Japanese*

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hended more than once in the same day) until they eventually make it across the line. But while failing to significantly deter, the enforcement strategy has been critical in determining where, how, and how often illegal immigrants cross the border. This is of critical importance in terms of public and media perceptions, the rewards for key actors (law enforcement agencies, elected leaders, smugglers), and for the clandestine border-crossing experience of the immigrants themselves.

Enhanced law enforcement has certainly made the border a much more challenging barrier. Indeed, the border has also become a deadlier barrier: a 1997 report by researchers at the University of Houston found that over the past four years, 1,185 people had drowned, died of exposure or dehydration, or been hit by automobiles while trying to cross the border between official ports of entry.[31] As law enforcement has concentrated on the easiest and most popular border crossing points, the human traffic has been disrupted and displaced. Clandestine crossers have turned to less visible and more remote entry points away from those urban areas targeted by law enforcement. Thus, apprehensions in the El Paso sector remain far below the levels prior to Operation Hold-the-Line but have skyrocketed to the west in New Mexico and Arizona. Similarly, apprehensions in the Imperial Beach sector south of San Diego (traditionally the single most important gateway for illegal entry) have declined sharply since Gatekeeper began, but arrests have jumped dramatically in the more remote parts of east San Diego county.

By disrupting the traditional routes and methods of clandestine entry, law enforcement has transformed the once relatively simple illegal act of crossing the border into a more complex system of illegal practices. Past forms of unauthorized entry primarily involved either self-smuggling or limited use of a local smuggler (coyote). Now the use of a smuggler has become standard practice. The increased use of smugglers, a 1997 report of the Binational Study on Migration concluded, "helps to explain why most migrants attempting unauthorized entry succeed despite significantly more U.S. Border Patrol agents and technology on the border.[32] Not surprisingly, as the demand for smuggling services and the risks of crossing the border have gone up, so too has the price of being smuggled. Smuggling fees have jumped from $250 to $300 to $500 or more.[33]

Border control officials view the increase in smuggling prices as a key sign that the policy is working. Yet higher prices are not necessarily a significant deterrent, given that smuggling fees are often covered by relatives in the United

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and U.S. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Policies (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

[31] Sam Howe Verhovek, " 'Silent Deaths' Climbing Steadily as Migrants Cross Mexican Border," *New York Times*, 24 August 1997.

[32] See *Binational Study: Migration Between Mexico and the United States* (Washington DC: Binational Study on Migration, 1997), 28.

[33] *Migration News*, February 1997.

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States rather than by the immigrants themselves.[34] The main impact of higher smuggling fees, it seems, is to enrich increasingly sophisticated and well-organized binational smuggling groups. As Miguel Vallina, the assistant chief of the Border Patrol in San Diego notes, "The more difficult the crossing the better the business for the smugglers."[35] Meissner explained in January 1996 that "[A]s we improve our enforcement, we increase the smuggling of aliens that occurs, because it is harder to cross and so therefore people turn more and more to smugglers."[36] But even as Meissner recognizes the fact that the Border Patrol creates business for smugglers, she also says that we are "moving as aggressively as we can . . . so that we can put them [the smugglers] out of business."[37] Thus, on the one hand, more enforcement fuels more smuggling; on the other hand, more enforcement will also presumably end smuggling.

The problem is that even while law enforcement puts some smugglers out of business, this simply creates business for competing smugglers. What is one smuggler's loss is another's gain. Smugglers are merely service providers (even if often abusive ones), and as long as there is a strong demand for their services, smuggling will persist. The high profits of the business (inflated by law enforcement pressure) guarantee that there will be smugglers willing to accept the occupational risks. Smugglers have also proved to be highly adaptable to law enforcement pressure. As one senior INS official has acknowledged, "Alien smugglers have developed a sophisticated infrastructure to successfully counteract U.S. Border Patrol operations along the Southwest Border."[38] The freelance smugglers who once dominated the business are increasingly being replaced by better organized and more skilled smuggling groups.[39] The sophistication of the smugglers, one federal prosecutor claims, has "improved dramatically."[40] Interestingly, these law enforcement-induced changes in the business of smuggling, claims one senior Border Patrol official, should be interpreted as a sign that the control strategy is working.[41]

Meanwhile, the growth of organized smuggling has provided a rationale for even tougher laws and tougher enforcement. The number of alien smuggling

[34] Philip Martin, "The Mexican Crisis and Mexico–U.S. Migration" (unpublished paper, University of California at Davis, 16 September 1996).

[35] Sebastian Rotella, "Tough Border Policies a Boon for Smugglers," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 February 1995.

[36] News Conference with Janet Reno and Doris Meissner, Washington DC, 12 January 1996.

[37] Hearings of the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 8 May 1996.

[38] Testimony of George Regan, acting associate commissioner of enforcement, Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the Subcommittee on Immigration Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 23 April 1997.

[39] Author interview with Johnny Williams, San Diego sector chief of the Border Patrol, 4 March 1997.

[40] Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, 1 April 1997.

[41] Author interview with Michael C. Nicley, assistant regional director of the U.S. Border Patrol, Laguna Niguel, CA, 27 March 1997.

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cases prosecuted in San Diego, for example, increased from 33 in 1993 to 233 in 1996, and is projected to reach approximately 400 in 1997.[42] Sharp increases in prosecutions are also evident elsewhere across the border. Smugglers are now being sentenced to years rather than months in prison. Nevertheless, there has been no shortage of smugglers. As one senior official from the Border Patrol's antismuggling unit put it, the smugglers "just get paid more for taking more risks."[43] Consequently, even though arresting more smugglers provides a body count for officials eager to show progress in controlling the border, it does not necessarily curb smuggling. At the same time, as the risks and penalties for smuggling rise, so does the smuggler's willingness to take more extreme measures to evade law enforcement. This partly explains the increased number of high speed chases and accidents that have resulted when smugglers try to evade highway checkpoints near the border.

A far less discussed and less measurable unintended by-product of the border enforcement offensive may be more corruption. In 1994, the *New York Times* reported that, "No agency of the government is more vulnerable to corruption than the INS, where front-line workers, paid little more than the minimum wage, give out green cards and other coveted documents that are worth thousands on the black market. Year after year, dozens of employees are arrested for taking bribes or related crimes. Yet even when corruption cases repeatedly expose glaring weaknesses in the system, the agency usually neglects to correct them."[44] Although obviously difficult to quantify, current trends along the border may reinforce rather than remedy the corruption problem. Michael Bromwich, the inspector general of the Department of Justice, has expressed serious concern as a result of the sudden build up of border law enforcement: ". . . there are many line employees who are untested and supervisors who have little experience providing leadership and guidance to employees in this difficult environment. Experience in other contexts indicates that massive law enforcement hirings may be accompanied by increased police corruption because of the greater susceptibility of new recruits to temptation or because corners may be cut in screening and training the new hires." He notes that the number of INS personnel along parts of the border has doubled since 1993. Fraud and corruption allegations involving INS employees, he says, represent the single largest component of the caseload of the Office of Inspector General.[45]

Further exacerbating the corruption problem is that as border controls increase, the incentive to offer bribes and/or buy entry documents from those

[42] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of California, *Annual Report 1996*.

[43] Author interview, San Diego, CA, 8 April 1997.

[44] Joel Brinkley, "INS Appears Adrift in Sea of Mismanagement, Low Morale; Staff Cites Unwieldy Workload, Lack of Leadership," *Dallas Morning News*, 11 September 1994.

[45] Statement of Michael R. Bromwick, inspector general of the Department of Justice, before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 14 May 1997.

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doing the controlling also increases. And as smuggling groups have become more sophisticated, organized, and profitable (due to the higher demand and cost for their services and the heightened risks involved in providing these services), the capacity and means to corrupt have also grown. Thus, bribing corrupt officials is in a sense the equivalent of paying an informal tax or entry fee—and the incentives to both pay and collect the fee increase as traditional methods of entry become more difficult and risky. Indeed, partly in response to the potential for increased corruption, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California established a Border Corruption Task Force in 1995.[46] While some officials point to the growing number of corruption cases as a sign of greater law enforcement resolve in confronting corruption, the increase in cases may also partly reflect an increase in corruption.

Another important consequence of the tightening of border controls is a change in the frequency of clandestine entry. The traditional pattern is that most Mexicans who cross the border illegally do not stay in the United States but rather go back and forth almost as a form of cross-border commuting. The increased risk and cost of crossing the border, however, has also increased the incentive for many illegal immigrants to extend their stay and perhaps even remain permanently. Put differently, as the commute has become more difficult and costly, the incentive to relocate closer to the workplace has increased. This is confirmed in a number of studies. For example, a study of Operation Hold-the-Line by Frank Bean and his colleagues found that many Mexicans who cross the border illegally stay on the U.S. side for longer periods in the El Paso area because of the increased difficulty of entry.[47]

In terms of reducing the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States, this outcome is an indicator of not only policy failure but of a counterproductive policy. Yet at the same time, this outcome contributes to the policy goal of reducing the number of illegal border crossings. Thus, when a 1997 Urban Institute study found that illegal immigrants in California were remaining in the state for longer periods of time because of tighter border controls, the INS responded that, "This is another sign that our efforts to control the border are working."[48]

Away from the border, meanwhile, there has been no shortage of illegal immigrant labor. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform noted in its staff report on Gatekeeper, "By one measure, Operation Gatekeeper appears to have had little effect—the availability of workers in industries that are dependent on illegal alien labor."[49] Indeed, in some industries, such reliance has

[46] Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, 28 February 1997.

[47] Frank Bean et al., "Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States-Mexican Border: The Effects of Operation Hold The Line on El Paso/Juarez" (Austin: Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, July 1994).

[48] "Tight Borders Keep Immigrants In, Study Says," *New York Times*, 12 October 1997.

[49] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Staff Report on Border Law Enforcement and Removal Initiatives in San Diego, CA* (Washington DC: November 1995), 7.

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actually increased as border controls have tightened. For example, the Urban Institute has calculated that the percentage of workers in California's agricultural industry that are illegal immigrants has gone from under 10 percent in 1990 to as high as 40 percent in 1997.[50]

According to The President's 1994 Report on Immigration, "Everyone agrees that the primary incentive for illegal immigration is employment. Workplace enforcement of labor standards and employer sanctions are the instruments for reducing that incentive. . . ."[51] Nevertheless, only about 2 percent of the FY 1996 INS budget was devoted to employer sanctions enforcement.[52] There are only about 1,700 INS investigators assigned to cover the interior of the country, and less than a fifth of their time is devoted to worksite enforcement.[53] While the Clinton administration has hired hundreds of new inspectors and claims that worksite enforcement is a priority, the trend for most of the decade has actually been toward a relaxation of workplace monitoring. For example, there were about 6,000 INS investigations of employers for immigration violations in FY 1995, a drop from almost 15,000 in FY 1989.[54] Nation-wide, worksite enforcement efforts in 1996 led to only fifty completed criminal cases, fifteen prosecutions, and twenty-four convictions.[55] In the first six months of FY 1997, the INS imposed only $3.8 million in fines against employers—compared with $13.2 million in fines for all of FY 1996.[56] Moreover, the INS generally settles cases for less than half the amount of the initial fine. Even as the number of illegal immigrants arrested in workplace raids has doubled since 1989, fewer companies are being fined under the employer sanctions law.

Among advanced industrialized countries, the United States has the toughest penalties for immigrant smuggling and related activities, yet it ranks among the lowest in terms of sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants.[57] Employer sanctions, created for the first time by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, are notoriously weak, poorly designed, and minimally enforced. Since employers are not required to verify the authenticity of documents, they risk little by hiring illegal immigrants—so long as they can present some form of documentation, which, not surprisingly, has spurred a booming business in phony documents. According to Richard Rogers, head of the INS in Los Angeles, a packet with a Social Security card and a green card can be

[50] Ibid.

[51] *Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President's Report on Immigration* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO] 1994), 42.

[52] *Migration News*, November 1996.

[53] William Branigin, "Reaping Abuse for What They Sew: Sweatshops Once Again Commonplace in U.S. Garment Industry," *Washington Post*, 16 February 1997.

[54] *Migration News*, April 1996.

[55] Testimony of George Regan, acting associate commissioner of enforcement, Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the Subcommittee on Immigration Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 23 April 1997.

[56] *Migration News*, September 1997.

[57] *Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin*, no. 12, September 1996.

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bought "for about $50 or $75, one sufficient for an employer to use as verification."[58]

The lack of attention to the workplace is a striking example of the enormous gap between expert opinion and policy practice. For example, reinforcing a widely shared view among immigration scholars, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded in a September 1994 report, "Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration."[59] Nevertheless, the most recent immigration control legislation passed by Congress in 1996 reaffirms the policy focus on the border while neglecting workplace controls. For example, although an earlier version of the proposed legislation included an increase in the number of Labor Department inspectors to enforce wage-and-hour laws and an increase in the penalties for employers who repeatedly hire illegal immigrant workers, these provisions were deleted in the final bill.[60]

The lack of political consensus in Congress on workplace controls contrasts sharply with the strong bipartisan support for more border controls. Thus, the border is conveniently targeted as both the source of the problem and as the most appropriate site of the policing solution. The border campaign is carefully scrutinized in congressional hearings, but these evaluations tend to be narrowly focused on operational concerns—equipment and technology needs, agency coordination, hiring levels, and strategy implementation. The unquestioned assumption seems to be that the obstacle to achieving deterrence is technical rather than any fundamental flaw in the focus and nature of the control strategy itself.

Judged purely on its actual deterrent effect, the enormous political popularity of the border control campaign seems rather puzzling. After all, while casual unauthorized crossings by local border residents have certainly been reduced as a result of enhanced controls, there is little evidence that determined long-distance border crossers in search of work in the United States are being seriously discouraged by the U.S. show of force along the border. A failing deterrence strategy, however, can still succeed politically. In this case, the border appears more orderly because much greater control has in fact been imposed at the major urban crossing points that are most publicly visible. Unauthorized crossings are much less visible because they are more dispersed, more remote, and more hidden. In just a few years, a powerful image of control has been projected through a high-profile deployment of law enforcement resources and personnel along what were once highly-contested sections of the border. "[S]ealing the border is an impossible mission," one researcher from the Uni-

[58] Quoted in Marcus Stern, "Low-Skill Labor Markets Full of Illegal Workers, But Employers are Seldom Fined," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 2 November 1997.

[59] Quoted in Marcus Stern, "Legislators Put Focus on Fences, Not Jobs," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 3 November 1997.

[60] Cassandra Burrell, "House Passes Bill to Crack Down on Illegal Immigration," *Associated Press*, 25 September 1996.

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versity of Texas at El Paso has noted. "Chief Reyes [the El Paso sector Border Patrol chief who launched Operation Hold-the-Line] has compromised by making the problem invisible. In that sense, he's been successful."[61] Indeed, Reyes was so successful that he was elected in November 1996 as a local representative to Congress.

Enhanced border policing has generated substantial rewards for both law makers and law enforcers. For the INS, the border campaign has brought with it enormous organizational expansion and political commitment to a long-neglected agency. For elected leaders, the campaign has won votes and provided a politically costless method of signaling that they are tough on illegal immigration. For Democrats in particular, beefing up border controls has helped inoculate them against Republican attacks that they are soft on illegals. For example, in the 1996 electoral race President Clinton battled Republicans in a war of images over the border and illegal immigration. In June 1996, a Republican National Committee television ad highlighted a border entry point marked "Mexico" and then showed what were presumably illegal immigrants running into the country under the glare of spotlights. The advertisement then declared that "under President Clinton, spending on illegals has gone up, while wages for the typical worker have gone down." The Democratic National Committee quickly went on the offensive with its own ad, which showed what were presumably illegal immigrants being hand-cuffed. The ad boasted that Clinton has significantly boosted the size of the Border Patrol, and responded to scenes from the Republican ad with the word "WRONG" stamped in red letters.[62] Both ads were run most often in California, where public anxiety over illegal immigration has been the highest. In the 1996 election, Clinton not only took California but also the conservative stronghold of Orange County.

The new image of order on the border is powerfully captured by pre- and post-Gatekeeper photographs taken of the same stretch of the border, displayed at the front entrance of the public affairs office at the Border Patrol sector headquarters south of San Diego. The picture of the border taken before Gatekeeper was launched shows a mangled chain-link fence and crowds of people milling about on both sides, seemingly unaware that the border even exists. The Border Patrol is nowhere in sight. The image is of a chaotic border that is defied, defeated, and undefended. The picture taken of the same area after Gatekeeper was initiated, however, shows a sturdy steel wall fence, backed up by powerful stadium lights and four-wheel drive Border Patrol vehicles alertly monitoring the line. There are no groups of people milling about on either side of the fence. The image is of an orderly border that deters and defends against unauthorized crossings. These kinds of photographs provide a visual representation of policy success. At a 1995 congressional hearing on border security,

[61] Quoted in Carlos Hamman, "Border Chief to Retire after Years of Holding the Line; Reyes May Consider Bid for Congressional Seat," *Dallas Morning News*, 22 October 1995.

[62] Dick Kirschten, "Crossing the Line," *National Journal*, 3 August 1996.

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Meissner turned to such before and after Gatekeeper pictures to make her case: "You can just see from the picture . . . those are crowds up on the top picture," she told Texas Republican Representative Lamar Smith. "The one below, you just don't have the kind of massing that we once had."[63]

Two of the Border Patrol's public affairs videos provide a similar contrast between order and chaos. The first video, titled "Border Under Siege," was made in 1992. The narrator alarmingly describes the border as "less than a boundary than a backdoor." The second video, titled "Challenge on the Border," was produced in 1996, and projects an entirely different message and image. While the first video depicts the border as being overwhelmed by hordes of clandestine crossers, the second video is largely self-congratulatory. The Border Patrol is applauded for finally securing the border so that it "is no longer an open backdoor."

The border, however, has many backdoors. Closing some of them means that the clandestine population flow has been moved, not removed. In the case of Gatekeeper, "The game is to try and focus as much attention as possible on one small piece of real estate," explains T. J. Bonner, the president of the National Border Patrol Council. "You then hope everyone ignores the fact that we're being totally overrun in the rest of the sector. . . ." The truth, Bonner says, is that "it's bursting out all over—Arizona, New Mexico, parts of Texas."[64]

From the political perspective of U.S. border control strategists, however, how the media and the public see the border is more critical than the actual deterrent effect of the border. Border policing has always been as much about image as reality. Indeed, the very premise of the current campaign to "regain control of the border" perpetuates the myth that the border was ever actually controlled. As William Langewiesche observes, "If the border is a myth, it is a useful one. The Border Patrol's real function is to play along."[65] Border management is therefore a game of image management.[66] How the game shapes the perceptions of the spectators (the media, local residents in border areas, the broader public) has enormous political importance—regardless of whether or not the opposing players (the clandestine border crossers) are actually deterred.

Tensions and Contradictions between Economic and Law Enforcement Policies

The game of image management along the border, however, is becoming more difficult for the border enforcers to play—even as they are under intense do-

[63] "Border Security," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 10 March 1995.

[64] Michael Gransberry, "INS Investigates Border Patrol Arrest Data," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 July 1996.

[65] William Langewiesche, *Cutting for Sign* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 44.

[66] This is an example of what Goffman calls the "art of impression management." See Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1973).

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mestic political pressure to play better and harder. The awkward problem facing U.S. officials is that at the same time as there is a powerful political imperative to control the border, this task is becoming evermore complicated in the context of Mexico's deepening market reforms and the broader process of U.S.–Mexican economic integration.

There is a growing tension, for example, between the policy of facilitating increased cross-border travel and enforcing immigration controls. The President's 1994 Report on Immigration observes that, "The openness of the world economy requires making commercial travel and tourism easier and friendlier. The U.S. economy clearly benefits from playing an energetic role in encouraging travel."[67] Noticeably down-played is the fact that some 40–50 percent of all illegal immigrants in the United States entered the country legally (as tourists or students, for example) and then overstayed their visas. The debate over controlling illegal immigration has so far focused mostly on the border, glossing over the significant problem of visa overstays. Roughly 150,000 people settle illegally in the United States each year after entering the country legally. This neglect of visa overstays is itself a revealing indicator of how the symbolic importance of border control trumps the stated policy goal of reducing the size of the illegal immigrant population. At the same time as Congress has pushed for an unprecedented increase in the size of the Border Patrol, it has failed to appropriate funds for even a modest increase in the number of INS investigators to track down visa overstayers.[68]

The tension between facilitation and enforcement is played out on a daily basis at the ports of entry along the southwest border. As the President's 1994 Report on Immigration frankly acknowledges, "efforts to facilitate travel across the U.S.–Mexico border as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement may conflict with the need to establish closer controls on cross-border traffic to enforce immigration laws."[69] Officials have an increasingly frustrating time reconciling two objectives: to facilitate the growing volume of legitimate border crossings at the ports of entry, but also to control the growing volume of illegitimate crossing attempts that result from stepped up border enforcement between the ports of entry.

This is illustrated at the port of entry at San Ysidro south of San Diego, by far the busiest land border crossing point in the world. A staff report of the U.S. Commission for Immigration Reform observes that, "Inspectors are frustrated that they must often choose between a thorough inspection which slows traffic or an expedited one that keeps traffic moving."[70] Operation Gatekeeper

[67] *Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President's Report on Immigration* (Washington DC: GPO, 1994), 26.

[68] William Branigin, "Illegal Immigrant Population Grows to 5 Million," *Washington Post*, 8 February 1997.

[69] *Accepting the Immigration Challenge*, 42.

[70] *U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Staff Report on Border Law Enforcement and Removal Initiatives in San Diego, CA* (Washington DC: November 1995), 14.

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has only added to the frustration. For example, the INS says that the initiation of Gatekeeper sparked a 40 percent rise in the use of fraudulent documents to cross the border at ports of entry. In January 1996, INS inspectors were caught off guard by the sudden influx of people attempting to enter through fraudulent document use. The following January, the INS significantly enhanced the number of inspectors in anticipation of a similar postholiday rush.

Tightening controls at the ports of entry, however, risks creating delays for the growing volume of legitimate border crossers. Some forty million people and fifteen million cars a year now enter the United States through the ports of entry south of San Diego. Overall, some 230 million people and 82 million cars enter the United States from Mexico every year.[71] Between 1984 and 1996, the number of people crossing the southwest border increased by 59 percent. As the number of crossings continue to increase as a result of deepening cross-border ties, so too do the pressures on law enforcement. The policy response has been a mixture of tougher penalties for fraudulent document use, a sharp increase in the number of port inspectors, and development of more efficient and technologically sophisticated traffic management procedures.

Innovations in border control techniques, however, do little to address the larger economic transformations that are helping to fuel continuing high levels of illegal immigration. For example, sweeping market reforms in Mexico are, at least in the short and medium term, adding to the incentives for Mexican workers to seek employment in the United States. In the most general sense, reducing the role of the state in the economy reduces the state's ability to withstand market forces—and the strong demand for cheap immigrant labor in the United States is certainly no exception. As Robert Bach explained before he became a senior INS official and a key proponent of the administration's border enforcement effort, "Increased market integration means the sending country's loss of control over its own labor supply. Although political tensions may increase . . . the demand for labor inside the United States will continue to dominate attempts to regulate the flow of immigrant workers."[72]

NAFTA only deepens and extends this process. Politicians on both sides of the border promised that the trade agreement would help curb immigration, yet as Douglas Massey and Kristin Espinosa explain, "The provisions of NAFTA . . . help to bring about the social and economic transformations that generate migrants. The integration of the North American market will also create new links of transportation, telecommunication, and interpersonal acquaintance, connections that are necessary for the efficient movement of goods, information, and capital, but which also encourage and promote the movement

[71] *Migration News*, February 1997.

[72] Robert L. Bach, "Hemispheric Migration in the 1990s" in Johnathan Hartlyn et al., eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 274.

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of people—students, business executives, tourists, and, ultimately, undocumented workers."[73]

Even many of the immigration experts who argue that NAFTA will eventually help to curb illegal immigration note that it fuels such immigration in the short and medium term. A number of studies suggest that the combination of NAFTA and the side-effects of Mexico's own domestic market reforms will add as much as several hundred thousand to the number of Mexicans who migrate to the United States annually though at least the end of the century.[74] This will, of course, further enhance the cross-border social networks that provide a critical base and bridge for later immigration flows. Thus, even the hoped-for long-term reduction of illegal immigration is not at all assured.

Market-based reforms in Mexico's agricultural sector have become a particularly important stimulus for illegal immigration.[75] For example, in a widely cited study, Raul Hinojosa Ojeda and Sherman Robinson have projected that 600,000 displaced Mexican farmers will likely migrate illegally to the United States over a six-year period.[76] The incentive to migrate is further reinforced by massive reductions in state assistance in rural areas.[77] Since the late 1980s, the Mexican government has been cutting back electricity, fertilizer, water, and credit subsidies to peasant farmers. Price supports for many crops have been slashed. In addition, prohibitions on the sale of communal farm lands (about 70 percent of Mexico's crop land and one-half of its irrigated land) have been eliminated. Although the government initiated an income subsidy program in late 1993 for producers of corn and other basic crops, it has been a poor substitute for the kind of public investment (affordable credit, crop insurance, infrastructural improvements such as irrigation and drainage) needed to modernize Mexican agriculture and make small-scale farming truly viable.[78]

Market-based reforms in the agricultural sector are leading to the displacement of millions of peasant farmers. Luis Tellez, the former undersecretary for planning in Mexico's Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, has estimated that one million peasants are likely to leave the land every year, and that as much as fifteen million peasants will leave agriculture in the next decade

[73] Douglas S. Massey and Kristin E. Espinosa, "What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration?—A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (January 1997): 991–2.

[74] Some of these studies are reviewed in Philip L. Martin, *Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993).

[75] Cited in Philip L. Martin, "Mexican–U.S. Migration: Policies and Economic Impacts," *Challenge*, March 1995.

[76] Cited in Philip L. Martin, "Do Mexican Agricultural Policies Stimulate Migration?" in Frank D. Bean, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Bryan Roberts, and Sidney Weintraub, eds., *At the Crossroads: Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 89.

[77] See Santiago Levy and Sweder van Wijnbergen, "Transition Problems in Economic Reform: Agriculture in the Mexico–U.S. Free Trade Agreement," Policy Research Working Papers (Washington DC: The World Bank, August 1992).

[78] See Manuel Pastor and Carol Wise, "State Policy, Distribution and Neoliberal Reform in Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 29 (May 1997): 419–456.

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or two.[79] Crossing the border in search of work will no doubt be the most logical option for many. As Philip Martin argues, "With projections that 20 to 50 percent of Mexico's farmers could leave the land over the next decade, the stage is set for a repeat of a great migration similar to what the United States experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, when structural changes in U.S. agriculture and cotton harvest mechanization brought sharecroppers from Mississippi to Chicago. Mexico is on the verge of a similar agricultural revolution, but potential destination cities for ex-farmers include Los Angeles and Houston."[80]

Meanwhile, the collapse of the peso in December 1994, which plunged Mexico into a deep economic crisis, has only added to the exit incentive. The peso devaluation widened the U.S.–Mexico wage gap from 8–1 to 12–1. In 1995, the Mexican economy shrank by 6 percent and about 10 percent of formal sector jobs were lost, reflecting the most severe recession in over half a century. The Mexican private sector responded to the crisis by cutting jobs and lowering wages. While the economy has been recovering, this has not been followed by a significant improvement in either wages or employment. At the same time, the U.S. economy continues to be a powerful magnet for low-skilled migrant labor. It seems that the "giant sucking sound" that Ross Perot warned would be produced by NAFTA is in fact the pull of the U.S. job market. Thus, regardless of stepped up U.S. border enforcement, economic trends suggest that El Norte will continue to be a favored destination for many Mexican workers.

Even if left conveniently unmentioned in the official policy debate, illegal immigration has become an increasingly important dimension of U.S.–Mexican interdependence. Mexico depends on exporting part of its unemployment problem, which in turn generates as much as $4 billion in remittances; and U.S. employers depend on the cheap labor provided by illegal Mexican workers. Far from being reversed, this mutual dependence is only being reinforced by the deepening process of economic integration. This is the less celebrated, though no less important, clandestine side of U.S.–Mexico integration. Building bigger and better border barriers only helps to deny this reality.

Extending the Analysis: Europe's Rio Grande?

Analytical leverage may be gained by comparing the changing dynamics along the U.S.–Mexico border to recent trends along other fault lines between developed and less developed countries. Germany's eastern border provides a particularly interesting comparison. Even as the Berlin Wall and the militarized border between West and East Germany have disappeared, the eastern border of a unified Germany is being rapidly built up to deter illegal immigration and other prohibited cross-border flows. Thus, while the military function of the border has disappeared, its policing function has gained new symbolic meaning

[79] Martin, "Mexican–U.S. Migration."
[80] Martin, *Trade and Migration*, 6.

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and political importance.[81] Despite the celebration over the fall of the Iron Curtain, some German law enforcement officials nostalgically lament its disappearance: "The wall that the GDR [German Democratic Republic] erected to 'protect' socialism not only prevented GDR citizens from leaving their country, but also had the function of a bulwark for the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany, since threats to the internal security of the FRG, posed by people coming over the border without passport checks, could be ruled out."[82]

The Oder-Neisse Rivers, which separate Germany and Poland, has been called "the Rio Grande of Europe." Heinrich Vogel of the Cologne-based Institute for East European and International Studies notes that, "there are strong economic and social parallels" between the U.S.–Mexico and German-Polish relationships.[83] For example, the wage gap between Germany and Poland rivals the wage gap between the United States and Mexico. Similar to the U.S.–Mexico border, border crossings between Germany and Poland have increased significantly in recent years. 147 million people crossed the German-Polish border in 1995—a 250 percent increase over 1991.[84] The number of vehicles crossing the border increased from approximately 7.2 million in 1990 to 60 million in 1994.

Along with expanding cross-border economic exchange between Poland and Germany, there has been an increase in illegal immigration and other forms of clandestine border activity. Although impossible to calculate with precision, one estimate suggests that around 100,000 people illegally enter Germany every year, mostly from the East.[85] The primary policing concern on the border is not unauthorized crossings by Poles (Poles do not require visas) but rather the use of Poland as a favorite entry point into Germany for illegal immigrants from other countries, such as Romania. Many illegal crossers attempt to blend in with the growing number of people legally crossing from Poland. As in the U.S.–Mexico case, increased cross-border traffic has strained the capacity of law enforcement to separate legal from illegal crossings.

The crumbling of authoritarian systems, the shocks of market-based economic restructuring, improved transportation and communications links to the West, and the lure of better paying jobs have all provided powerful incentives for many East Europeans to move illegally to Germany or to other European Union (EU) countries via Germany. Efforts to cross the German border illegally are also partly a response to the significant tightening of Germany's asy-

[81] Albrecht Funk, "Control Myths: The Eastern Border of the Federal Republic of Germany Before and After 1989" (paper prepared for the ECPR workshop, "Police and Immigration towards a Europe of Internal Security," Madrid, 18–22 April 1994).

[82] Fritz Ulrich Maier, quoted in Funk, "Control Myths," 1.

[83] Tyler Marshall, "Regional Outlook; Europe's New Wall: The Rich and the Poor," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 September 1991.

[84] Peter Gumbel, "European Unity Sits and Waits on the Oder," *Wall Street Journal*, 10 May 1995.

[85] Cited in *Migration News*, September 1995.

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lum laws in May 1993. No longer able to apply for asylum at border crossings, many foreigners have instead opted to enter Germany as illegal immigrants.[86]

In response, Germany has quickly built up its border policing presence, not only at land borders but at air and seaports as well. For example, at the Frankfurt airport, there has been more than a tripling of enforcement personnel since the early 1990s. The Bundesgrenzschutz (or Federal Border Police) has been restructured and expanded. Its budget more than doubled between 1990 and 1995.[87] The single most important targeted area is the German-Polish border. While there were only about 400 border guards on the German-Polish border in 1990, the number increased to some 3,300 by mid-1996. About 80 percent of the border guards along Germany's eastern border are from the former GDR. It is perhaps ironic that while their old mission was to keep people from the East in, their post-cold war mission is to keep them out.

Following the pattern on the U.S.–Mexico border, tighter German border controls are forcing more clandestine crossers to hire smugglers. The business of human smuggling is booming, partly thanks to increased law enforcement. As one German border official candidly remarked, "We create the business for the smuggler. We remove 100 aliens, and the smugglers bring 100 back in."[88] Between 1992 and 1993, there was nearly a 250 percent increase in the number of people arrested for alien smuggling.[89] According to the German border police, small-scale smuggling is increasingly being replaced by more organized international smuggling groups. And this, as in the U.S. case, is providing a further rationale to define illegal immigration as an organized crime problem. But also following the U.S. experience, more extensive and sophisticated border policing has so far failed to significantly reduce the number of people illegally attempting to cross the border.[90]

There are, however, crucial differences between the German and U.S. border policing efforts that reflect distinct historical legacies, state capacities, regional contexts, and border image concerns. While Germany's deployment of police to the eastern border parallels the expansion of the U.S. Border Patrol on the southwest border, the stadium lights and steel fencing favored by the United States are noticeably missing. The combined legacy of the country's authoritarian past and recent memories of the Berlin Wall inhibit the use of more high-profile policing and surveillance methods. In particular, German officials are wary of creating the image of building an "electronic Iron Curtain," a concern that does not similarly constrain U.S. officials, who actually emphasize the high-tech character of their border strategy. For similar reasons, the German

[86] Funk, "Control Myths," 13.

[87] "Massive German Border Patrol Increase Cuts Illegal Immigration," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 29 August 1995.

[88] Author interview, Eissenhuttenstadt, Germany, 24 June 1996.

[89] Report on Illegal Entry, Grenzschutsdirektion, Koblenz, Germany, nd.

[90] Peter Cullen, "Crime and Policing in Germany in the 1990s" (draft discussion paper, University of Edinburgh, 1996), 21.

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military does not play the same border support role that the U.S. military does. As one senior German law enforcement official put it, "Some of the border control methods used by the United States are inconceivable here."[91]

Historical sensitivities also mean that German officials are careful to explain and justify the tightening of the eastern border not simply as a German initiative but rather as part of a broader European policy on common external border controls. Under the Schengen Accord, internal border checks between signatory countries are dismantled while external controls are built up as a compensatory measure. In other words, the tightening of German territorial controls is embedded in a larger European framework that dampens the appearance of a nationalist reassertion of German territorial sovereignty. In immigration matters in general, such as asylum policy, German leaders have rationalized their increasingly restrictive controls as necessary measures to conform to wider European standards.[92] External border enforcement in particular is promoted and legitimized as performing a European function rather than simply serving German national interest. In the U.S. case, in contrast, it is precisely the image of defending and reasserting national sovereignty that officials hope to convey on the southwest border.

The German-Polish border is also more ambiguous than the U.S.–Mexico border, because Poland is expected to join the EU. The carrot of future entry into the EU helps assure Polish cooperation in stemming the trafficking of people through Polish territory. As agreed to in a treaty that took effect in March of 1993, Poland now takes back those who try to enter Germany illegally, while Germany provides funds as compensation. Germany also provides funds for Poland to improve the policing of its own borders. For example, Germany allocated $80 million to Poland in 1994 for border control purposes. Thus, the German and broader EU strategy is to use Poland and other central European countries as a kind of buffer zone. Poland's entry into the EU would open the German-Polish border and formally extend the EU's external border to Poland's eastern frontier. While this scenario is years away, the United States and Mexico are not even contemplating such a move.

Also in sharp contrast to the United States, it is important to emphasize that Germany has much more extensive internal controls, including the kind of workplace regulations that would meet stiff resistance by U.S. employers long accustomed to minimal state intervention. German penalties are both more common and more severe. For example, employer fines in Germany include the profits earned by employing illegal workers. German authorities also rely on a mandatory resident registration system, as well as national identity cards, which are broadly viewed in the United States as an unacceptable threat to civil liberties. Germany is also attempting to integrate its various bureaucratic surveillance systems (education, welfare, labor, criminal justice) into a central for-

[91] Author interview, Wiesbaden, Germany, 1 July 1996.
[92] Funk, "Control Myths," 16.

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eigner registry to monitor and check more effectively the residency status of all foreigners.[93]

Despite these extensive controls, growing numbers of illegal immigrants are employed throughout the German economy, such as in the construction and service industries. However, the job magnet is certainly weaker in comparison to the U.S. case, and this is no doubt significantly due to the more regulated nature of the German workplace and of the broader society. In contrast, U.S. enforcement attention is focused almost exclusively on the border itself, while internal controls remain at token levels. Thus, the German border is in a sense thicker (extending into German society), while the U.S. border is noticeably thinner and certainly higher, in the form of fencing, floodlights, and so on.

Conclusion: The Debordering and Rebordering of the State

The changing border dynamics discussed here suggest that the role of territorial controls may be shifting rather than simply declining in the post-cold war era of economic integration. Borders provide a living laboratory for tracing how states are reinventing themselves in a transformed economic and security environment. Despite the celebratory rhetoric about the emergence of a borderless world, a number of critical territorial divides are being politically reinforced, particularly those between developed and developing regions. The policy concern is less about deterring the military incursions of neighboring states or restricting cross-border commercial flows, and more about policing the clandestine territorial crossings of nonstate transnational actors, especially illegal immigrants. Thus, while many states are embracing free market initiatives that de-territorialize their economies, they are also attempting to reassert their territorial authority over "undesirable" populations flows. As Saskia Sassen notes, despite the relaxation of barriers to the flow of goods, information, and capital, when it comes to regulating the movement of people, "the national state claims its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders."[94] And as suggested here, the economic push to open borders and the law enforcement push to close borders generates its own tensions and contradictions that further reinforce the trend toward enhanced border policing.

Controlling illegal immigration is certainly not a new concern, but in many countries it has quickly risen from the status of low to high politics. In an increasingly restrictionist political climate, state leaders are scrambling to create an appearance of controlling their borders against unauthorized entrants. As shown in the U.S. case, intensified border enforcement has failed to significantly curb illegal immigration and has even generated a variety of negative consequences. Yet it has succeeded in terms of constructing an image of a more

[93] Ibid., 15.

[94] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59.

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secure border. While the overall deterrent effect has been limited, the U.S. border control strategy has had a profound effect in terms of influencing where, how, and how often illegal immigrants cross the border. Thus, the old border game between law enforcers and law evaders persists as before, but the game strategy of the law enforcers has changed to maximize the appearance of control. At least for now, projecting a winning image has provided a politically viable substitute for actually winning the game.

Timothy Mitchell has noted how border controls have helped define our conception of the state and have given the state the appearance of autonomy, authority, and power: "By establishing a territorial boundary and exercising absolute control over movement across it, state practices define and help constitute a national entity. Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social practices—continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspectors, currency controls, and so on. These mundane arrangements, most of them unknown two-hundred or even one-hundred years ago, help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the nation state."[95] From this perspective, evaluating border policing solely in terms of the stated policy goal of deterrence misses much of what these state practices are all about. Even while border controls may fail as a serious deterrent, they reinforce territorial identities, symbolize and project an image of state authority, and relegitimize the boundaries of the "imagined community."[96]

[95] Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review* 85 (March 1991): 94.

[96] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso), 1991.

*Research for this article was made possible by a Social Science Research Council-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing World and a Research Fellowship from the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. I also thank the Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

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Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988

WILLIAM D. JACKSON

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of bold concessions on arms control issues and regional conflicts in the latter half of the 1980s has been variously viewed as a response to the militant, anti-Soviet policies of the Reagan administration, compelled by the deepening internal crisis of the Soviet system; the result of a new and more pragmatic form of thinking about international relations that had gained ascendance in Moscow; and the reflection of an ideological transformation involving the social democratization of a part of the Soviet elite.[1] Realists and Idealists continue to debate the role of shifts in the balance of power, the assertive defense policies of the Reagan administration, ideological change in the Soviet Union, and the emergence of new ideas about mutual security in ending the cold war.[2] Many of these factors were clearly relevant in varying degrees to the profound shift in Soviet foreign policy that occurred in the latter half of the 1980s. While a complete assessment of the weight of these and other factors in bringing about the transformation of Soviet foreign policy must await a complete opening of Soviet archives on the period, the more detailed evidence on Soviet foreign policy making, which has become available in the form of a growing set of memoirs by key Soviet participants as well as other documents, indicates that the evolution in Soviet policy toward the United States in the period after 1985 was closely linked to shifting perceptions of the

[1] See, for example, Mike Bowker, *Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1997); Jeffrey Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kaplan, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Jacques Levesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, Keith Martin, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[2] See Lebow and Risse-Kaplan, *International Relations*.

WILLIAM D. JACKSON is professor of political science at Miami University in Ohio. He has published numerous articles on Soviet foreign policy during the cold war.

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Reagan administration on the part of Gorbachev and his key foreign policy advisers. In the absence of such a shift in perceptions, it is unlikely that Gorbachev would have been prepared to move away from his original strategy of coping with the United States and accept the political risks associated with a policy of bold accommodation toward the Reagan administration. Further, in contrast to some recent accounts of the end of the cold war, which credit hard-line policies with producing a transformation in Soviet behavior,[3] the interest displayed by the second-term Reagan administration in improving relations with Moscow and the personal trust that gradually developed in high-level contacts between Soviet and U.S. officials in this period appear to have been critical in transforming U.S.–Soviet relations and ending the cold war.

Though at the time Gorbachev ascended to the post of general secretary in March 1985, the Soviets were interested in reestablishing détente and resuming negotiations on a number of arms control issues, Gorbachev and his reformist allies were deeply distrustful that the Reagan administration appeared to have turned back to attitudes and policies characteristic of an earlier period of the cold war.[4] As a consequence, Gorbachev and his advisers initially discounted prospects of achieving a new stage of cooperation with Washington and embraced a diplomatic strategy that sought to "outflank" the hardline Reagan administration with a new, modernized peace offensive aimed at Western Europe and Western public opinion.[5] As a result of high-level encounters with Reagan, his top officials, and other Western leaders, however, Gorbachev came to have a growing confidence in the interest of the Reagan administration in cooperating with a Soviet Union under his leadership and the possibilities of altering fundamentally U.S.–Soviet relations through direct negotiations with Washington. As his perceptions of the Reagan administration began to change, Gorbachev gradually abandoned his original strategy that had been premised upon the assumption that the Reagan administration's attitude toward Moscow would not significantly change. This article represents an attempt to explore the intellec-

[3] See, for example, Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (January/February 1995): 154–161; Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990).

[4] Gorbachev's reflections on his own attitudes toward the United States in this period are contained in his memoirs, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformi* (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. ii, 23–25; a discussion of Gorbachev's views on foreign policy in this period may also be found in Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Random House, 1995), 56–58; and Anatoly Chernyayev, *Shest' let c gorbachevim* (Moscow: Progress, 1993), 33–88. Additional commentary and evidence regarding Gorbachev's thinking in this period regarding foreign policy and relations with the United States are contained in the joint memoirs of Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev and Georgi Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnoye Otnosheniye, 1992), 54–83. A less detailed and more general account of Gorbachev's thinking regarding foreign policy in this period is contained in Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 47–51.

[5] Chernyayev, *Shest' let*, 41.

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tual history of thinking about the United States as an adversary within the Soviet elite, especially on the part of Gorbachev in the period 1985–1988 as revealed in the memoirs of key Soviet participants and other newly available records.

Gorbachev and the Reagan Administration: Initial Contacts

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the U.S.–Soviet détente that had taken shape in the early 1970s came to an end. Beyond Afghanistan, relations between Moscow and Washington were further strained during this period by the intensification of regional proxy conflicts in Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia and by a significant escalation in the arms race. The sharpened anti-Soviet rhetoric, escalation of U.S. military spending, and increased involvement in proxy conflicts in Afghanistan and Nicaragua on the part of the Reagan administration during its first term had further contributed to returning U.S.–Soviet relations to a pattern of confrontation characteristic of early periods of the cold war. Relations reached a nadir in 1983 as a result of the Korean Air Line (KAL) incident and the Soviet decision to break off arms control negotiations following the beginning of NATO deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. In 1984, however, both Washington and Moscow showed interest in improving diplomatic contacts. Concerned by reports that the Soviets had believed that a U.S. military exercise in the autumn of 1983 was a possible prelude to nuclear war, President Ronald Reagan began to display new interest in improving communication with the Soviet leadership.[6] At the same time, Reagan began to accord more weight to the views of Secretary of State George P. Shultz and his more pragmatic advisers on questions of dealing with Moscow.[7] Along with the standard attacks on communism and Soviet policies, a new emphasis on U.S. willingness to engage in a "constructive dialogue" with Moscow began to appear in the president's speeches.[8] The death of General Secretary Yuri Andropov in February also served to stimulate U.S. interest in improving the diplomatic relationship. The Soviet leadership remained highly skeptical, however, that the president's new rhetoric signaled any significant shift in Washington's position-of-strength policy.[9] As 1984 progressed, however, the level of diplomatic contact between Moscow and Washington did gradually increase and in September President Reagan met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Washington—the first meeting held by a U.S. president with the Soviet foreign minis-

[6] Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 139.

[7] A good discussion of the policy debates and decisions within the Reagan administration on reengaging Moscow may be found in George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: MacMillan, 1993), 477–486.

[8] See Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 142–143.

[9] A good discussion of Soviet perceptions of U.S. policy in this period may be found in ibid., 168–173.

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ter since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan five years earlier. Following its landslide victory in November, the Reagan administration continued to signal Moscow that it was interested in improving diplomatic contact. In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in December, President Reagan's National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane informed Dobrynin, according to the latter's account, that "Reagan believed he had fulfilled the basic task of his presidency, which was to restore the potential of American armed forces [and] now believed it was time to improve relations with the Soviet Union gradually and reach agreement on reducing nuclear arms."[10] Further, McFarlane suggested that Washington would like to extend an invitation to Mikhail Gorbachev, who appeared increasingly set to succeed the ailing Konstantin Chernenko, to visit the United States.[11] Though no visit was arranged, U.S.–Soviet dialogue was improved by an agreement in January to resume arms negotiations, which had been broken off in November 1983. Following Gorbachev's ascension to the post of general secretary in March, the Reagan administration quickly expressed the hope in its initial communications to Gorbachev that a new, more constructive diplomatic dialogue could be established.[12] Arriving in Moscow in March 1985 to attend the funeral of Chernenko, Vice President George Bush carried a letter to Gorbachev from President Reagan suggesting an early summit and inviting Gorbachev to Washington.

Gorbachev, according to Dobrynin, was especially pleased to find that the Reagan administration appeared interested in quickly establishing high-level diplomacy.[13] An early summit was a goal to which Gorbachev himself attached some importance, although he appeared to have low expectations that meaningful progress could be made in negotiations. Nonetheless, he saw utility in holding an early meeting with Reagan for several purposes. First, a summit would allow Gorbachev to make his own assessment of Reagan. Gorbachev appeared to regard such an assessment as critical in formulating his own diplomatic strategy. In a private meeting Gorbachev held with Dobrynin in March 1985, Gorbachev pressed the Soviet ambassador for an assessment of Reagan. According to Dobrynin's account of the meeting, Gorbachev was keenly interested in knowing what kind of man Reagan was. "[Gorbachev] did not doubt Reagan's anti-Soviet predisposition, but was the President open to persuasion or was he just hopeless? Was he an anti-communist fanatic or a pragmatist? Could one come to terms with him or would it be worthless to try?"[14]

Gorbachev would subsequently show himself to be genuinely preoccupied with a search for answers to these questions during much of the remainder of Reagan's term in office. His own diplomacy would be significantly affected, moreover, by his evolving judgment on the questions he raised in his discussion

[10] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 563.
[11] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 509.
[12] Ibid., 527–533; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 565–567.
[13] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 567.
[14] Ibid., 569.

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with Dobrynin. The subject of whether to agree to Washington's proposal for an early summit became a subject of debate within the Soviet leadership in April. In these discussions, Gorbachev argued against the view, held by Gromyko among others that a summit was appropriate only when concrete agreements could be achieved, telling his colleagues, according to Dobrynin's account: "If you make it a rule [that a summit should occur only when a major agreement was in prospect] . . . the summit will not take place in two or three years. Probably it will not take place at all. Now time is short, we need a summit to get to know Reagan and most important to launch a personal dialogue with the American president."[15]

In addition to using a summit to get to know Reagan, Gorbachev had a larger political objective in mind. He saw such summits as a means of advancing a new image of Soviet diplomacy as a champion of peace and of increasing domestic and international pressure on the Reagan administration to moderate the arms race. Gorbachev had likely received reports from Dobrynin in Washington that the convening of an early summit with Reagan would encourage Congress to delay or scale back key military programs and would otherwise bolster the position of the moderate wing of the ruling establishment. Dobrynin almost certainly reported to Moscow conversations he had with Senator Robert Dole in March, in which the Republican senator told the Soviet ambassador that an early summit "would mean the collapse of the policy advocated by the extreme right wingers around Reagan." Dobrynin probably also reported a conversation with Robert McFarlane, who had told him that an early summit would undermine the prospects for MX funding.[16]

Though Gorbachev was eager to accelerate negotiations with the United States on a variety of arms control issues, he and his colleagues in the leadership were deeply skeptical of the possibilities that the Reagan administration would fundamentally alter its posture toward the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's most influential adviser on foreign policy in this period, Aleksandr Yakovlev, had expressed the view that the new interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union expressed by the Reagan administration was motivated by a desire to improve the administration's image and thereby reduce or blunt opposition to the militaristic policies that it remained determined to pursue.[17] Highly doubtful that the Reagan administration would fundamentally alter its policies toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership were inclined to pursue a diplomatic strategy that discounted the prospects of reestablishing a détente relationship with the hardline Reagan administration. They sought to isolate the Reagan administration and thereby increase pressure on it to alter its policies by enticing Western Europe with bold new disarmament proposals. According to the account of his principal foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyayev,

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 568–569.

[17] Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Itoki oogrozi i obshchestvennoye mneniye," *MEiMO*, no. 3, 1985, 3–17.

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Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy during this period was keyed to the "outflanking variant" (*obkhodny variant*), which aimed at "encouraging contradictions in the Atlantic alliance through the influence of propaganda and isolating American imperialism in the eyes of peaceloving world society." While this was a traditional Soviet tactic, Gorbachev hoped to enhance its viability by offering far-reaching disarmament proposals, the rejection of which would serve to further increase the administration's isolation.[18] By demonstrating a willingness to make concessions in the name of peace, the Soviet Union would improve its own image and at the same time escalate international and domestic opposition to the Reagan administration's own military build-up. Such a strategy had been urged on Gorbachev, according to Chernyayev, by Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States, in Arbatov's first meeting with Gorbachev after he had become general secretary.[19]

In early July 1985, Washington and Moscow announced that Gorbachev and Reagan would meet for a summit in Geneva in November. The Soviet leadership's expectations and objectives regarding the Geneva summit were the subject of formal discussion at a session of the Politburo in early November. According to Dobrynin's account, the discussion culminated in the approval by the Politburo of a memorandum dated 11 November 1985, containing a summary evaluation of the policies of the Reagan administration and a statement of Soviet policy with regard to the impending summit in Geneva. Noting that the chances were "slim" that the Reagan administration was now "prepared to build relations with the Soviet Union on an equal footing," the document emphasized the value of displaying Soviet interest in dialogue." Gorbachev was instructed to press the fact that nuclear and space weapons were the principal problems facing the two countries. While Reagan could be expected "to repeat his old claims against us" in regional conflicts, entering into a discussion of these conflicts, the policy memorandum concluded, had the value of further enhancing the legitimacy of a Soviet role in these areas. Regarding any final documents issuing from the meeting, the Politburo memorandum concluded, according to Dobrynin's citation: "it certainly would not be bad to have a joint document summarizing the results of the summit. But achieving it should not be an idée fixe." At a minimum, however, the memorandum concluded, "the summit should end on a mutual note of readiness to keep the dialogue alive."[20] In his account of the preparations for the Geneva meeting, Georgy Kornienko, the deputy foreign minister who served as an adviser to Gorbachev at the summit meeting, also notes that Soviet expectations that a real breakthrough would occur with the Reagan Administration at Geneva were low.[21]

In five hours of private discussions at the Geneva meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan covered a wide spectrum of issues. Reagan sought to emphasize Soviet

[18] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 78.

[19] Ibid., 41.

[20] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 385–386.

[21] Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 59.

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totalitarianism, domination of Eastern Europe, involvement in Third World conflicts, and broad militarization as root sources of cold war tension. While responding to Reagan's charges with his own attack on the insidious influence of the military industrial complex on U.S. policy, Gorbachev sought to focus discussions on outstanding disagreements on arms control, especially Soviet concerns over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Their first discussion, according to Gorbachev, had the character of an ideological debate and became at times heated and emotional.[22] Neither in their private conversations nor in the broader conversations of the delegations was significant new agreement reached regarding regional conflicts or outstanding arms control issues. Gorbachev and Reagan did agree to hold two more meetings in Washington and Moscow in the near future. According to several accounts the two leaders got on better as the meetings progressed.[23] While each leader emerged with a better feel for the personality and political views of the other, the meeting did not result in a far-reaching reassessment of the nature of the cold war adversary in either Washington or Moscow. Like Reagan in his attitude toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev remained cautious and guarded in his assessment of the United States in general and the Reagan administration in particular. Gorbachev told Dobrynin on the plane trip back to Moscow from Geneva that he had found Reagan to be "complex and contradictory" and "stubborn and very conservative," but still had found it possible to "establish contact with him and discovered a man who was not as hopeless as some believed."[24]

New Thinking and Its Motivations

While uncertain about whether Soviet diplomacy could induce the Reagan administration to alter its policies toward Moscow, Gorbachev was convinced of both the necessity of introducing changes in Soviet foreign policy conducive to reducing the tension and burdens of the cold war and modernizing the face of Soviet diplomacy in order to render Soviet diplomatic efforts to mobilize opposition to U.S. policy more effective. In this regard, according to Dobrynin, "[Gorbachev] did not hide his displeasure with Gromyko's conservative and dogmatic approach to the vital problems of Soviet foreign policy, particularly in relation to the United States."[25] Following his ascension to the post of general secretary, Gorbachev began to emphasize new themes in his official remarks on international relations, which came to be officially entitled New Thinking (*Novoe mishleniye*). This was designed both to signal and legitimize a more flexible and realistic Soviet foreign policy, as well as to present a new image of the Soviet Union as a defender of "common human values" and "civilization" in general threatened by the nuclear arms race and other serious global problems. Though

[22] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 14.
[23] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 606–607; Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 14; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 593.
[24] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 592.
[25] Ibid., 569.

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many of the new ideas Gorbachev began to stress had emerged earlier within the intelligentsia, they had not previously been incorporated into official doctrine.[26] Several key tenets of New Thinking were apparent in Gorbachev's report to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. Gorbachev accorded a new stress to growing global interdependence and the imperative of increased international cooperation to deal with unprecedented global threats, the most serious of which was the nuclear arms race.[27] A traditional emphasis on the image of two social systems—capitalist and socialist—engaged in a global competition was supplemented in Gorbachev's report by a new emphasis on a single interdependent world.[28] Reflecting another theme central to New Thinking, Gorbachev declared that in the nuclear age the security of all states and especially the United States and the Soviet Union was mutual and "could only be achieved by political means."[29] To underscore a new Soviet reasonableness on arms control, Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union acknowledged the importance of rigorous verification.[30] Other aspects of Gorbachev's report indicated a new moderation and realism in Soviet foreign policy. Of further significance was Gorbachev's declaration that "pushing revolution from the outside, especially by military means, was futile and impermissible."[31]

In advancing the New Thinking, Gorbachev was establishing a doctrinal foundation that could serve a dual purpose. At one level, New Thinking served to legitimize a more flexible Soviet diplomacy aimed at reducing the tensions and burdens of the cold war and creating a more favorable international environment for the pursuit of Soviet domestic reforms. The new stress on the mutuality of security and the principle that security could be effectively enhanced only by political, not military means not only served as an indictment of the Reagan administration's alleged militarism but also served to provide doctrinal support for a reduced emphasis on military strength as a reliable means of enhancing Soviet security. At another level, the New Thinking presented the Soviet Union as a defender not only of the interests of the working classes but more broadly of human civilization faced with a range of new global threats, the most prominent of which—the nuclear arms race—was linked to the militarism of the Reagan administration. In this regard, New Thinking also served to enhance the attractiveness and appeal of Soviet peace-campaign diplomacy among moderate circles in Europe and the United States and, it was hoped, facilitate the building of opposition to the policies of the Reagan administra-

[26] See, for example, Checkel, *Ideas*.

[27] *M.S. Gorbachev: Izbrannie rechi i stat'i* [hereafter *Rechi*] (Moscow: Izdatelst'vo politicheskoy literaturi, 1987), vol. iii, 198–199.

[28] A good analysis of this and other innovative aspects of the sections of the report dealing with the international situation and East-West relations may be found in Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 254–265.

[29] *Rechi*, vol. iii, 245.

[30] Ibid., 249–250.

[31] Ibid., 189.

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tion.[32] This latter potential appeared especially important in the immediate context in which the Soviet leadership remained relatively pessimistic regarding the likelihood of a significant shift in Washington's policies.

Harsh Image of United States Remains Ascendant

While hopeful that a reinvigorated and more intelligent Soviet diplomacy would at least build increased international and domestic opposition, and possibly induce progress in negotiations with the United States, Gorbachev in the months following the Geneva Summit displayed little inclination to present a revised image of the capitalist world, the United States in particular. Gorbachev's report to the 27th Congress presented a largely orthodox and in some respects especially severe attack on the capitalist West and U.S. imperialism. "Capitalism of the 1980s," Gorbachev declared from the rostrum of the Congress, "is becoming the ugliest and most dangerous monster of the twentieth century."[33] The most reactionary and aggressive circles within the capitalist ruling class had gained the upper hand within the capitalist world, according to the general secretary. As a consequence, the aggressive and imperialist policies of the capitalist states were reaching new levels. The United States and its military industrial machine, "which showed no signs of reversing, was continuing to act as the locomotive of militarism."[34] The "right wing of U.S. monopoly capital," which had come into control in the 1980s, Gorbachev warned, "did not want to make a sober evaluation of world realities." This circumstance "lower[ed] the probability of major [*krupny*) change in the policies of the ruling forces and increased the degree of their recklessness."[35] Though a "softer" image of the United States as adversary, which emphasized the growing strength of "reasonable" forces in the United States, had appeared as part of official discourse in the 1970s and had served to provide an ideological justification for involvement in a growing range of negotiations with Washington,[36] Gorbachev chose to endorse little of this image in his pronouncement on the United States to the 27th Congress. In advancing a harsh image of the Reagan administration, Gorbachev may have sought to cover his ideological flanks and soothe the conservative wing of the party.[37] The harsh image of the United States as a reckless imperialist power that Gorbachev advanced in his report to the Congress, however, was also useful in terms of the *obkhodny variant* strategy keyed to mobilizing international opposition to Reagan administration policies.

[32] This aspect of New Thinking was stressed by Vadim Zagladin, a leading official in the International Department of the Central Committee, in an article published immediately following the Congress. Zagladin, "Programmnie tsel'i kpss i globalnie problemi," *Voprosi Filosofii*, 86/2, 3–15.

[33] *Rechi*, 187.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., 190.

[36] William D. Jackson, "Soviet Images of the U.S. as a Nuclear Adversary," *World Politics* 33 (July 1981): 614–639.

[37] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 256.

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Gorbachev appeared to be following this same line in a closed door speech to cadres at the Soviet Foreign Ministry that was held at the end of May 1986, the full text of which is now available. Repeating his line at the Party Congress that the United States was the locomotive of militarism, and accusing the Reagan administration of pursuing a diabolic strategy of deliberately accelerating the arms competition in order to "wear out" (*izmotat'*) the Soviet Union, Gorbachev offered an image of the Reagan administration as sinister and not seriously interested in arms control.[38] Positive changes in U.S. policy could not be expected in the near term, Gorbachev told the assembled diplomats and officials. His skepticism regarding the possibilities for a breakthrough in U.S.–Soviet skepticism regarding the possibilities for a breakthrough in U.S.–Soviet relations and his continuing attachment to the *obkhodny variant* appeared evident in his conclusion that Soviet diplomacy was overly focused on the United States and that enhanced importance should be attached to other directions of foreign policy activity. "In general the foreign ministry has become too 'Americanized'," Gorbachev told the assembled officials. Foreign policy activity was needed in all directions, "Europe being one of the most important."[39] Gorbachev's remarks at the Foreign Ministry in May 1986 also suggest that he continued to attach high importance to the traditional Soviet tactic of the "peace campaign." Gorbachev told the assembled Foreign Ministry officials that "It is absolutely necessary to improve work with the creative intelligentsia in the West . . . it plays a decisive role in the formation of public opinion."[40] Overall, the objective of Soviet diplomacy, Gorbachev told the assembled officials, should be "on the one hand to limit the harmful effects of current U.S. policy . . . and on the other, to lay the basis for the normalization of relations with the United States in the future."[41] Gorbachev also indicated that SDI should not be a subject of inordinate concern, suggesting that the Reagan administration was deliberately disseminating exaggerated and false claims of progress in the development of such weapons. "You will note that the United States is quite exclamatory on everything concerning SDI—the successes and accomplishments of the program. If everything was as they say, and they were accomplishing some superiority, then there would be more secrecy."[42]

In the immediate post-Geneva period, Gorbachev and his reformist advisers remained doubtful that concrete progress could be made with the Reagan administration on contentious arms control issues or on significantly improving the overall U.S.–Soviet relationship. Though Reagan had written a personal message to Gorbachev in the weeks following Geneva in which he told the Soviet leader, "I want you to know I found our meeting of great value," the failure

[38] The full text of the speech was published for the first time in M.S. Gorbachev, *Godi trudnikh reshenii*, (Moscow: 1993), 38–59.

[39] Ibid., 48.

[40] Ibid., 53.

[41] Ibid., 47.

[42] Ibid., 48.

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of the United States to offer revised arms control positions on the intermediate nuclear force (INF) and SDI continued to frustrate Gorbachev. In January 1986, Moscow had publicly unveiled "dramatic" proposals for complete nuclear disarmament in an effort to increase pressure on the Reagan administration. At the same time that he publicly launched new proposals for complete nuclear disarmament, Gorbachev made clear that he was not prepared to schedule another summit meeting until specific progress in on-going arms control negotiations could be achieved. In his report to the 27th Congress in February, Gorbachev declared that a new summit would be predicated on practical results and there would be "no sense in holding empty talks."[43] In adopting this position Gorbachev, whatever his own views, was almost certainly representing the views of his colleagues in the Politburo. In April, Gorbachev sent a letter to Reagan via Dobrynin that, according to Dobrynin, "expressed our disquiet at the lack of any concrete improvement in our relations since the summit five months before."[44] Within the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, the view prevailed among those closely involved in the negotiations in Geneva that while the United States derived political benefits from the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva by giving the public impression of interest in arms control to its allies and public opinion in the United States and Western Europe, the Reagan administration was content with the fact that the negotiations were close to stalemate.[45]

In the spring of 1986 several actions by the United States served to further increase perceptions within the Soviet leadership that the Reagan administration had not abandoned previous hardline policies in favor of a more moderate approach aimed at achieving a new détente. The deliberate incursion by the cruiser *U.S.S. Yorktown* and the destroyer *U.S.S. Caron* into Soviet territorial waters off the Crimea in March and U.S. military actions against Libya in March and April were seen within the Soviet leadership as at least a continuation, if not an increase, in the hardline attitude of the Reagan administration. The latter incident led the Soviets to cancel a planned meeting of Secretary of State Shultz with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in April.[46] Other U.S. actions in the spring of 1986 further convinced Gorbachev and his colleagues that the Reagan administration was continuing its pursuit of a militant policy toward Moscow and did not view the Geneva meeting as a new turning point. These included, according to Gorbachev, the decision that the United States would supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to insurgents in Afghanistan and Angola, the inauguration of a new series of U.S. nuclear tests immediately following Gorbachev's announcement of the extension of the Soviet moratorium on testing, a continued emphasis on strong anti-Soviet rhetoric in Reagan's

[43] *Rechi*, 250; A good discussion of Soviet maneuvering in this period may be found in Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 266–68.

[44] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 602.

[45] Akromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 108.

[46] For a discussion of these episodes, see Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 269–274.

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speeches, a deliberate effort by the Reagan administration to exploit the Chernobyl nuclear power plant tragedy, and the announcement in the late spring that the United States would no longer consider itself bound by the restraints of the unratified SALT II Treaty. These actions furthered Gorbachev's perceptions that "right wing circles" remained firmly in control of policy in Washington.[47] Addressing a Plenum of the Central Committee in June, Gorbachev stressed that there was still no basis for speaking of any easing of tensions (*smyagenii napryazhennosti*) in U.S.–Soviet relations.[48] Notwithstanding his pessimistic views, according to his own account, Gorbachev continued to take the position with his colleagues that the Soviet Union should not allow itself to be lured into a tit-for-tat series of actions that would contribute to a further deterioration in U.S.–Soviet relations. Such a policy would only play into the hands of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other hard-line forces in Washington. Rather, Gorbachev argued, Moscow should continue its policy of seeking to engage the Reagan administration in meaningful negotiation that would produce substantive progress, especially in arms control. Precisely such a policy would weaken the influence of the hard-liners in the United States.[49] Gorbachev's account of his strategy is consistent with the position he took on dealing with Washington at the Plenum of the Central Committee in June. Arguing that the ruling circles in the United States felt threatened by the public peace initiatives of the Soviet Union since Geneva, Gorbachev declared that it was in the Soviet interest to advance yet another initiative to increase the pressure on the Reagan administration to act to end the stalemate in Geneva. Further, Gorbachev told the Central Committee members, "If the American side ignores our initiatives it will become obvious that the current Administration is conducting an unworthy game (*vedet nedostoynoou igru*) on the most serious of questions on which the future of humanity depends."[50] The new arms control initiatives proposed by Gorbachev in mid-June included important concessions on INF—that the Soviets would not insist that British and French systems be counted as part of INF, and that INF systems capable of striking the Soviet Union would no longer be considered as U.S. strategic weapons to be counted against the U.S. total in proposals on reducing strategic arms levels. At the same time, Gorbachev proposed a fifteen-year moratorium on withdrawing from the ABM, during which time research on SDI would be confined to the laboratory.

During this period Gorbachev received differing advice on the prospects of achieving significant progress with the Reagan administration on arms control and more broadly on improving the atmosphere in U.S.–Soviet relations. When French President François Mitterand visited Moscow in June immediately after

[47] Gorbachev, *Zhzin'*, 23–24.

[48] "Doklad generalnovo sekretarya TsK KPSS," *Pravda*, 16 June 1986. This conclusion had formed part of the official communique issued at the end of a Warsaw Pact meeting earlier in the month.

[49] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, 23–24.

[50] "Doklad," *Pravda*, 16 June 1986.

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a state visit to Washington, Gorbachev sought Mitterand's opinion on what was for Gorbachev a crucial question: To what degree did President Reagan's thinking and intentions regarding relations with the Soviet Union diverge from that which prevailed in the higher echelons of the military-industrial-complex? In response to Gorbachev's line of questioning, Mitterand appeared to make a concerted effort to convince Gorbachev that not only could he deal with Reagan, but that because of Reagan's personality and beliefs there were unique opportunities to achieve a radical breakthrough in fundamentally altering U.S.–Soviet relations—opportunities linked to Reagan's particular character. According to the transcript of their conversation, cited by Chernyayev, Mitterand advised Gorbachev: "I think that despite his political past, Reagan belongs to that group of political leaders who intuitively strive to bring an end to the political situation prevailing today. It may seem to you that I am expressing an inconsequential opinion, but this is an actual fact. In contrast to a series of American leaders, Reagan is by no means a machine. This is a living being."[51]

Apparently interested in this remark, Gorbachev told Mitterand that he considered this information one of the important moments of their meeting. Gorbachev returned to the same line of questioning in a meeting in the Kremlin with former President Richard Nixon later the same month. Much as Mitterand had done, Nixon presented a view of Reagan as very much his own man with his own vision. Moreover, Nixon told Gorbachev, Reagan believed that the personal relationship that was developing between himself and the Soviet leader would facilitate progress toward new agreements.[52]

Reykjavik Summit in Gorbachev's Strategy

According to Chernyayev, Gorbachev's conversations with Mitterand and Nixon furthered his inclination to continue to probe and test the Reagan administration's receptivity to new and more far-reaching Soviet initiatives on arms control. Subsequently, in August Gorbachev decided to propose a quick follow-on summit to Geneva to be held in the fall in either Britain or Iceland. In proposing a second summit less than a year after Geneva and notwithstanding the fact that no major breakthroughs had occurred in on-going arms control negotiations with the United States, Gorbachev hoped to increase pressure to move forward on arms control and to score a propaganda victory. In his own account of his decision to propose an "interim summit," Gorbachev notes that he was prompted to act by the receipt of a letter from Reagan outlining "new" U.S. proposals on arms control. Gorbachev regarded the proposals as nonserious and cosmetic. Overall, Gorbachev perceived Reagan's August letter as part of a larger U.S. policy designed to create an appearance of an interest in arms control and counter the effects of Gorbachev's own peace campaign while con-

[51] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 102.
[52] Ibid., 104.

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tinuing to pursue its own militant policies and military expansion. "[Reagan's letter] struck me as an attempt to create the appearance that the dialogue was continuing, and as still another step in the 'double game' which the American leadership was conducting."[53] Rejecting Shevardnadze's advice that he issue a reply curtly dismissing the letter as offering nothing new, Gorbachev took the position that such an approach would not contribute to increasing the pressure on the Reagan administration and would not build on public expectations for progress in disarmament raised in Geneva. Accordingly, Gorbachev decided it would be preferable to seize the initiative and call for an interim summit to be held in Britain or Iceland in order to draw attention to the "blind alley" into which negotiations had fallen since Geneva. According to his account, he called Shevardnadze, then Gromyko, as well as two other key members of the Politburo, Nikolai Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachev, who concurred with his thinking.[54] Chernyayev's detailed account of Gorbachev's decisions regarding the Reykjavik meeting further reveals that Gorbachev envisioned the meeting as part of his on-going peace campaign directed more at building pressure on the Reagan administration to engage in serious negotiations in Geneva than at achieving real agreements at the summit. In a memo to First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev, who was charged with the task of overseeing preparation of Soviet proposals, Chernyayev conveyed Gorbachev's instructions that the proposals were to be framed "in the spirit of the program of January 15" and should be designed to "stun" Reagan.[55] The Soviet proposals, the Chernyayev memo further stipulated, were to be formulated in a fashion calculated to turn (*peretyanoot*) Western Europe to our side and increase the pressure of world opinion on the Reagan administration.[56] To achieve this objective, Chernyayev emphasized, it was essential that the Soviet proposals include the offer to remove all SS 20s from Europe and not insist on the retention of medium range missiles to offset those in the arsenals of Britain and France. Elaborating on the necessity of such a position and presumably echoing Gorbachev's position, Chernyayev's memo advised Kovalev: "With the help of a variety of intermediate proposals [since Geneva] we have sought to induce Reagan toward concessions. Nothing has come of these efforts. [Reagan] will change his position only if we succeed in pulling Western Europe to our side and if we will further skillfully set (*natravlivat*) world opinion against Reagan. Leaving SS 20s in Europe will not bring Western Europe to our side."[57]

In response to concerns about abandoning the previous Soviet position that insisted British and French arsenals be calculated in the balance and that Moscow should be able to retain an offsetting force of intermediate weapons, Cher-

[53] Gorbachev, *Zhizn*, vol. ii, 25.

[54] Ibid., 25.

[55] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 107. Overall, Chernyayev's discussion of the preparations for Reykjavik are to be found in *Shest'let*, 106–111.

[56] Ibid., 107.

[57] Ibid.

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nyayev offered the sardonic comment: "Can the comrades seriously believe that Thatcher or Mitterand or those who take their place can reach the fantastic situation in which they press the buttons of their own rockets against us? Can it be that this is the basis of our European strategy?"[58]

Outlining his own strategy for the Reykjavik meeting at a Politburo meeting on 22 September, Gorbachev told his colleagues that in proposing a summit he wished to dramatize the current situation and challenge Reagan. Effectively challenging the Reagan administration to move forward on arms control, however, would require that the Soviet leadership prepare a package of proposals that took American interests into account rather than a program it would appear reasonable for the Americans to reject.[59] Gorbachev's own account of his remarks to the Politburo in this regard is generally consistent with that offered by Chernyayev:

> At a session of the Politburo I laid out my philosophy (*kredo*) [regarding the Reykjavik meeting]. We should go to the meeting with bold, but still realistic proposals. If they were to be accepted, this would signify that the process of disarmament and normalization of the world situation was beginning. If they were rejected, we would publicize this and expose the policy of the [U.S.]administration.... In the Politburo all agreed that Reykjavik would improve the image (*oblik*) of our foreign policy and again demonstrate our striving to avert a new stage in the arms race.[60]

Though in approaching Reykjavik, Gorbachev believed that the pressure his own peace campaign was building on the Reagan administration combined with bold proposals that contained elements that could entice Washington might result in a breakthrough, he continued to believe that the Reagan administration was engaged in a crafty "double game" designed to allow it to maintain a militant policy of "neoglobalism." A new glimpse of the position in closed party discussions taken by Gorbachev and his key foreign policy advisers (Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Dobrynin) is afforded by the text of a secret Central Committee resolution adopted in September 1986 that was released by President Boris Yeltsin and published in 1995 as part of the President's Archive historical documents. The resolution, which had been presented for Central Committee adoption over the signatures of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, KGB Head and Politburo member Viktor Chebrikov and Party Secretaries Vadim Medvedev, Yakovlev, and Dobrynin, was intended as policy guidance to the Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, KGB, and the International Department and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. Entitled "On Measures to Strengthen Opposition to the American Policy of Neoglobalism," the resolution characterized the Reagan administration as fully committed to a strategy of "wearing out" (*izmotat*) the Soviet Union through an all-out acceleration of the arms race and an expansion of regional conflicts.

[58] Ibid., 111.
[59] Ibid., 109.
[60] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 26–27.

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The resolution suggested that the Reagan administration's professed interest in a new dialogue was devious, insincere, and designed largely to mask its underlying strategy: "At the same time it inflames regional conflicts, [the Reagan Administration] emphasizes their regulation on American terms as a priority task without the prior resolution of which it is impossible to lessen tensions and to move forward in the realm of arms control and disarmament and fruitful American-Soviet dialogue. . . .[61]

In detailing elements of a strategy to combat the neoglobalism of the Reagan administration, the Central Committee resolution—presented as the elaboration of a Politburo directive—made no mention of new efforts at diplomatic engagement. Rather, it stressed the importance of rallying the states of the nonaligned movement as well as "Circles in the West (including the United States) who are concerned by the dangerous sharpening of international conditions as a result of the adventurist actions of the Reagan Administration." Included among the elements of a package of steps designed to increase world wide opposition to the Reagan administration policies was a call to approach Beijing regarding combatting U.S. neoglobalism: "3. Insofar as there are signs that the Chinese leadership also appears disturbed by the dangerous actions of Reagan's neoglobalism, attempts could be made to initiate a dialogue on this problem with the Chinese, starting, perhaps, on the level of scholars."[62]

The text of the resolution further suggests that at least in the fall of 1986, with a second summit meeting with Reagan impending, Gorbachev and the leadership in general continued to substantially discount the prospects of a new diplomatic relationship with the Reagan administration and to place primary reliance on a strategy of rallying international opposition to U.S. policy. The available evidence further suggests that initially Gorbachev viewed the Reykjavik meeting as a sophisticated element in his peace campaign designed to increase political pressure on the Reagan administration to alter its policies toward the Soviet Union and to build international support for his own policy, rather than as an opportunity for serious negotiations. Gorbachev expected to lay out bold proposals that would increase pressure on the Reagan administration to begin serious negotiations in Geneva or conduct high-level exchanges. Only days before the Reykjavik meeting did Gorbachev decide to include his principal military adviser, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, in the Soviet delegation.[63]

In the weeks immediately following the dramatic summit in Reykjavik, at which the United States had been placed in the position of appearing to reject dramatic and unprecedented Soviet proposals for deep cuts in strategic arms and the elimination of all European theater missiles by insisting on no restrictions on the development of SDI, Gorbachev believed his strategy was working. According to Chernyayev, he told his colleagues: "Despite the absence of concrete

[61] "Ne pozvolim S Sh A dostich' prevoskhodstva," *Istochnik* 2/95, 95.

[62] Ibid., 72.

[63] Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 111.

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agreement, the results of Reykjavik have exceeded expectations. The Americans have begun to roll back. (*Amerikantsi stali otkativat'sya nazad.*) Reykjavik is a success for the peace process. The Americans have been frightened and again have resorted to aggravations. They are acting in this manner because they are not in a position to change the momentum we have started."[64]

In addition to the fact that he believed that the Reykjavik meeting had greatly increased political pressure on the United States to move forward on nuclear disarmament, the summit meeting appeared to have affected Gorbachev's perception of Reagan in a positive manner. According to Dobrynin's account: "[I]t was at Reykjavik . . . that Gorbachev put away passion and decided that he could and would work with Reagan. He saw in him a person capable of taking great decisions, and Gorbachev himself told me so when we returned to Moscow."[65]

The encounter in Reykjavik had a positive effect on other members of the Soviet delegation as well. Most importantly, perhaps, Marshal Akhromeyev, according to his own account, came away from the meeting favorably impressed by the professionalism and seriousness of both Secretary of State Shultz and the chief U.S. negotiator in Geneva, Paul Nitze.[66] At the same time, the maneuvering at Reykjavik, including the impromptu U.S. proposal to ban all ballistic missiles, had raised suspicions in Akhromeyev similar to those of Gorbachev that the Reagan administration was playing a double game and, with its own dramatic proposal that the U.S. delegation knew would be rejected by the Soviet Union, showed itself to be more interested in achieving a propaganda victory than advancing the negotiations.[67]

While Gorbachev's assessment of Reagan appears to have shifted somewhat as a result of the meeting in Reykjavik, he remained highly distrustful of overall administration policy. The Reagan administration's unwillingness to yield any ground on SDI and its apparent backtracking—from the Soviet viewpoint—on an agreement in principle to a 50 percent reduction in strategic warheads that had been affirmed at Reykjavik appear to have deepened Gorbachev's concern that he was being played along by the Reagan administration. In Gorbachev's view, Washington engaged in an effort to promote the image that it was seriously interested in arms control in order to deflect the pressure Gorbachev saw his policies as generating. While Reykjavik may have influenced Gorbachev's perception of Reagan in the direction of the views Mitterand had expressed to Gorbachev some month's earlier, Chernyayev notes that in the post-Reykjavik period, Gorbachev continued to be subject to the stereotypical Soviet view that the military-industrial complex and not the American president was the ultimate arbiter of U.S. policy.[68]

[64] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 119.
[65] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 610.
[66] Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 112.
[67] Ibid., 117.
[68] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 118–119.

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Gorbachev's concerns regarding the persistence of a militant approach in U.S. policy deepened in the months following Reykjavik. In February 1987, Gorbachev sought and obtained Politburo approval to make a major alteration in the Soviet proposals offered at Reykjavik. Soviet concessions on INF were no longer to be linked to acceptance of Soviet proposals that would require severe restrictions on SDI development and research.[69] Notwithstanding these new Soviet concessions on INF as well as on sublimits on heavy ICBMs, Washington, in Gorbachev's view, continued to stall. In the months following Reykjavik, Gorbachev remained highly uncertain over whether the United States and its allies could be persuaded to move beyond the cold war on any terms. He told Margaret Thatcher in March that he doubted that the Western allies were really interested in finding an exit (*vykhod*) from the cold war; rather, they only seemed interested in introducing new complications and tensions. On the subject of the ongoing disarmament talks in Geneva, the Soviet leader told Thatcher that he seriously questioned whether "the West is ready for real disarmament or is conducting the negotiations only for the sake of public opinion."[70]

Probing and Testing

Gorbachev had other objectives in mind in inviting Thatcher to Moscow. As he informed the Politburo—according to the transcript of his remarks recently provided by Chernyayev—Gorbachev expected that by elevating the diplomatic stature of British-Soviet relations he could prod other leaders in the West into a jealous competition to develop special relations with the Kremlin. Gorbachev told his Politburo colleagues:

> We acted correctly in inviting [Thatcher]. We had in mind not only [Thatcher] herself, but also the U.S.A. and the European line which has a key significance. The enlargement of Britain's [diplomatic] role is in our interest. Helmut Kohl sensed this at once. He still more keenly regrets his remarks in the fall [comparing *Perestroika* to a propaganda show worthy of Joseph Goebbels]. The Italians fear that a rapprochement [*sblizheniye*] will occur between the USSR and the FRG. They all have their own interests and we must calculate on this.[71]

Gorbachev's remarks to the Politburo also reveal his hope to exploit favorable and exaggerated accounts of Thatcher's visit to Moscow offered by Thatcher to the Western press, as well as the political need of Western leaders to underscore progress and agreements as a result of their meetings in Moscow. In this regard, Gorbachev told his colleagues: "[Thatcher] gave an overly positive

[69] For Gorbachev's closed-door remarks to the officials at the Foreign Ministry, as well as his remarks at the end of 1986 to Dobrynin, cited by the latter, see Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 620. They suggest that Gorbachev attached less importance to SDI than the Soviet military and believed the advice he had received from some scientists and officials that even were SDI to be successfully implemented, the Soviets could negate the system at relatively low cost.

[70] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 79.

[71] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 138.

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evaluation of her visit. And that's how the Western press, including the American press understood it. . . . So let them think this way. . . . Conversing and arguing with me [Thatcher] simultaneously searched for agreement. She very much did not want her visit to be called a failure.[72]

Much as he had probed and challenged Thatcher, Gorbachev took a similar line in a meeting in the Kremlin with Shultz the following month. According to records recently released by Gorbachev, he told Shultz:

> We have had direct and concrete experience of dealings with the present administration. But after two years the impression has formed that it acts as if nothing has happened, as if it doesn't see what the Soviet Union has done to improve U.S.–Soviet relations. . . . No American Administration in recent decades has had possibilities of cooperating with the USSR to better the situation as yours has. And you're not taking advantage of them, and time is running out.[73]

In his own account of the meeting, Shultz notes that Gorbachev repeatedly questioned U.S. intentions, telling Shultz: "I have knowledge about your instructions. You are here to probe. You have come on an intelligence mission. You will not come to a conclusion and you will blame it on the need to go consult your allies."[74] In fact, in subsequent working sessions during Shultz's visit, important progress was made in further narrowing the positions of the two sides on INF; in his own account, Gorbachev claims that it was the progress achieved during Shultz's visit in April that began to dispel his doubts that the Reagan administration was interested in significantly transforming U.S.–Soviet relations.[75] As a result of continued progress achieved in the INF negotiations in Geneva during the summer, Gorbachev began to alter his estimate of the prospects for a major change in relations. In September, when Shevardnadze arrived for a working meeting in Washington, he carried a letter from Gorbachev to Reagan in which the Soviet leader expressed the view that success in the accelerating negotiations "would crown in a befitting manner the process of interaction on the central issues of security which began in Geneva" [and] "provide a firm basis for a stable and forward development not just of the U.S.–Soviet relationship, but of international relations as a whole for many years."[76] Providing further evidence of the improving atmosphere, Shevardnadze surprised Shultz by confiding that a final high-level decision to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan had been made.[77]

Though the working relationship between Washington and Moscow had improved dramatically over the summer and early fall of 1987, Gorbachev himself was still not free of doubts regarding the Reagan administration's readiness

[72] Ibid., 138–139.
[73] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 36–37.
[74] Schultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 890.
[75] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 51–52.
[76] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 985.
[77] Ibid., 987.

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to move toward a fundamental transformation in its relations with the Soviet Union. Expecting to finalize plans for a Washington summit in December on a return working visit to Moscow the following month, Shultz encountered a Gorbachev reluctant to commit himself to a summit that would yield only one substantive agreement on arms control and still harboring suspicion that the Reagan administration was not prepared to alter its overall policy toward Moscow. Shultz's own account of this meeting has been since supplemented by the publication of a transcript of the meeting provided by the Gorbachev Institute, as well as Gorbachev's own commentary in his memoirs.[78] The accounts reveal the Soviet leader's continuing uncertainty regarding Washington's policies and his own determination to probe the administration's seriousness in changing the relationship. In his two meetings with Shultz, Gorbachev concentrated on exploring the possibility of significant progress in negotiations over strategic arms reductions and the application of the ABM treaty to SDI prior to the scheduling of a summit in Washington. While expressing satisfaction with the largely completed INF treaty, Gorbachev accused the administration of putting forward vague proposals on strategic arms and SDI that suggested a lack of real interest in achieving agreement.[79] Gorbachev's line of commentary and questions in his two sessions with Shultz appear to reflect his continuing suspicion that the Reagan administration was content to take the INF agreement, while engaging in its "double game" on other arms control issues. As the meeting progressed, Gorbachev raised broader questions regarding the basic policy and attitude of the Reagan administration. Seizing upon a recent press account that reported U.S. intelligence agencies warning that the Soviet Union was engaging in a traditional Soviet "peace offensive," and calling into question the seriousness of Gorbachev's policy of reform, Gorbachev queried Shultz provocatively: "Can't you get on without continuing to depict the Soviet Union as an enemy? How can we continue to negotiate with you if you see us as an enemy?"[80]

While Gorbachev did press for U.S. concessions on SDI and strategic arms in his meeting with Shultz, the United States offered no substantive concessions on these issues. Nonetheless, within days of this meeting, Moscow communicated its final agreement to a December summit in Washington. On INF, START, and SDI, most of the important concessions Gorbachev made in this period were pocketed by the United States without any significant reciprocal concessions. Though this pattern may be seen as evidence that Gorbachev was bargaining from weakness, such a conclusion presumes that removing British and French missiles in Europe, and limiting U.S. strategic programs were Gorbachev's most important objectives. Yet the record in this period, including Gorbachev's willingness to allow his unreciprocated concessions to stand, suggests that he viewed the concessions as means to a larger objective—the

[78] "Iz arkhiva gorbacheva," *MEiMO*, No. 10, 1993, 69–81 and No. 11, 1993, 73–84.
[79] "Iz arkhiva," No. 10, 73.
[80] Ibid., No. 11, 75.

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achievement of a fundamental transformation of the international situation and especially the fundamental transformation of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a transformation was viewed by both Gorbachev and his reform-oriented allies as essential to the overarching objective of reform of the Soviet system. In pursuing this strategy, Gorbachev's principal concern was whether the Reagan administration was prepared to change its relationship with Moscow. In deciding to proceed with a summit in Washington that would involve a signing of only one major arms agreement, Gorbachev appeared to decide in favor of at least continuing the building momentum of engagement with Washington on the assumption that the building momentum would compel the Reagan administration to move increasingly farther from the policies toward Moscow it had embraced during its first term and also to display increasing approval and support for Perestroika.

Washington Summit as Turning Point

The Washington summit itself marked an important turning point in U.S.–Soviet relations. With the conclusion of the INF agreement, his cordial reception in Washington, and with a reciprocal Reagan visit to Moscow scheduled in the summer of 1988 to make the fourth summit in thirty months, Gorbachev had tangible evidence of the changing relationship. Gorbachev's attitude toward the Reagan administration was also being directly transformed as a result of his personal interactions with Reagan, Schultz, and other ranking U.S. officials. His changing attitudes would have further consequences for Soviet foreign policy. As his personal relationship with Reagan developed and concrete results in improving relations became evident, it was in Gorbachev's political interest at home to stress the importance of personal diplomacy at the highest level. Reporting on the results of his visit to the United States, Gorbachev told the Politburo on 17 December:

> In Washington we felt manifest for the first time what the human factor can be in international politics. Prior to this we had satisfied ourselves with the rather banal formula: in foreign policy personal contacts between heads of state, heads of government and in general contacts between those who make policy are important. . . . But all the same even as concerned individuals we understood this as contacts between representatives of opposing classes and irreconcilable systems. For us Reagan was only the expression of the most conservative section of American capitalism and the master of the military industrial complex. But it turned out that beside this it is also significant that politicians, including the leaders of states, if they are, in fact, responsible people embody in addition personal qualities, and the interests and hopes of very simple people. Those people in particular who have voted for them at elections. . . . Consequently, they can be led by very normal human feelings and anxieties.[81]

[81] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 189–90.

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In his memoirs, Gorbachev acknowledges that by 1987 his respect for and trust in key Western leaders, especially Schultz, Reagan, Kohl, and Mitterand, was growing.[82] In his own reflections on the period, Ambassador Jack Matlock has offered a similar view, suggesting that Gorbachev's developing personal relationships with Reagan, Bush, Thatcher, Mitterand, and Kohl had an important effect on his own reimaging of the United States and its allies. Matlock argues that the Washington summit was a turning point. From Washington onward, Gorbachev had sufficient trust and confidence in his Western counterparts that he was less susceptible to the hard-line influence of the KGB. "From December 1987, he [Gorbachev] no longer dealt with us as a hostile force. . . . It was particularly important for Gorbachev to trust the good faith of the Western leaders, since the intelligence reports he received from the KGB continued to encourage suspicion of the 'imperialist threat.'"[83]

Chernyayev offers a similar evaluation of Gorbachev's growing confidence in Western leaders' readiness to place U.S.–Soviet relations on a new basis in this period. While Gorbachev would continue to be vexed with aspects of Washington's policy, especially over Afghanistan, in the months following the Washington summit, his image of the Reagan administration and more broadly the United States as a negotiating partner had substantially evolved as a result of his personal contacts with ranking U.S. officials as well as other Western leaders. Reflecting this new attitude, he told Chernyayev immediately following Shultz's working visit to Moscow in the spring of 1988:

> Look at how Shultz, Nitze, [Matthew] Ridgway and [Colin] Powell listened when I spoke. None of them was inclined to justify their own President. Shultz indeed is an intelligent and decent person, a major political figure. . . . And look how things are unfolding at the working level. Shevardnadze relates to me—Ridgway and [Aleksandr] Bessmertnykh sit down together and conduct official negotiations and with half a word they understand everything . . . two correct-thinking, intelligent people. When before has such a situation existed! . . . I have the impression when I look at them [i.e. Shultz, Nitze, Powell and Ridgway] listening to me that they forget that they are functionaries [*chinovniki*] in the service of Reagan. They are simply normal people who understand their responsibilities.[84]

In his own account, Marshal Akhromeyev also notes that his perception was also undergoing a change as a result of his direct encounters with administration officials, which began at Reykjavik and continued to expand as a result of his direct involvement in the negotiations in Geneva beginning in 1987. Akhromeyev's account suggests that he came to have increasing confidence in Shultz, Nitze, and Powell as negotiating partners. His meeting at the Pentagon with Chairman of the Joints Chiefs, Admiral William J. Crowe, and the service chiefs at the Washington summit also left Akhromeyev impressed by the pro-

[82] Gorbachev, *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 76.
[83] Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995), 151–152.
[84] Chernyayev, *Shest'let*, 190–191.

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fessionalism and intelligence of the military leadership.[85] The meeting marked the beginning of direct contacts between the United States and Soviet military, which would gradually expand. In subsequent months, a cordial working relationship as well as a degree of personal friendship developed between Crowe and Akhromeyev, which paralleled the relationship that had developed the preceding year between Shultz and Shevardnadze.

The Washington summit did not mark a complete end to the pattern of suspicion and distrust prevailing between Washington and Moscow. Distrust and doubt regarding the other side's intentions and policies remained and would periodically flare up as difficulties were encountered in negotiations over outstanding issues or the speeches or actions of one side raised suspicions in the other regarding a return to behavior characteristic of the first half of the 1980s. Despite a last minute flurry of high level negotiations, no meaningful progress was achieved at the Washington summit with regard to a mutually acceptable interpretation of the limitations which the ABM Treaty imposed on SDI testing and development.[86] While some progress was made on several outstanding issues related to a strategic arms agreement, substantial progress would continue to be impeded by the disagreement over SDI. The failure to adequately satisfy Soviet concerns on this issue would continue to be a source of serious concerns and suspicion to Moscow throughout the remainder of the Reagan administration's term.

Conflicts between U.S. and Soviet positions regarding a peace settlement in Afghanistan would also continue to provoke serious distrust on Moscow's part throughout the spring of 1988. While the Washington summit did not mark an abrupt shift in attitudes, it did mark a significant turning point in Moscow's view of the Reagan administration, and in Gorbachev's approach to dealing with Reagan. As the working diplomatic relationship improved, Gorbachev relied decreasingly on the strategy of seeking to mobilize world opinion against the Reagan administration, and reflected greater confidence that the Reagan administration was prepared to shift away from the harsh anti-Soviet policies of its first term in favor of a policy of increased cooperation with Moscow. Those who were most influential in shaping Soviet foreign policy increasingly concluded that moderates had gained ascendance over hardliners in Washington, and that Reagan himself was changing his attitude toward the Soviet Union. This new perception was reflected in Soviet decisions in early 1988 regarding Afghanistan. According to Georgy Kornienko's account, in the aftermath of the Washington summit, he advised Gorbachev that those in the Reagan administration who favored a policy supportive of an early peace settlement in Afghanistan that would facilitate Soviet withdrawal, "The Dealers" (*Ulazhivateli*), had gained ascendance over "The Bleeders" (*Krovopuskateli*)

[85] Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 140–141.

[86] A good discussion of these negotiations and the unsatisfactory nature of the verbal compromise included in the final communique regarding this issue is contained in Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami*, 142–148.

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faction that favored obstructing a settlement in order to prolong the drain on Soviet resources and the damage to the Soviet position in world politics. Moreover, Kornienko suggested to Gorbachev that if the Soviet Union were to set a firm early date for the beginning of Soviet withdrawal, the Reagan administration would respond cooperatively insofar as it had a new preoccupation in its second term with bolstering its place in history through concrete achievements in reducing world tensions.[87] In following this course of action in February 1988, whether as a direct result of such advice by Kornienko or not, Gorbachev demonstrated that he was prepared to conduct policy based on the expectation of a new level of cooperation from the Reagan administration. Although Gorbachev was to be disappointed and angered by the Reagan administration's refusal to link a cutoff of U.S. supplies to the Mujahadeen to the Soviet withdrawal, his anger did not lead him to revert to his earlier approach to dealing with Washington. Indeed, by the spring of 1988, with domestic reform entering a new and critical phase in the Soviet Union, continuing improvement in U.S.–Soviet relations was acquiring even greater importance to Gorbachev.[88] Reflecting his evolving attitude, Gorbachev was prepared by the end of 1987 to encourage a reconstruction of the United States at the level of official ideology—a task he had previously been unprepared to undertake.

Reconstructing the Enemy

While Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and other reform-oriented elements in the Soviet leadership may have recognized that the siege mentality embedded in official discourse on the international situation served to sustain political conservatism as well as a profound misallocation of resources to a bloated military sector,[89] Gorbachev himself displayed little inclination to endorse a revised image of the enemy before the fall of 1987. As a protege of Yuri Andropov, who held a profoundly harsh cold war image of the United States, Gorbachev assumed power imbued with his own suspicions and distrust of the Reagan administration. Not only Gorbachev, but other reformers such as Aleksander Yakovlev also harbored profoundly negative views of the Reagan administration in this period.[90] In the absence of concrete evidence of a shift in the Reagan administration's policy toward Moscow, Gorbachev was unwilling to use the

[87] Ibid., 161–162.

[88] Regarding Gorbachev's anger and frustration with U.S. policy on Afghanistan in the spring of 1988, see *Zhizn'*, vol. ii, 118–121.

[89] Shevardnadze comments on the importance of altering the "enemy image" of the United States to the domestic reform project in his own memoirs. *E. A. Shevardnadze Moy vybor* (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 122–123, 172. An English translation is available as E. A. Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 66–67.

[90] In an article that appeared in the journal of the Institute for the Study of International Relations and the World Economy, where he served as director in 1985, Yakovlev was highly pessimistic regarding the prospects for any change in U.S.–Soviet relations as long as the Reagan administration was in power. *MEiMO*, No. 3, 3–17.

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powerful bully ideological pulpit that came with his post as general secretary to encourage a significant reimaging of Moscow's cold war adversary. Nor was he prepared to instruct the ideological apparatus of the party to alter its ongoing efforts to propagate an image of the Reagan administration as a malevolent imperialist force. In the absence of concrete progress in negotiations, cordial meetings with Reagan notwithstanding, Gorbachev thus did little before the fall of 1987 to encourage a significant alteration of the cold war image of the United States, which continued to be propagated and encouraged by the party's ideological apparatus. More sophisticated analyses of the international situation and the policies of the West were increasingly evident in the writings of some members of the intelligentsia engaged in the study of international relations. By 1987, a younger generation of scholars had begun to produce analyses that were far less dogmatic and often implicitly called into question the simplified stereotypes that continued to dominate the rhetoric and writings of the party and state leadership. The writing of these scholars was largely confined to specialized and limited-circulation journals, however, and had yet to have a significant impact on mainstream, official ideological discourse, as expressed in official speeches of the leadership or in the official party press.[91]

Official encouragement for a reimaging of the Reagan administration was to become evident, however, only after Moscow and Washington moved toward the conclusion of an INF Agreement in the latter half of 1987 and Gorbachev began his own reassessment of the United States based on his experience in dealing with the Reagan administration. In September, *Kommunist*, the party's leading theoretical journal, published an article by Stanislav Kondrashov, a prominent journalist on the staff of the official government paper *Izvestiia*, which pointedly called for a more objective appraisal of the outside world and an end to "black and white oversimplifications" and "mechanical denunciations."[92] By the end of 1987, Gorbachev himself began to stress this theme. In a speech of major ideological significance delivered in November on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev offered a commentary on the international situation and U.S. policy that was distinctly less harsh in tone than the remarks he had made at the 27th Party Congress eighteen months earlier. Posing the rhetorical question, "Is capitalism capable of freeing itself from militarism?" the general secretary suggested that an affirmative answer was now ideologically acceptable when he noted that contemporary history offered examples of capitalist countries with minimal military ex-

[91] Examples of this trend include: V.V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, V. Kortunov, "O razumnoy dostatochnost," *S SH A: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, No. 12 (1987), 11–22; G. A. Trofimenko, "Noviye real'nosti i novoye mishlenie," *S Sh A*, No. 2, (1987); V. M. Berezhkov, "Velikaya nauka-zhit vmeste," *S Sh A*, No. 2 (1986); O. Bykov, "Real'naya vozmozhnost obuzdaniya gonki vooruzhenii," *ME i MO*, No. 1, 1986; V. Kortunov, "Novoye politicheskoye mishleniye," *MEiMO*, No. 10, 1986. See also Checkel, *Ideas*, for a discussion of this trend.

[92] S. N. Kondrashov, "Tochnyi obraz mira," *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1987.

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penditures.[93] Official endorsement of a new degree of open-mindedness in assessing the policies of the capitalist states was suggested by the very structure of the section of Gorbachev's remarks on the international situation, which was keyed to a series of such open rhetorical questions—to which definitive and orthodox ideological answers were not provided. In other comments suggesting a cautious albeit distinct reevaluation of the Reagan administration, Gorbachev declared that "an understanding of the catastrophic danger the world is in . . . is penetrating even into the upper echelons of the ruling elite in the Western world." "A sign of a change in stereotypes of antisovietism and suspicion with regard to our initiatives and action" is the accord with the United States "on the conclusion in the near future" of an agreement on medium range missiles.[94] Overall, Gorbachev's speech appeared to be an important green light for a managed reconstruction of the image of the enemy in official ideological discourse.

Coincident with Gorbachev's shifting views on the Reagan administration and in the wake of the concrete progress on disarmament achieved at the Washington summit, important new themes became apparent in official Soviet discourse on the international situation and U.S.–Soviet relations in particular. Immediately following the Washington summit, dramatically new conclusions regarding the character of contemporary capitalism were appearing in the party press. The party theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, which had recently come under the editorship of a Gorbachev ally, in its issue for January 1988 carried an article by three prominent international relations analysts who reached the ideologically startling conclusion that there were "no influential political forces in either the United States nor Western Europe that would find the goal [of initiating war against the Soviet Union] to be acceptable." It was not simply the military might of the Soviet Union and the danger of cataclysmic nuclear war that was depicted as keeping the aggressive instinct of imperialism in check, the authors suggested, but a whole range of changes which had occurred both in the international situation and in the internal political characteristics of the capitalist states themselves. Perhaps most significantly, the authors concluded that democratic institutions in the United States had become an effective check on the aggressive inclinations of the Pentagon.[95] The same month, a lengthy analysis appeared in *Pravda* that concluded that militarism was not an inevitable or necessary characteristic of capitalism and excoriated those who held such a view as "left-radicals."[96]

Ideological revision of the image of the capitalist West continued to broaden and deepen after 1987. The reimaging of the West in official discourse

[93] "Gorbachev's New Thinking in World Affairs," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 39 (9 December 1987), 13.

[94] Ibid., 13–14.

[95] V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, A. Kortunov, "Vyzovi besopastnosti-stariye i noviye," *Kommunist*, January 1988, 42.

[96] Yuri Krasin, "A esli bez militariszma," *Pravda*, 28 January 1988.

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was encouraged not only by signals and cues provided from the top, in Gorbachev's official pronouncements and articles and editorials in the party press, but also more generally by the freer intellectual climate of glasnost.[97] While these new and increasingly positive images of the U.S. political system were associated in the first instance with the general policy of glasnost, which was pressed by Gorbachev as a means of overcoming domestic stagnation and stimulating a reformist atmosphere and image, their publication reflected a new confidence on the part of Gorbachev and the reform-oriented element of the party that a significant transformation had begun in U.S.–Soviet relations.

Conclusions

Overall, the emerging record of memoir accounts and previously unavailable documentary material suggests that Gorbachev's direct contacts with Western officials, most importantly his meetings with Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, played an important role in overcoming his deep distrust and skepticism regarding Washington's readiness to alter its policy and approach to the Soviet Union. Though Gorbachev never abandoned his belief in the formidable influence of the military-industrial complex in Washington, he did come to see Reagan much in the light that Mitterand had sought to present the American president to Gorbachev in one of their early meetings—as a president capable of taking bold decisions and as a man with a deep interest in progress in nuclear disarmament.[98] Gorbachev also developed increasing confidence in and respect for Shultz and the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva, based both on his own meetings with these officials and Shevardnadze's and Marshal Akhromeyev's assessments of their counterparts. In this regard, the emerging records and memoir accounts appear to offer considerable support for Dobrynin's observation that it was the interest of the second-term Reagan administration in pursuing a more cooperative policy toward a Gorbachev-led Soviet Union, rather than the hard-line rhetoric and policies of the first-term Reagan administration that accounts for the remarkable transformation of U.S.–Soviet relations in the period 1985–1988.

In this regard Dobrynin has noted:

> [T]he increased defense spending provoked by Reagan's policies was not the straw that broke the back of the evil empire. We did not bankrupt ourselves in the arms race as the Caspar Weinbergers of this world would like to believe. The Soviet response to Star Wars caused only an acceptable small rise in defense spending. Throughout the Reagan Presidency the rising Soviet defense effort contributed to

[97] Especially important in this regard was the influential collection of essays by prominent social scientists on political and ideological issues under the general editorship of Yuri Afanasyev, *Inovo ne dano: glasnost, demokratiya, sotsialism* (Moscow: Progress, 1988).

[98] This point has been recently strongly reiterated in a joint article by Gorbachev's principal foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyayev. A. Chernyayev and Pavel Palazhchenkko," Na samom dele bylo tak," *Nezavizamaya gazeta*, 15 February 1997, 6.

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> our economic decline, but only marginally as it had in previous years. . . . It may sound like an historical paradox . . . but if the President had not abandoned his hostile stance toward the Soviet Union for a more constructive one during his second term, Gorbachev would not have been able to launch his reforms and his new thinking. Quite the contrary, Gorbachev would have been forced to continue the conservative foreign and defense policies of his predecessors in defense of the nation against America.[99]

The record also suggests that the human factor was of considerable importance in redefining the character of U.S.–Soviet relations in the period 1985–1988. The recognition of the importance of this factor should at least balance and contextualize the spate of claims that tough defense and covert policies "won" the cold war, or that Soviet economic difficulties compelled Gorbachev to embrace the Reagan administration. Gorbachev ascended to the post of general secretary imbued with much of the standard Soviet ideological worldview. While he recognized the importance and desirability of reducing East-West tensions and resuming progress on arms control, he held a highly negative and distrustful image of the Reagan administration and had discounted the possibilities of achieving substantial cooperation in direct diplomacy. Instead, Gorbachev was inclined to pursue the *obkhodny variant*, which emphasized a new, more sophisticated peace campaign and an attempt to divide NATO by luring the European states into improved relations with Moscow. Gradually, however, Gorbachev's contacts with Reagan, Shultz, and other top Western officials led him to adopt a more positive image of the Reagan administration as a reliable negotiating partner, prepared to move forward on disarmament and generally supportive of Gorbachev's domestic reform program.

Though viewed from the erroneous standpoint of retrospective determinism—Gorbachev's quest for improved relations with Washington has been depicted as the result of the rapidly developing internal crisis in the Soviet Union—the diplomatic strategy that evolved under Gorbachev's leadership in the period 1985–1989 did not reflect a reluctant capitulation of objectives that Gorbachev and his reformist allies would have preferred to retain. The strategy of bold concessions on arms control and regional conflicts that Gorbachev subsequently embraced was viewed by him not as a policy of capitulation, but as a triumph of a reformed Soviet diplomacy that corrected costly errors of the Brezhnev leadership, transformed the Reagan administration from a militant cold war adversary into a supporter of perestroika, created an international climate that facilitated the implementation of reform and greatly enhanced his own power and prestige on the Soviet, as well as the world stage. Once he became convinced that a policy of bold concessions would achieve these results, the concessions appeared to Gorbachev more than justified. In the context of this strategy, assessing the readiness of the Reagan administration to transform relations with the Soviet Union was a critical preoccupation for Gorbachev.

[99] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 611.

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The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy during the Cold War

ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON

In January 1966, Frank Church (D-ID) commented privately on how internal squabbling and ideological divisions had "immobilized" the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But, he added, this development enhanced the opportunity for senators who did not serve on the committee to influence foreign policy issues.[1] Church's observation captured the altered institutional framework through which Congress approached international issues during the height of the cold war. Symbolized by internal challenges to the preeminence of the Foreign Relations Committee, the legislature's role in the foreign policy powers that it shared with the executive declined after 1945. Yet the expanded U.S. world presence also created openings for Congress to affect international matters in less traditional ways. Changes in the culture of Congress, meanwhile, allowed ambitious legislators to use the body's increasingly decentralized nature to forward their own agendas.

Before World War II, Congress exercised its foreign policy powers through three broad frameworks. The first method came via its constitutional right to declare war and, for the Senate, to approve treaties and confirm ambassadors, functions assigned in a shared fashion to both the legislative and executive branches. Second, although less frequently used, was the attachment of policy riders to military appropriations bills, as occurred in 1919 when a tie vote on such a measure prompted the Wilson administration to withdraw troops sent to aid anticommunist forces in the Russian civil war. A more common manifes-

[1] Frank Church to Robert Farning, 12 January 1966, Series 2.2, Box 9, Frank Church Papers, Albertson's Library, Boise State University, Idaho.

ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON is assistant professor of history at Williams College. His most recent book is *Ernest Gruening and the American Dissenting Tradition.*

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tation of the appropriations power came in congressional manipulation of tariff policy. Finally, within Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee established itself as the most reliable expression of the congressional will on international affairs; its chair was generally the most influential legislator on foreign policy issues.[2]

The advent of nuclear weapons, the emergence of the cold war, the establishment of a sizable peacetime army, and the backlash against congressional attempts to legislate neutrality in the 1930s fundamentally altered the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches. Postwar presidents more forcefully asserted an independent right to conduct foreign policy, pointing either to treaty obligations (such as the United Nations or NATO) or the commander-in-chief clause.[3] In response, all three traditional paths through which Congress influenced foreign policy were transformed. On the constitutional front, declarations of war tended to give way to joint resolutions offering advance approval for overseas actions. Meanwhile, with important exceptions—such as NATO, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Panama Canal Treaties—treaties fell out of favor, replaced either by executive or statutory agreements. The altered nature of the appropriations power produced more mixed results. Congress all but sacrificed its role in foreign economic policy, while the cold war rendered votes against defense appropriations politically impossible until the mid-1960s. On the other hand, the development of the foreign aid program provided a new entry point for both chambers of Congress to address international issues. Finally, a series of dramatic changes occurred in the internal structure through which Congress handled foreign policy matters. The bureaucratic power of the Department of Defense and the development of the U.S. nuclear arsenal encouraged the emergence of the Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to rival the Foreign Relations Committee. The postwar era also featured a vast expansion of subcommittees devoted to international issues, which in the Senate alone ballooned from

[2] For warmaking, see John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); for the treaty issue, see Lloyd Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); for the appropriations power, see Richard Coke Lower, *A Bloc of One: The Political Career of Hiram W. Johnson* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Robert David Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 105–150; for the 1930s, see Wayne Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); for foreign economic policy, see Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 73–79.

[3] For the new constitutional theories, see Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); for the role of the intelligence community, see Frank Smist, *Congress Oversees the Intelligence Community* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1995); for the effect of the expansion of defense spending, see Ann Markusen, Scott Campbell, Peter Hall, and Sabina Deitrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); for the rise of executive agreements, see Loch Johnson, *The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive* (New York: New York University Press, 1984).

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seven in the first postwar Congress to thirty-one by 1965. These two developments, in combination with a high turnover rate in its chairmanship between 1945 and 1959, ended the Foreign Relations Committee's position as the unchallenged congressional representative on international matters.[4]

Scholars of the congressional role in postwar international history have concentrated their attention on how Congress's shared constitutional prerogatives atrophied in the years following World War II.[5] This approach unsurprisingly has yielded a conclusion that the legislature's overall influence in foreign policy matters declined. A focus on the structural changes, however, produces a quite different interpretation of events. The diffusion of power within Congress produced a less formal and more subtle legislative role in international affairs than had been the case before 1941. The conduct of the foreign policy subcommittees associated with the relatively low-profile Senate Government Operations Committee exemplifies the point.

The Emergence of Government Operations

The Legislative Reorganization Act passed in 1946 set the stage for the proliferation of foreign policy subcommittees. The measure consolidated the number of congressional committees, increased access to staff, and limited the power of committee chairs to control subcommittee agendas. In the Senate, when combined with the decentralizing tendencies already present in the upper chamber, the act ushered in what one scholar has termed the era of "subcommittee government." Subcommittee chairs, who obtained the right to hire their own majority staffs, also received increased responsibility due to the heavy workload of the postwar Congress. By the end of the 1950s, two-thirds of all Senate meetings occurred in subcommittees, which obtained still more power with the advent of the multiple referrals process, under which bills were referred to all subcommittees claiming jurisdiction over an issue.[6]

[4] For a listing, see *CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index, Part V, 79th Congress-82nd Congress, 1945–1952* (Washington, DC: Congressional Information Service, 1983), 988–998; *CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index, Part VI, 89th Congress-91st Congress, 1st session, 1965–1969* (Washington, DC: Congressional Information Service, 1983), 814–835.

[5] For the most recent expression of this point of view, see Fisher, *Presidential War Power*; also Cecil Crabb, Jr. and Pat Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992); Thomas Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).

[6] James Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), 182–183, 403–405; Norman Ornstein, "Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives" in Ornstein, ed., *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1975), 88–114; David Rohde, "Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee Bill of Rights," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 411 (January 1974): 39–47; Roger Davidson, "Subcommittee Government" in Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 99–133.

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No senator more spectacularly exploited the new congressional environment than Joseph McCarthy (R-WI). Though he initially confined his charges of communist infiltration of the State Department to speaking appearances, he soon discovered that he could use the powers of Congress to forward his interests as well. After the Republicans captured control of the Senate in 1952, McCarthy received a subcommittee chairmanship of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee from which to base his inquiries. Over the next eighteen months, he oversaw a series of investigations and public hearings that benefited from the access to professional staff and the increased powers granted to subcommittee chairs provided by the Legislative Reorganization Act. Moving beyond the usual functions of subcommittees—reporting legislation or conducting oversight in a strict sense of the term—the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee concentrated on mobilizing public opinion to restrict the executive's freedom of action in international affairs. The Wisconsin senator's tactics were not without precedent; in the 1930s, for example, a special committee chaired by Gerald Nye (R-ND) conducted a free-wheeling investigation that began by exploring the link between arms manufacturers and the U.S. entrance into World War I and culminated in rallying public support for stringent neutrality legislation. But the need to obtain majority support on his committee limited Nye's power as chair, and the Senate as a whole retained the right to terminate the committee by altering or refusing to renew its authorization. McCarthy, on the other hand, recognized how the era of subcommittee government weakened these constraints, providing opportunities for individual members of Congress to marshal the institution's powers to wield more influence over foreign policy.[7]

The Wisconsin senator profited from the Legislative Reorganization Act's reforms in one other way. McCarthy based his investigations not from the Foreign Relations Committee, on which he in vain attempted to obtain a position, but from a subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, whose mandate the Legislative Reorganization Act broadened dramatically. Originated in 1921 as the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, the committee labored in obscurity for its first twenty-five years, issuing but two reports, sending less than ten bills to the Senate for consideration, and focusing on such mundane issues as the applicability of the Harriman Geographic Code System for the United States. But then the reformers of 1946 vested in it the power to coordinate the oversight activities of all congressional committees. In addition, the act granted the committee the right to evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the executive branch (such as the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council) and to study relations between the United States and international organizations to which it belonged. In 1952, to reflect

[7] The best coverage of the congressional aspect of McCarthyism is Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970); for the Nye Committee, see Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*.

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its more prominent status, the committee's name was changed to Government Operations.[8]

McCarthy understood how these vague provisions gave Government Operations jurisdiction over some international matters. Ironically, his very success at using the power of his subcommittee to heighten his profile paved the way for his downfall: the Army-McCarthy hearings exposed a television audience, which peaked in excess of twenty-million people, to the Wisconsin senator's reckless and bullying tactics. But several of his colleagues of diverse ideological viewpoints learned from McCarthy's success at utilizing Congress's newly flexible institutional powers to fulfill his own personal, partisan, and ideological goals, as events over the next decade and a half would make clear.

The Birth of the Jackson Subcommittee

One of the minority members of McCarthy's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee was Henry Jackson (D-WA). With his attachment to the anticommunist principles of the early cold war and his calls for increased defense spending, especially for conventional arms, Jackson in many respects typified the cold war liberalism of the mid-1950s. He distinguished himself, however, in his support for a foreign policy eschewing ideological concerns for balance of power principles, which he believed also guided Harry Truman's final secretary of state, Dean Acheson. This agenda in turn earned praise from national commentators, who generally looked askance at congressional activism on foreign policy issues.[9]

During Jackson's initial years in the Senate, one fundamental assumption of cold war liberalism—that the United States could afford symmetrical containment of communism—was challenged by Dwight Eisenhower's New Look. Concerned about the need for a balanced budget, Eisenhower shifted priorities in his national security policy, relying more on nuclear weapons, covert action, and psychological warfare, all of which promised scaled-back defense expenditures. The new president also revised his predecessor's decision-making structure, chiefly in the more prominent role he assigned to the National Security Council (NSC). Early in his administration, Eisenhower asked Robert Cutler, president of a Boston bank and an active campaign supporter, to recommend ways of strengthening the NSC. The fruit of Cutler's work appeared in the establishment of a special assistant to the president for national security affairs

[8] *Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, History 1921–1972* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, [hereafter GPO], 1972), 1–11; Garison Nelson with Clark Bensen, *Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947–1992, Volume 1: Committee Jurisdictions and Member Rosters* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), 158; Sundquist, *Decline and Resurgence*, 325.

[9] Jackson, "Toward a Superior Force in Being," *New York Times Magazine*, 20 May 1956; Markusen, et. al., *Rise of the Gunbelt*, 162–164; Michael Foley, *The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 17–33; Richard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," *New Yorker*, 12 May 1962.

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(a post occupied first by Cutler himself and then by Gordon Gray) and the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to facilitate the implementation of national security policy. Although the actual situation differed, the perception existed that the NSC stood, in Cutler's words, "at the top of policy hill," focusing less on providing the president with a range of policy options than on making ambiguous compromises to paper over the bureaucratic divisions within the administration.[10]

Inheriting a strategy pioneered by Harry Truman and aided by internal divisions among the opposition, Eisenhower successfully promoted a policy of bipartisanship during his first term that stifled most Democratic congressional criticism and provided himself maximum freedom of action in international affairs. But after his reelection in 1956, signs of increased congressional activism emerged, and both the policy and the decision-making structure behind the New Look came under increasing attack. Partisanship among Senate Democrats played a key role in this development, but so too did international reverses such as the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 and domestic concerns of a "missile gap" between the United States and the USSR. Democrats angling for the party's 1960 presidential nomination, most notably John Kennedy (D-MA) and Stuart Symington (D-MO), blamed these cold war setbacks on Eisenhower's budget-conscious national security policy. They called for increased defense spending, especially for conventional weapons, as an alternative. Such sentiments prompted Joseph Clark (D-PA) to lament that his colleagues seemed "more concerned with military defense and preparations for war than with positive programs for peace and disarmament."[11]

Unlike Clark, Henry Jackson harbored no such concerns. He only wished that he could play a more active role in his party's attacks against Eisenhower's national security agenda. But, like McCarthy, Jackson's inability to secure a position on the Foreign Relations Committee frustrated his desire for influence on foreign policy issues. He therefore charged his staff with finding an alternative forum from which he could express his views. Shortly after Congress convened following the 1958 midterm elections, Jackson introduced a resolution to study the effectiveness of the NSC in confronting the "problems facing the

[10] For Eisenhower's national security policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 127–197; for the role of the NSC, see Anna Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Fall 1986): 307–326; and Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 45–47.

[11] Joseph Clark, "A Disarmament Policy for Democrats," 1960, Box 22-W(B), Joseph Clark Papers, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Philadelphia; Thomas Paterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years," *Diplomatic History* 3 (Winter 1979: 1–19; Henry W. Berger, "Bipartisanship, Senator Taft, and the Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Summer 1975): 221–234; Anna Nelson, "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress," *Political Science Quarterly* 102 (Spring 1987): 43–64; Gary Reichard, "Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952–1956," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Spring 1978): 46–65.

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free world in the contest with world communism." The senator's gambit was clever in two ways. First, the NSC's centrality in Eisenhower's decision-making structure assured that any study of its role also would provide an opportunity to critique the administration's broader foreign policy. Moreover, by framing the resolution as an inquiry into a structural rather than a policy matter, Jackson ensured its referral to the Government Operations Committee, on which he did serve, rather than the Foreign Relations Committee. He further expected that Government Operations Chair John McClellan (D-AR) would create a new subcommittee to handle the resolution. Jackson's staff understood their mission: to increase the perception of the senator as a specialist in international affairs.[12]

Invited by the president to comment on the resolution, Cutler cautioned that since Jackson "confuses the mechanism's effectiveness with the capabilities of its operators," a subcommittee, if authorized, would range far beyond the narrow question of whether the NSC was functioning as the authors of the National Security Act had intended. Eisenhower, of course, recognized this fact as well and aggressively sought to squelch the inquiry. He began by meeting with Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), Armed Services Committee Chair Richard Russell (D-GA), and J. William Fulbright (D-AR), who shortly would assume the helm of the Foreign Relations Committee. All three sympathized with the president's position, although for different reasons. Johnson believed that a policy of conciliation rather than confrontation on foreign policy matters would best serve the Democrats' partisan interests, but he failed to persuade Jackson to withdraw his offering. Russell then acted. The Georgia senator, worried that the new subcommittee could infringe on the prerogatives of his own committee, suggested that Eisenhower release a public letter warning that the resolution would thrust "Congressional investigative activities deeply into the nation's highest national security and foreign policy deliberative processes." Russell argued that the public relations value of such an action, in combination with his own private lobbying within the Senate Democratic caucus, would at the very least trim the mandate of Jackson's offering.[13]

As Russell predicted, Eisenhower's letter prompted a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee. Sensing a potentially hostile environment, Jackson looked to preempt any possible opposition by informing his colleagues that he would conduct a "quiet study," not an investigation. A proposed Foreign Rela-

[12] Jackson, "Memorandum for the Members of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery," 2 February 1959, Box 68, Foreign Policy Defense [hereafter FPD] Series, Henry Jackson Papers, Allen Library, University of Washington, Seattle; Richard Neustadt personal interview, 26 October 1996; Robert Tufts personal interview with author, 15 January 1997.

[13] Dwight Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson, 25 June 1959, copy in Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Jackson to J. K. Mansfield, 27 June 1959, Box 68, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Robert Cutler, "Memorandum for General Parsons," 4 June 1959, copy in Box 8, Folder 214c, Gordon Gray Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Gilbert Fite, *Richard B. Russell, Jr., Senator from Georgia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 357–358.

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tions Committee inquiry into Eisenhower's foreign policy two years before had encountered bipartisan opposition because its sponsor, Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey, framed it as an investigation, implying a hostile and partisan intent.[14] Jackson noted that the proposed subcommittee did not possess subpoena powers, and by deriving its authority from Government Operations would necessarily confine itself to structural rather than policy issues. He further promised to avoid questions likely to embarrass the president and to consult the Senate leadership before opening any public hearings. To pacify opposition among the Senate GOP, meanwhile, McClellan indicated his willingness to use the multiple referral technique to refer to the new subcommittee measures sponsored by Alexander Wiley (R-WI) to create a National Economic Council and Jacob Javits (R-NY) to diminish the policy-making role of the NSC, both of which Russell's Armed Services Committee had refused to report.[15]

Confident that everything had "worked out fine," Eisenhower withdrew his opposition, crediting Russell and Johnson for restraining Jackson. Within the administration, Gordon Gray believed that the shield of executive privilege would make a policy of limited cooperation with the Washington senator possible. The majority of the Government Operations Committee then authorized the creation of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, with only Ernest Gruening (D-AK), in a sign of future disagreements with his Washington colleague, expressing skepticism. Republicans named the hard-line anticommunist Karl Mundt (R-SD) and Javits as their subcommittee members; the duo joined Democrats Humphrey and Edmund Muskie (D-ME), with Jackson designated chair.[16]

Actually, the president underestimated the political and bureaucratic abilities of his foe. Jackson gave up little, since all along he hoped to mask his partisan and personal intentions by portraying the inquiry as scholarly and professional. In addition, the tangle over its authorization raised the subcommittee's visibility beyond expectations. International relations theorist Hans Morganthau, who gushed that upon the subcommittee's "success or failure may well depend the fate of this country," joined the *New York Times* in anticipating "refreshingly new" insights on the development of national security policy, while columnist Russell Baker termed the subcommittee's attempt "to fit democratic government for a prolonged competition with totalitarianism" of "im-

[14] For the background to the inquiry, see Hubert Humphrey to Albert Gore, 17 December 1956; Humphrey to Wayne Morse, 18 December 1956; both in Box 129, Hubert Humphrey Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul.

[15] Jackson, "Memorandum on President's Letter to Senator Johnson," Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers.

[16] Bryce Harlow to LBJ, Box 48, LBJ A Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin; Gordon Gray, "Memorandum for the President," 12 June 1959, Box 8, Folder 214c, Gray Papers; Dwight Eisenhower to Jackson, 10 July 1959, Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; "Excerpts from Minutes of Committee on Government Operations, Held Monday, May 4, 1959," copy in Box 533, RG III, Karl Mundt Papers, Dakota State University, Madison, SD; Fite, *Richard B. Russell*, 358.

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mense importance." A once low-profile inquiry conducted by an offshoot of a minor Senate committee suddenly was on the front page of the *Times*.[17]

Having won the battle over authorization, Jackson structured the subcommittee to fulfill three broad goals. First, he hoped to enhance his visibility on international questions. Second, he sought to frame public discussion on national security issues for the 1960 campaign season. Finally and most ambitiously, the Washington senator envisioned the subcommittee conducting detailed staff studies of national security policy and issuing reports containing guidelines for the nation's foreign policy. As was the case with McCarthy's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, none of these functions resembled the traditional roles of congressional subcommittees. But the diffusion of power characteristic of the postwar Senate provided Jackson with freedom to maneuver.

This agenda required a small, expert staff with extensive contacts among the policy-making elite, to be supplemented by outside consultants, mostly from the academic world. As staff director, Jackson appointed J. K. Mansfield, a former professor in Yale's International Relations Department who had worked for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; the Washington senator looked to the JCAE as an example of a committee that wielded influence through quiet alliances with the national security bureaucracy. Recalled by one contemporary as the "presiding genius" of Jackson's plan to use the subcommittee to establish his own base of power, Mansfield's expertise in technical questions relating to nuclear weapons, one of the subcommittee's anticipated lines of attack, enhanced his attractiveness. From the intelligence community came Robert Tufts, who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and then in the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (PPS) under Dean Acheson; and the subcommittee's secretary, Helen Hill, Tufts' secretary at the PPS whom Jackson obtained on loan from the CIA. Finally, the senator shifted to the subcommittee his principal assistant and chief ideological confidante, Dorothy Fosdick, whose previous diplomatic service came as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conference and with the PPS. Fosdick joined Jackson's staff immediately following his election, eager to remain involved with international issues but disinclined to serve under John Foster Dulles. As one contemporary recalled, her move to "Capitol Hill came with the full blessing of the foreign policy establishment."[18]

[17] John Finney, "President Backs Senators' Study of Policy Making," *New York Times*, 19 July 1959; Russell Baker, "The Jackson Inquiry," *New York Times*, 19 July 1959; editorial, "A Look at National Policy," *New York Times*, 20 July 1959; Hans Morganthau letter to editor, *New York Times*, 2 August 1959.

[18] Richard Neustadt personal interview with author on 22 September 1995; Roberts Tufts personal interview with author on 15 October 1995; Pat Holt personal interview with author, all on 30 May 1996; "Biographical Sketches—Majority Staff Members Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery," Box 533, Mundt Papers.

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These figures spent an unusually lengthy period—over six months—conducting background interviews. In conversations with administration officials, Mansfield adhered so rigorously to the study guidelines that Eisenhower staffers wondered whether he was interested in "disarming" the administration or simply was a figure who rarely "got the point." Fosdick and Tufts, however, presented a more hostile point of view, reminding Pentagon representatives that "when Senator Jackson himself became involved in the questioning," the type of "consideration" demonstrated by Mansfield would vanish. Beyond the administration, Jackson's staff contacted over three-hundred figures ranging from George Kennan, the father of the containment doctrine and the first head of the PPS; to Matthew Ridgway, former Army chief of staff and critic of Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear weapons; to strategic thinkers and international relations theorists such as Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie. In general, Jackson explained, the committee wanted the opinions of those whose personal experiences had given them "definite ideas concerning existing deficiencies in the policy process."[19]

The lengthy background investigation removed some of the partisan tinge surrounding the subcommittee. Developing extensive contacts with the policy-making elite, a former staffer recalled, also created for Jackson a "talent bank" to which he later could turn for counsel on national security issues. But the long research period also threatened to rob the subcommittee of the high public profile gained from the skirmish over its authorization. To avoid this problem, the subcommittee sponsored a seminar at the fall 1959 meeting of the American Political Science Association, while Fosdick used her contacts with the Council on Foreign Relations to schedule a similar event that November. Administration officials defended Eisenhower at both of these forums. But the line that they adopted—that the NSC played a vital role in the president's policy and that it was functioning well—actually benefited Jackson by reminding observers of the inquiry's importance. By February 1960, commentator James Reston observed that the Washington community anticipated the subcommittee's "scholarly, objective, and non-partisan" inquiry as "one of the most significant in many years," the model, Reston concluded, of a "legislative investigation at its very best."[20]

[19] J. K. Mansfield to Hubert Humphrey, 20 October 1959, Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Jackson to Gabriel Almond, 28 July 1959, RG III, Box 533, Mundt Papers; Robert H. Johnson, "Memorandum for the Record," 10 September 1959; Johnson, "Memorandum for the Record, 17 September 1959; all in Box 8, Folder 214c, Gray Papers.

[20] Jackson to Thomas Hennings, n/d 1959, reproduced in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Hearings, Organizing for National Security*, 86th Congress, 2nd sess. [hereafter *Organizing for National Security Hearings*], 8 (23 February 1960); James Reston, "Inquiry at Its Best," *New York Times*, 26 February 1960; Davidson, "Subcommittee Government," 114; Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill,'" 320–323; Grenville Garside, "The Jackson Subcommittee on National Security" in Dorothy Fosdick, ed., *Staying the Course: Henry M. Jackson and National Security* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 59.

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Jackson did not disappoint. He opened the hearings with a carefully coordinated list of witnesses headed by Robert Lovett, former undersecretary of state and defense, with whom Jackson explored the need "to spend more on defense and other national security programs." The Washington senator privately gloated that obtaining testimony from "men who have no political or military ax to grind" had revealed "that we face an enormous peril, that we are not doing enough, and that we should do more." Calling for the United States once again to "compete effectively" with the USSR, he demanded lessening the role of the NSC and the Bureau of the Budget by returning to the "traditional approach" of conducting diplomacy through the State Department. These changes, Jackson hoped, would pave the way for expanding defense spending, reform an overly bureaucratized decision-making structure, and allow for a more dynamic foreign policy along the lines outlined by NSC 68, the Truman administration document that served as the ideological blueprint for the cold war.[21]

Press commentary on the hearings testified to the subcommittee's success at positioning Jackson as a leading voice on national security issues. Quincy Howe of ABC, for example, noted the "irony" of how the Republican Lovett gave "the Democrats better political ammunition than most of their own leaders have yet provided." Syndicated columnist Doris Fleeson went even further, arguing that the witnesses made "the defense case that Democrats have been groping for but have so far failed to define." *Newsweek* agreed that "the Great Debate over the state of U.S. defenses" took a "far different turn" as a result of Jackson's decision to summon witnesses who lacked partisan or bureaucratic agendas for criticizing the administration. Columnist Raymond Brandt summarized Jackson's achievement: the Washington senator demonstrated "how to plan a congressional committee to get the results he desired." Indeed, Jackson was among the first in Congress to use congressional hearings for the explicit purpose of satisfying the media's desire for substance in an age when policy makers like Dulles frequently offered simplistic explanations, at least in public, on international questions.[22]

With the subcommittee's "explosive" potential now fulfilled, Republicans belatedly mobilized against Jackson's "free hand" over its agenda. Bryce Harlow, the president's chief congressional liaison, revived an earlier suggestion that Jackson inquire into "the organization of Congress in the national security field," hoping to provoke a bureaucratic turf battle. Assured that at most the subcommittee would hold public hearings "for a day or two," Mundt had been content for a member of the majority staff to advise him "periodically . . . of the progress being made." Now, however, the South Dakota senator conceded that Jackson "seems to be using the subcommittee as a forum to advance the

[21] Jackson to Mark Chitter, 5 March 1960, Box 256, 1953–1962 Series, Jackson Papers; Jackson to Hubert Humphrey, 17 November 1960, Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; *Organizing for National Security Hearings*, 21 (23 February 1960), 55, 87 (24 February 1960), 94–95 (25 February 1960).

[22] Richard Neustadt personal interview with author; Ned Pendleton memorandum, "Press Comment re hearings," 4 March 1960, copy in Box 570, RG III, Mundt Papers.

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argument that the United States is lagging in the military preparedness program." Begging for White House "guidance" for "non-partisan, non-Administration witnesses" to offer "favorable" testimony, the South Dakota senator also publicly denounced implications, made most prominently by columnist Walter Lippmann, that Lovett's testimony constituted a direct criticism of Eisenhower's national security policies. Such attacks, however, were too little too late: by this time, the subcommittee's inquiry had developed into what one observer described as the Senate's "subtle spectacular," an "implicit invasion by the Legislative branch of the jealously guarded precincts of the Executive," even though its topic resembled more "the graduate seminar than the Congressional investigation."[23]

But Jackson wanted the subcommittee to do more than crystallize the "conventional wisdom" concerning the administration's shortcomings in national security matters. Throughout the hearings, he argued that lessening the policy-making role of the NSC would leave it free to operate where it was most effective—"pulling together at the summit level of government . . . all the component parts of policy" to articulate "broad strategic requirements." Jackson's friend and a regular subcommittee witness, Paul Nitze, performed this task to perfection during the Truman administration, when he played the key role in writing NSC 68. The Washington senator now looked to assume Nitze's role himself. To set the stage, he called a host of prestigious witnesses, beginning with Kennan and Nitze, aiming less to elicit explosive testimony than to establish the credibility of the subcommittee's staff studies and final report. He hoped to downplay superficial issues such as allegations of a "missile gap" with the USSR and highlight instead the need for a foreign policy promoting the balance of power executed by a professional diplomatic corps.[24]

Completing these documents consumed most of the subcommittee's efforts from mid-1960 through late 1961. In the meantime, however, the attention of both the nation's political community and Jackson himself shifted to the presidential campaign. After bypassing his Washington colleague for his running mate, John Kennedy named Jackson chair of the national party as a consolation prize. Despite similar ideological viewpoints, the duo did not enjoy a close personal relationship, which the stress of the campaign failed to improve. Kennedy complained that Jackson spent too much of his time talking about national security policy when he should be focusing on electoral matters. Jackson had all

[23] Bryce Harlow, quoted in Dorothy Fosdick, "Memorandum for the Record," 1 October 1959; Karl Mundt to Jackson, 26 September 1959; Mundt to Melvin Bird, 16 March 1960; Mundt to Bryce Harlow, 12 March 1960; all in Box 570, RG III, Mundt Papers; "Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery," 16 July 1959, RG III, Box 533, Mundt Papers; Cabell Phillips, "'Subtle Spectacular' on Capitol Hill," *New York Times*, 29 May 1960.

[24] Richard Neustadt personal interview; Robert Tufts personal interview; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Hearings, Organizing for National Security: The Department of State, the Policy Planning Staff, and the National Security Council*, 86th Congress, 2nd sess., 831 (26 May 1960), 879 (17 June 1960).

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along viewed the party's nominee as a "possible prime consumer of the product" of the subcommittee inquiry and showed little inclination to adjust course, prompting his replacement with John Bailey almost immediately after the election. Jackson's hopes that the new administration would turn to him for advice on appointments to national security posts likewise were dashed. The senator touted Paul Nitze for secretary of defense (a position he clearly desired for himself as well) and Robert Tufts for national security adviser; but Kennedy chose Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy for the slots instead.[25]

These personal setbacks, however, did not lessen the impact of Jackson's opinions on modifying the role of the NSC. The new administration adopted most of his suggestions shortly after coming to office. Asserting that the presidency, rather than the NSC, needed to form the "vital center of action in our whole scheme of government," Kennedy abolished the NSC Planning Board and the OCB, decreased the frequency and the importance of NSC meetings, and reduced the number of staff personnel assigned to the NSC. Jackson, who warmly praised the changes, received commendation from the administration with the release of the subcommittee's report in early November 1961. The document itself offered little new. More significant was the attention it attracted from figures such as McNamara, who spent Thanksgiving morning poring over the "extraordinary and perceptive statement"; Kennedy, who sent his personal congratulations on the content; and Nitze, who joked about how he seemed "to recognize some of the conclusions." The praise offered proof of Jackson's success at creating what Richard Neustadt recalled as "climate of opinion" among key officials "that Ike was overbureaucratized." As Elmer Staats, Kennedy's deputy budget director, noted, the inquiry "had a very substantial effect on the thinking of both the executive and the legislative branch."[26]

By the time of the report's release, Jackson had managed to use a seemingly obscure subcommittee to wield a substantial impact on the nation's foreign policy scene. A number of factors permitted this success. The Washington senator, like McCarthy before him, took advantage of the diffusion of power in the aftermath of the Legislative Reorganization Act. He also benefited from the similarities between his national security viewpoint and that of the majority of the Senate Democratic caucus and much of the official class in Washington. Finally, Jackson profited from his willingness to assume a more flexible definition of

[25] Richard Neustadt personal interview; Robert Tufts personal interview; Garside, "The Jackson Subcommittee" in Fosdick, ed., *Staying the Course*, 60; Dorothy Fosdick, ed., *Henry M. Jackson and World Affairs* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 63.

[26] Robert McNamara to Jackson, 23 November 1961; Paul Nitze to Jackson, 4 December 1961; Elmer Staats to Jackson, 9 January 1962; all in Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Report, Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman*, 87th Congress, 1st sess., CIS Document #S0485; for Kennedy's national security doctrine, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 198–236; and David Kaiser, "Issues and Men" in Diane Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 9–20; Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill,'" 325; Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, 89–91.

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congressional power than had McCarthy. After the Lovett testimony increased the subcommittee's profile, the chair quickly moved away from explosive hearings and focused instead on developing high-quality staff reports designed to influence the policy-making elite.

The Jackson Subcommittee Under Democratic Rule

Despite the praise from the president and other administration officials, Jackson faced several short-term dilemmas in 1961. His desire to issue the reports as subcommittee prints (and thus official congressional documents) boosted the leverage of the subcommittee's heretofore ignored minority members. Mundt long had complained about the abuses suffered by the sole member of the minority staff, ranging from office space in a former closet to Jackson's practice of providing drafts of the subcommittee's studies on Friday afternoon in anticipation of a release the following Monday morning. Before the publication of the last round of staff studies and Jackson's long-awaited final report, the South Dakota senator threatened to deny responsibility for their content unless he and Javits received at least two weeks to review them and suggest changes. Striking more directly at Jackson's aims, Javits recommended that the subcommittee concentrate on reporting legislation and less on issuing broad policy recommendations, while Mundt urged hearings on the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Jackson rebuffed these more serious challenges to his authority by granting Mundt's initial demands. Meanwhile, several Democrats looked to imitate him in creating a foreign policy-related subcommittee. Humphrey, whose own Disarmament Subcommittee had not been renewed by the Foreign Relations Committee, proved especially persistent in this regard. Jackson's staff viewed Humphrey's activities with "substantial" alarm, but, turning Jackson's earlier arguments against him, the Minnesota senator reasoned that since his proposed subcommittee would not "relate to top policy cooperation," its jurisdiction would not "overlap" with Jackson's. When Humphrey prevailed, a second Government Operations subcommittee dealing with international matters, the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, came into being.[27]

With the issuance of its final report, the mandate of the Jackson subcommittee technically expired. Edmund Muskie, for one, assumed that "as promised" the Washington senator would consent to terminating the subcommittee; Mundt likewise eagerly anticipated moving "on to other endeavors." Jackson, of course, had no intention of sacrificing the power which the subcommittee provided. But Kennedy's dismantling of Eisenhower's national security struc-

[27] Rod Kreeger to Karl Mundt, n/d 1961; Mundt to Henry Jackson, 9 March 1961, 26 April 1961; all in RG III, Box 570, Mundt Papers; Mundt and Jacob Javits to Jackson, 12 June 1961, Subseries IV, Box 28, Jacob Javits Papers, State University of New York, Stony Brook, Library; Hubert Humphrey to Jackson, 6 January 1961, 21 July 1961; Jackson to Humphrey, 11 July 1961; "Comparison between Present and Proposed Resolutions Authorizing Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations," 1961; all in Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers.

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ture robbed Jackson of the issue, which he initially used to rally support from other Democrats. Understanding the need for some creativity, the Washington senator contended that a reauthorized subcommittee would focus on the technical question of how the president's new decision-making structure functioned. This argument persuaded his colleagues on the Government Operations Committee, who expressed no opposition to reauthorization in late 1961. The subcommittee's new name, the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, reflected its altered scope. The title change served another purpose: it ensured that the national media would continue to refer to the "Jackson subcommittee," thus highlighting the profile of its chair.[28]

Despite the seemingly more narrowed scope of the subcommittee, Jackson continued to search for a way to continue forwarding his own foreign policy agenda. Quietly, he cultivated ties with the administration figures sympathetic to his ideological perspective, notably Secretary of State Dean Rusk, from whom he welcomed any "executive prodding" whenever the secretary of state was so inclined. But Rusk was hardly Kennedy's most influential policy maker, as Jackson understood. The new president's freewheeling foreign policy style conflicted with Jackson's more traditional approach to the conduct of diplomacy, while the senator, still "profoundly influenced by the point of view" associated with NSC 68, considered initiatives such as the Peace Corps or the Alliance for Progress misguided. In late 1962, the "breach" between the senator and Kennedy's national security apparatus went public, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara dismissed Jackson as the "senator from Boeing." Although Jackson's supporters rushed to his defense,[29] the insult confirmed that the senator's influence on matters of substance with Kennedy had come to an end. So Jackson shifted his subcommittee's focus: if he could not make his presence felt among the executive branch, he would play for the long run by aiming at the nation's elite thinkers on foreign policy, especially in the universities.[30]

In searching for an issue around which to center the new hearings, Jackson also offered an oblique criticism of the president's national security structure, opening an inquiry on the quality of the U.S. ambassadorial corps. The hearings operated under the premise that in a world oriented around balance-of-power principles, diplomacy would best be conducted by the diplomats, rather than the likes of McNamara or Bundy.[31] Since the subcommittee's new inquiry

[28] Richard Neustadt personal interview; Mundt to Rod Kreger, 23 August 1961, Box 570, RG III, Mundt Papers; Jackson, "Notes for First Meetings," 25 May 1962, Box 79, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Hearings, State, Defense, and the National Security Council*, 87th Congress, 1st sess., 1284 (24 August 1961).

[29] Richard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," *New Yorker*, 12 May 1962.

[30] Richard Neustadt personal interview; Robert Tufts personal interview; Jackson to Charles Hitch, 13 July 1961, Box 67, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Fosdick, ed., *Henry M. Jackson*, 71; for the influence of these publications, see Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill,'" 325.

[31] Richard Neustadt personal interview; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *Hearings, Administration of National Security*, 88th Congress, 1st sess., 2 (11 March 1963), 211 (24 July 1963); U.S. Senate, Committee on Govern-

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aimed at the foreign policy elite, it featured highly technical discussions that received little press attention. Jackson solicited suggestions from figures such as Averell Harriman, James Gavin, Lauris Norstad, and Edwin Reischauer on how to achieve a "good balance" between the State and Defense Departments and to ensure that ambassadors would coordinate all activities in the nations to which they were accredited. The hearings offered insight into Jackson's ideal of the Senate's foreign policy role when partisan or ideological concerns did not ensure public attention for events in the upper chamber. The senator relied on "nonpartisan and professional" staff preparation and testimony from expert witnesses, hoping to shape elite opinion on national security issues and perhaps influence what historian Ernest May has referred to as the postwar class of "officials" upon which cold war administrations relied to execute their foreign policy.[32]

As with the NSC inquiry, Jackson released both a committee print and a favorably reviewed commercial publication, aiming to shape public opinion on the hearings' rather arcane agenda. As long as Kennedy remained in the White House, the Washington senator concentrated on the long term, but this situation changed after Kennedy's assassination. Although Lyndon Johnson maintained Kennedy's key national security personnel, the balance of power in the White House gradually shifted, most notably by providing Dean Rusk with a more prominent role. Given this change, Jackson subtly adjusted the focus of the subcommittee yet again; as he confided to James Gavin in March 1964, the subcommittee's actions now would be designed "to have impact where it counts—chiefly in the Executive Branch."[33]

Jackson's strategy illustrates the danger of relying on formal measures of power to understand the congressional role in cold war foreign policy. In fact, the Washington senator worried that attempts to revive the upper chamber's weakened constitutional powers could create an overt confrontation between the branches, threatening the informal ties on which the subcommittee relied. This concern grew especially acute during the latter stages of the Kennedy administration, when some Senate Democrats began to question many basic tenets of cold war foreign policy. In late 1963, a bloc of Democratic liberals defected during consideration of the foreign aid bill, arguing that anticommunism had too frequently justified aid to right-wing, dictatorial regimes. This type of dissent also manifested itself the next March, when Ernest Gruening, Jackson's Government Operations colleague, delivered the first full-length Senate speech urging the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. In a more spectacular event, J. William Fulbright publicly called for abandoning the myth "that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and relentless enemy of the free

ment Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *Report, Administration of National Security: Basic Issues*, 88th Congress, 1st sess., CIS Document #S0604, iii.

[32] Jackson to Herbert Althschull, 11 June 1963, Box 72, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Jackson to George Kennan, 12 April 1963, Box 75, FPD Series, Jackson Papers.

[33] Jackson to James Gavin, 10 March 1964, Box 74, FPD Series, Jackson Papers.

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world" by recognizing "the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute." Sowing the seeds of a rivalry that would grow much more intense, Jackson dismissed Fulbright's remarks with the comment that "one man's myths are another man's realities."[34]

And Jackson's realities remained oriented around the principles of NSC 68, a document which, he maintained, recognized that "international peace and security depend not on a balance of power, but on a certain imbalance of power in favor of the protectors of peace." Given this aim, maintaining U.S. ties with its most important allies—the nations of Western Europe—assumed a heightened importance. Much to the senator's disappointment, however, the foundations of the Western alliance grew progressively less sound as the Johnson administration became preoccupied by the commitment in Vietnam. A sense of drift in U.S. policy toward Europe reached its height in early 1966, when President Charles DeGaulle announced that France would withdraw from NATO and ordered all U.S. troops off French soil. A "harsh conflict" erupted within the administration on how to respond. Rusk, joined by Acheson (back in Washington and serving as the de facto assistant secretary of state for European affairs) and John McCloy, urged a hard line against DeGaulle. But Johnson, siding with NSC officials, overruled the State Department and adopted a low-key approach that refrained from attacks against the French decision.[35]

The president in part arrived at this decision due to concerns with "checks and balances at home"; he worried that harsh criticism against DeGaulle only would encourage congressional initiatives, such as a resolution by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe. Jackson adopted a different approach, arguing that the "ambiguity" evident in executive branch goals had invited "others, including Members of Congress, to peddle, sometimes in an irresponsible manner, their own specific topics for our national aches and pains." Having again demonstrated his concern with formal assertions of legislative power, Jackson announced that he would convene hearings to "break new ground" on improving NATO.[36]

As was the case with the NSC inquiry, Jackson confronted strong opposition to his ability to hold such policy-based hearings. The staff of the Foreign

[34] Jackson address, "The Political Authority and the Professional," National War College, 29 April 1964, Box 5, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; 110 *Congressional Record* [hereafter CR], 88th Congress, 2nd sess., 6227–6231 (25 March 1964); Randall Bennett Woods, *Fulbright: A Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 333–337; LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer, *Fighting the Odds: The Life of Frank Church* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1994), 159–188.

[35] Francis Bator personal interview with author, 1 February 1997; *National Security Policy Hearings*, 11–17 (13 May 1965); H.W. Brands, Jr., *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 89–105; Frank Costigliola, *The United States and France: The Cold Alliance since World War II* (New York: Twayne Publications, 1992), 126–144; Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 227–233.

[36] 112 CR, 89th Congress, 2nd sess., 21576 (1 September 1966); *National Security Policy Hearings*, 11–17 (13 May 1965), 132 (29 June 1965), 164 (27 July 1965).

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Relations Committee, headed by Carl Marcy, long had worried about the tendency of Government Operations' foreign policy subcommittees to focus on "the field of policy, not legislation." In early 1966, committee Chair Fulbright decided to act. In two terse letters to Jackson, written "in order to keep the main lines of jurisdiction clear," the Arkansas senator expressed his concern about the "scope and purpose of the hearings." Although generally not "fussy about matters of committee jurisdiction," Fulbright personally brought his complaints to Mansfield. The move formed part of a more ambitious attempt by the Foreign Relations chair to restore his committee's lost prerogatives, which culminated with the simultaneous opening of public hearings on the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. But while the hearings successfully established the Foreign Relations Committee as a vital player in the congressional response to the Vietnam War, the skirmish with Jackson played out differently for Fulbright. As Eisenhower, Johnson, and Russell had discovered in the late 1950s, even a full committee chair possessed few outright powers to restrict the freedom of action of a rival subcommittee. The Jackson hearings would proceed.[37]

Although victorious in yet another bureaucratic skirmish, Jackson nonetheless faced a delicate task: for the first time, his agenda overtly challenged that of a sizable contingent of Senate Democrats. To overcome the difficulties in such a situation, he stressed the need for the hearings to perform "an *educational* function for the American people, bringing experienced judgment to bear on critical issues of national security." The inquiry thus looked to serve a dual purpose. First, Jackson aimed to present an ideological alternative to the "disheartening" Mansfield Resolution, providing "ammunition" in the effort to frustrate those attempting to use a different set of congressional powers focused on formal resolutions to forward their point of view. More ambitiously, the senator hoped to mobilize a powerful enough public sentiment on behalf of a renewed commitment to NATO to persuade the president to respond to DeGaulle more aggressively.[38]

The roster of witnesses at the hearings consisted of the most prominent losers in the administration's bureaucratic battle of that spring. Dean Acheson led off, followed by Christian Herter, Lauris Norstad, and John McCloy. To those who complained that the list read like a roster of that "small but terribly influential conspiratorial group known as the New York Foreign Policy Establishment," Jackson's response was blunt: the country should "thank God" for the group's collective wisdom. With this sentiment as their ideological guide, the hearings contained few surprises. Acheson, Herter, and McCloy all stressed that the continuity in international relations since the 1940s meant that, in

[37] Fulbright to Henry Jackson, 6 June 1966; 5 July 1966; both in Box 74, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; "Staff Memorandum: Considerations Relating to Committee Organization," n.d., 1965 box, Carl Marcy Chronological Series, Records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Record Group 46, National Archives; Woods, *Fulbright*, 415–424.

[38] Jackson, "notes, NATO," Norfolk, VA 9 October 1965, Box 5, FPD Series, Jackson Papers; Garside, "The Jackson Subcommittee," 57.

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Acheson's words, the diplomatic need "for a strong Western coalition has not diminished"; the United States needed to retain the traditional NATO structure regardless of French policies. On the military front, the witnesses seconded Norstad's claim that NATO's foundations were "as good—*and as necessary*—as when they were written into the treaty of 1949." Culturally, Jackson's admonition for better understanding of the European perspective won praise from all who testified.[39]

As Acheson concluded his testimony, Jackson exulted that "it's been like old times." Perhaps, however, because of his unwillingness to confront the obvious changes in the international climate, Jackson failed to realize either aspect of his European agenda. Within the administration, outside of the upper levels of the State Department, the impression arose of Jackson as so much of a "one-note Charlie" on the issue "that he had marginalized himself." The White House did try to use the senator as a "major" spokesman against "the criticism we have been getting on neglect of Europe," to the point of employing the language of the subcommittee's report, rather than a formal statement from the State Department, "to indicate the American viewpoint" on future relations with France. But, as Jackson complained to Rusk, the administration's continuing obsession with Vietnam showed that it had not learned that "a world power like the United States cannot afford to be preoccupied with one area of the world or one set of problems."[40]

More surprisingly, given his earlier successes, Jackson struggled to define the parameters for Senate discussion on the future of NATO. In this endeavor, he received complete support from the executive branch. Johnson administration officials did all they could to fuel the rivalry between the Jackson Subcommittee and the Foreign Relations Committee, noting that the Washington senator had "been particularly helpful" in providing "such a favorable Congressional framework" for expressing sentiments on European policy. But, within the Senate itself, signs of trouble for Jackson appeared even during the hearings: in an almost unprecedented occurrence, witnesses faced skeptical questions offered by Javits and several of the subcommittee's newest Democratic members, such as Abraham Ribicoff, Fred Harris, and Lee Metcalf.[41] The existence of the Mansfield Resolution offered a sense of the Senate disquiet over the future U.S.

[39] U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Hearings, Atlantic Alliance*, [hereafter *Atlantic Alliance Hearings*], 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1, 6 (27 April 1966), 66 (6 May 1966), 125, 126, 133 (25 May 1966).

[40] Francis Bator personal interview with author; "Memorandum of Discussion—France—NATO," 6 March 1966, Box 177, NSF—Country File, LBJ Library; Mike Manatos to Jackson, 11 January 1968, Box 9, White House Name File, LBJ Library; George Christian, "Memorandum to Mike Manatos," 30 March 1967, Box 6, White House Name File, LBJ Library; Francis Bator, "Memorandum for the President," 26 July 1966, Box 172, NSF—Country File, LBJ Library; Jackson to Dean Rusk, 21 June 1966, Box 78, FPD Series, Jackson Papers.

[41] John Leddy and Douglas MacArthur, II to Dean Rusk, 20 April 1966, Box 82, State Department Subject/Numeric Files, 1964–1966, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park; *Atlantic Alliance Hearings*, 149 (16 June 1966).

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role in Europe, and many Democrats went even further in reconsidering the foundations of NATO.[42] But the most unexpected challenge to the Washington senator came from within the Government Operations Committee itself. In the midst of the Atlantic Alliance hearings, Government Operations' newest subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures (SFAE), began exploring problems in U.S. relations with Europe. But the SFAE offered radically different conclusions than did the Jackson subcommittee, frustrating Jackson's attempt to forge a consensus from within his own committee, much less from the Democratic caucus of Congress as a whole. In the process, the Washington senator came to understand the complexities of marshaling the powers of Congress to frame public consideration of foreign policy matters.

The Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures

The SFAE originated due to the efforts of Ernest Gruening, whose dissenting inclinations dated from the 1920s, when as an anti-imperialist journalist, he had criticized U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean Basin. For the next three decades, serving in various capacities, Gruening argued that the heritage of the United States, as a country founded in revolution itself, compelled it to adopt a foreign policy friendly to reformers overseas, even at the expense of short-term strategic interests. This viewpoint identified the Alaskan as one of the leading skeptics of the cold war consensus personified by Jackson. After arriving in the Senate in 1959, Gruening pleaded for a spot on the Foreign Relations Committee, citing his "long experience in this field in relation to Latin America"; as occurred with Jackson, however, Gruening's quest met with failure. But he remained on the lookout for a bureaucratic opening to influence international developments. One appeared in early 1965, when Hubert Humphrey departed the Senate to assume the vice presidency. Gruening met with Julius Cahn, the counsel to the Humphrey subcommittee, to discuss a plan to infuse the subcommittee with oversight responsibilities for the Agency for International Development (AID), the agency responsible for implementing the foreign aid program. Gruening admitted to Cahn that he needed "to do a lot of persuading with John McClellan to keep the subcommittee alive"; shortly thereafter McClellan privately indicated his opposition to the idea.[43]

The Alaska senator also had to tangle with his old nemesis, Henry Jackson. Relations between the two had been poor since the 1940s, when Jackson, then Seattle's congressman, frequently endured lectures from Gruening, the territo-

[42] For examples of this latter pattern, see Stephen Young to Louis Stratton, 12 May 1967, Box 47, Stephen Young Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland; Frank Church, "U.S. Policy and the 'New Europe,'" *Foreign Affairs* 45 (October 1966).

[43] Gruening Diaries, 17 November 1964, Ernest Gruening Papers, Rasmuson Library, University of Alaska, Fairbanks; Gruening to Lyndon Johnson, 16 December 1958, Box 366, LBJ Senate Papers, LBJ Library; for Gruening's career, see Ernest Gruening, *Many Battles: The Autobiography of Ernest Gruening* (New York: Liveright, 1974).

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rial governor of Alaska, about the crippling effects of Seattle economic interests on the territory's well-being. After one such performance, Jackson recommended that the governor develop a positive economic agenda rather than continuing "to heap criticism on Seattle." Anticipating Jackson's likely opposition to his scheme, Gruening proposed to Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), who in only his third year of Senate service did not stand to inherit a subcommittee chair, dividing Humphrey's subcommittee into two, with Ribicoff taking over a new subcommittee to concentrate on domestic matters and Gruening inheriting the Humphrey subcommittee's powers over foreign policy. Ribicoff in turn approached Jackson, who consented to the arrangement provided that he receive the Humphrey subcommittee's jurisdiction over international organizations. At the time, the Washington senator planned hearings critical of the United Nations playing a prominent position in U.S. foreign policy. In February, McClellan, faced with a newfound consensus among his committee, reversed course and approved the creation of the SFAE.[44]

Jackson consented to the Gruening/Ribicoff proposal because he considered the foreign aid program relatively insignificant. Gruening, on the other hand, believed that it provided an opening for Congress to use its appropriations power to address broader foreign policy issues. Given this fact, he reasoned, oversight of the program imposed a new responsibility upon the Senate, with its traditionally prominent "role in the conduct of foreign affairs." The Alaska senator conceded that the specific foreign policy functions assigned by the Constitution, such as declaring war, confirming ambassadorial nominations, and approving treaties, had become "perfunctory and routine" in the cold war period. But, Gruening maintained, senators needed to confront the situation at hand rather than lament the passing of a bygone constitutional framework. Because Congress retained the power of the purse, foreign aid represented a way to influence foreign policy, through tactics such as roll call votes, generating publicity with hearings, and using the oversight power to pressure executive branch officials.[45]

Despite their personal and ideological differences, Gruening and Jackson shared a conviction that they could use seemingly minor subcommittees to forward their own foreign policy programs. Like Jackson, Gruening quickly established firm command over both the structure and agenda of his subcommittee. But since the Washington senator concentrated on framing the consideration

[44] Gruening to Orville Freeman, 26 May 1965, Box 2, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures Papers [hereafter SFAE Papers], Record Group 46, National Archives; Gruening Diaries, 12 January 1965, 19 January 1965, Gruening Papers; Laura Olson personal interview with author, 21 October 1995; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1947*, 79th Congress 1st sess., 354-356 (20 May 1946).

[45] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959*, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 942–945 (21 May 1959); U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1960*, 86th Congress, 2nd sess., 624–626 (5 April 1960); George Sundborg personal interview with author, 23 February 1995.

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of issues already in the public debate and reaching the foreign policy elite, he relied on a small staff and well-connected consultants. Gruening, on the other hand, saw the SFAE as a weapon in what one contemporary recalled as his "vendetta" against the foreign aid program. He thus secured a large, permanent staff to conduct investigations and to publicize abuses in the foreign aid program, and he installed his legislative assistant, Herb Beaser, as the SFAE's chief of staff. The chair's search for publicity occasionally produced rather bizarre sideshows. During one hearing on devoting more foreign aid funds to population control, the Alaska senator (a nonpracticing MD) demonstrated the virtues of the intrauterine device by waving one before the startled audience; at another, he humiliated AID Director David Bell, invited to appear on another issue, by stumping Bell repeatedly on the scope and rationale of U.S. assistance to a host of countries in Africa and Asia.[46]

Even given an occasional tendency to overplay his position, the mere establishment of the SFAE testified to Gruening's bureaucratic skill. DeGaulle's demand that all U.S. troops leave French soil transformed the U.S. military equipment in France into surplus supplies, subjecting them to the subcommittee's jurisdiction and thus giving the Alaskan an opportunity to implement his thesis that the foreign aid program provided an entry point for ambitious members of Congress to influence broader foreign policy concerns. He responded by transforming an SFAE investigation into Defense Department disposal of overseas property into a reconsideration of the future of the Atlantic Alliance, operating under the theory that the French actions demonstrated that "NATO is obsolete." The organization, Gruening maintained, had been founded at a peculiar time in international relations, when Western Europe seemed incapable of resisting an attack from the USSR. This condition no longer applied. Moreover, NATO's continued existence provided an excuse for the Pentagon to demand budgets based on an outdated assumption "that Russia will attack."[47]

Gruening thus drew quite different lessons from the French episode than did Jackson. At the very least, the Alaskan reasoned, Congress needed to tighten its oversight of U.S. foreign bases. It was "evident" that administration officials had "thoroughly neglected the question of what would happen to our bases in France when the time came for us to leave that country," perhaps "due to the tendency of our military people to interpret the worldwide responsibilities of the United States as requiring the establishment of permanent bases abroad from which we should not depart in the foreseeable future." The senator forecast "withdrawal from other NATO countries as the changing nature

[46] Laura Olson personal interview; Pat Holt personal interview; Jack Germond personal interview, 19 June 1995; Gruening to Robert Strother, 10 August 1966, Foreign Aid 1966 file, Brown Boxes series, Gruening Senatorial Papers [hereafter GSP], Gruening Papers; Gruening to Mrs. L. Sullivan, July 20, 1966; Gruening to Mr. and Mrs. Donald Guthay, 11 July 1966; both in Box 3, SFAE Papers.

[47] Gruening to Robert McNamara, 26 April 1966; Gruening to Paul Ignatius, 6 June 1966; both in Box 2, SFAE Papers; Gruening, "Our Obsolete Concepts about NATO," 23 August 1966, copy in Series 25, Box 3, Gruening Papers.

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of the Soviet threat . . . no longer requires the maintenance of large forces in Europe." In the end, this set of ideas ranged far beyond what most in Washington were willing to consider, and the Gruening inquiry failed to attract the attention—from either the press or from administration officials—of its Jackson counterpart. But the Alaskan did challenge Jackson at the Washington senator's most vulnerable point: the Senate Democratic caucus. The battle of dueling Government Operations subcommittees thus ended in something of a draw. In this fight, neither Gruening nor Jackson demonstrated any particular concern with rehabilitating the formal powers of Congress; both realized the leeway offered by acting along less traditional lines.[48]

By the mid-1960s, Jackson viewed European affairs as the most critical arena for implementing his long-held goal of orienting U.S. foreign policy according to the principles of NSC 68. For Gruening, Latin America was the most appropriate region for demonstrating how the United States could return to a foreign policy faithful to the country's traditional ideals. It therefore came as little surprise that the SFAE's most ambitious undertaking dealt with inter-American relations. From the time of his arrival in the Senate, the Alaskan unsuccessfully urged AID to conduct a single-country case study to determine how the United States could best assist reformers overseas; now, with the creation of the SFAE, Gruening could implement the idea himself. He chose Chile, which with its long democratic tradition, AID had touted as the best example of how initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress fostered peaceful change in Latin America. Convinced that this policy had failed, the Alaska senator could think of no better country to explore. As with Jackson, he did not even bother to file legislation around which the investigation ostensibly would center. Instead, he departed for a lengthy tour of several nations in western South America, including Chile, in anticipation of issuing a subcommittee report.[49]

The report claimed that AID, excessively influenced by the postwar experience with Europe, had not understood that "funds could not simply be channeled in Chile's direction with assurance that they would contribute to that country's long-range growth." The senator also scored AID for its lack of knowledge "about inducing innovations in alien cultures." Finally, Gruening fretted about the consequences of linking foreign aid with political goals. Knowledge that the United States most likely would continue assistance be-

[48] Gruening diaries, 7 April 1966, Gruening Papers; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, *Report, Disposal of United States Military Installations and Supplies in France*, 90th Congress, 1st sess., CIS Document #S1597, 1, 7, 12 (30 January 1967).

[49] Herb Beaser to Dave Toyryla, 20 October 1964, Box 31, General Subjects, 1963–1965, GSP, Gruening Papers; Laura Olson personal interview; Ralph Dungan personal interview with author, 29 May 1995; Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Political Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 180–181; for an example of the touting of Chile, in this case by Teodoro Moscoso, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962*, 87th Congress, 2nd sess., 395 (16 April 1962).

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cause of its fear of the spread of communism encouraged countries "to avoid and postpone harsh decisions on fiscal discipline and reform."[50]

As was the case with Jackson's NSC hearings, Gruening's Chilean report provided the most concise and persuasive articulation of concerns already percolating in Washington. In effect, the Alaska senator provided a left-wing rationale for opposing the Alliance for Progress, a program which most liberal Democrats once backed enthusiastically but of which many grew rather skeptical as the 1960s proceeded. With even the pro-administration *Washington Post* conceding that "the amount of serious inquiry and research that has gone into this report sets it apart from many blanket criticisms of AID," the study solidified Gruening's credentials as the most innovative thinker among the Senate dissenters on the issue. Wayne Morse (D-OR), the chair of the American Republics Affairs Subcommittee, cited the report to prove his claim that the Alliance for Progress was in "disarray," and the Alaska senator's work likewise drew praise from Foreign Relations Committee members Fulbright, Church, and Albert Gore (D-TN).[51]

Like Jackson, however, Gruening discovered that elevating the influence of his subcommittee entailed political risks. Frank Moss (D-UT) noted that Gruening had attracted "resentment" from colleagues concerned that he "was too active and stretched out too far" on foreign policy matters. Conservative senators looked to tap into that sentiment in February 1967, rallying around an extraordinary effort by Frank Lausche (D-OH) to slash the SFAE's funding on the Senate floor. Reviving the bureaucratic jealousy angle pioneered by Bryce Harlow several years before, Lausche questioned the merits of the SFAE receiving nearly 50 percent of the allotment granted to the entire Foreign Relations Committee. But Gruening, illuminating the difficulty of curbing the power of any subcommittee once it had entrenched itself, withstood the challenge, and the SFAE retained a funding level of $100,000. Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) then looked to weaken its power in another way by recommending that the Foreign Relations Committee establish its own foreign aid subcommittee. Lack of interest, however, derailed the proposal, leaving the SFAE as the only Senate subcommittee devoted exclusively to the issue of foreign aid.[52]

Gruening shared with Jackson a more ambitious agenda than merely crystallizing ideas already in place. In his case, however, he desired a subcommittee

[50] U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, *Report, United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study*, 89th Congress, 2nd sess., CIS Document #S0918, vii–ix, 50, 76–77, 95–111, 114–124.

[51] Gruening to Drew Pearson, 8 September 1966, Foreign Aid 1966 file, Brown Boxes series, GSP, Gruening Papers; *Washington Post*, 11 July 1966, 1966 Scrapbook Vol. 2, GSP, Gruening Papers; Wayne Morse press release, 27 March 1967, Box B-47, Wayne Morse Papers, University of Oregon Library.

[52] George Pavlik to Bourke Hickenlooper, 10 January 1967, Box 37, Foreign Relations Committee series, Bourke Hickenlooper Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; Frank Moss personal interview, 30 May 1995; 113 CR, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 3904–3905 (20 February 1967).

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to serve as part of a legislative ambush of executive branch policies through the foreign aid program. Using congressional hearings and the roll call process represented other weapons in this effort, as he demonstrated in 1967 when two Senate votes decided the ultimate fate of the Alliance for Progress. The first instance came in March, when John Sparkman (D-AL), acting at the administration's request, introduced a resolution requesting an advanced congressional commitment for long-term economic assistance to Latin America. Fulbright, by this point estranged from Johnson due to the escalating conflict in Vietnam, convened Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the resolution, and invited Gruening to appear as the chief witness. There, he joined his Alaska colleague and several committee members in a wide-ranging three-and-a-half hour discussion exploring Gruening's claim that "most of our efforts and our preachments about peaceful evolutionary change have fallen on deaf ears," resulting in Latin Americans having "the same dictatorships now that they had at the beginning of the Alliance, and earlier." After the testimony, John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) remarked that "if the President is going to get any support, it is more likely to come from this side of the aisle." In the end, the committee reported a vague resolution, which the administration considered "worse than useless."[53]

In August, Robert Kennedy (D-NY) attempted to reverse the defeat through an amendment to increase funds for Latin American aid, an initiative that his colleague, Jacob Javits, described as "a vote of confidence or no confidence in the future of the Alliance for Progress." Contrary to the hopes of both New York senators, however, the debate quickly showed the continued strength of the arguments presented in Gruening's skeptical SFAE report. Morse commented that, if anything, the Senate should decrease funding for the Alliance; Fulbright agreed, while Gruening pointed to the Mexican Revolution—"the outstanding example of self-help and progress among the Latin American countries"—as an alternative to an expanded U.S. presence in the hemisphere. Burnt once in the promise that more economic aid could form part of a broader U.S. reformist agenda and suspicious in any case that Johnson would embrace such a policy, enough Senate liberals rebuffed Kennedy's initiative so that, when combined with the votes of conservative senators already hostile to more U.S. aid to Latin America, the Senate's most significant pro-Alliance measure after 1963 went down to defeat. As the *New York Times* remarked, the coalition of the Senate's ideological extremes "succeeded in crippling the program."[54]

The SFAE made its presence felt in a very different way than did the Jackson subcommittee, in large part because Gruening never entertained any illu-

[53] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Latin American Summit Conference*, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 138–143, 149 (21 March 1967); W.W. Rostow, "Special Emissary to Discuss Latin American Arms Policy," 7 February 1968, Box 48, White House Confidential File, LBJ Library.

[54] 113 CR, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 22965–22972 (17 August 1967); Felix Belair, Jr., "Foreign Aid Bill, Cut $100-Million, Passed by Senate," *New York Times*, 18 August 1967; editorial, "Aid Irresponsibles," *New York Times*, 18 August 1967.

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sions that subtle and informal congressional prodding would advance his agenda. Therefore, he accepted a confrontational relationship with the executive, relying on publicity and the power of the purse to affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Nonetheless, he shared with Jackson a conviction in the ability of subcommittee reports to influence public opinion, a recognition of the importance of reaching the Washington elite when framing the discussion of international issues, and an understanding that Congress possessed a wide array of avenues to impact foreign policy even in an era when the executive seemed disinclined to accept the traditional constitutional relationship between the two branches.

Conclusions

In the long term, the Gruening and Jackson subcommittees experienced opposite fates. In 1968, Gruening stood for a third term, but the combination of his advanced age (81) and his dissenting positions on foreign policy paved the way for an upset defeat in the Democratic primary. With the Alaskan's departure from the upper chamber, the SFAE lost its patron and perished. On the other hand, Jackson's national influence continued to grow, and his subcommittee remained active throughout the 1970s. But despite the differences between their chairs, the two subcommittees demonstrated the capacity of ambitious and politically savvy senators to use the altered postwar committee structure to their advantage. Both Gruening and Jackson primarily desired to advance their viewpoints by increasing their own influence. In relying, however, on the institutional tools provided to them as members of the Senate, they simultaneously helped to define the upper chamber's foreign policy role.

On the bureaucratic level, the performance of the subcommittees highlights the importance of looking beyond the traditional foreign policy committees when analyzing the congressional role in the cold war. Obviously, as the Vietnam hearings demonstrated, the Foreign Relations Committee retained a good deal of its pre-World War II powers. Nor did each of the thirty-one Senate subcommittees that held hearings on foreign policy issues during the 89th Congress, when the dueling NATO hearings occurred, have the impact of the SFAE or the Jackson subcommittee. Yet the decentralized committee structure did give individual senators the opportunity to influence international questions about which they felt passionately. As with Jackson and the NSC hearings or Gruening with the Alliance for Progress, subcommittees could frame the national debate on foreign policy issues. Or, as Jackson attempted in both the ambassador and Atlantic alliance hearings, subcommittees could facilitate the development of informal ties with elements in the executive branch bureaucracy or the policy-making elite. Finally, senators could follow Gruening's example in using both the altered congressional structure and the appropriations power to influence international developments. Most important, members of Congress often could achieve their goals even if they lacked majority support

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within the institution as a whole, as was almost always the case with Gruening and frequently so for Jackson.

At the policy level, the two subcommittees showed some of the ways in which Congress continued to affect foreign policy throughout the cold war. In addition to the legislature's clear power over the foreign aid program, the growth of the national security bureaucracy broadened the opportunities for members of Congress to exercise informal pressure on the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, the increasing political importance of foreign and defense policy highlighted the congressional ability to raise public awareness of selected international issues, whether through the often subtle framing associated with Jackson or the highly publicized investigations preferred by Gruening.

The nature of the U.S. position internationally, changed dramatically between the conclusion of World War II and the end of the cold war, and the congressional role in U.S. foreign policy likewise was transformed. The legislature's ability to use the constitutional powers it shared with the executive to influence international developments suffered from the postwar reluctance to employ the war-making or treaty-making clauses, while the fate of the appropriations power was more balanced. But at the structural level, the altered format created a host of methods for Congress to affect foreign policy developments. Jackson and Gruening, by using the relatively obscure Government Operations Committee, proved masters in exploiting this development.

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

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Necessity in Foreign Policy

GREGORY A. RAYMOND

In 432 B.C.E., representatives from the Greek city-state of Sparta traveled to the oracle at Delphi to ask whether they should go to war over Athenian violations of the Thirty Years' Peace Treaty. After receiving a positive response, the Spartans convened a meeting of the Peloponnesian League to canvass the opinions of their allies. Delay not, urged the Corinthians. "We have arrived at the moment of necessity."[1]

Throughout the ages, many statesmen have echoed the Corinthians' call to action by justifying foreign policy undertakings with a rhetorical strategy and form of argument that appeals to the exigencies of necessity. Political realists, with their skepticism concerning the role of ethical considerations in policy deliberations, have been especially vocal in asserting that some policies are driven by unavoidable necessities. According to realist thought, under certain circumstances national leaders must act in ways that contravene moral norms. Their primary duty, notes George Kennan, is to the interests of the society they represent, not to the moral sensibilities of particular individuals within that society.[2] "Ignoring one's interests, squandering one's resources in fits of altruism," adds

[1] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Paul Woodruff, ed. and trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 30.

[2] George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Winter 1985–86): 206. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson exemplified this view when he described foreign policy making during the Truman administration in the following terms: "Our discussions centered on the appraisal of dangers and risks, the weighing of the need for decisive and effective action against considerations of prudence. . . . Moral talk did not bear on the issue." Cited in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Ethics and Politics: Cases and Comments* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1990), xi. For a discussion of the fundamental assumptions shared by the variety of theorists who consider themselves to be realists, see Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

GREGORY A. RAYMOND is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Boise State University. His most recent books include *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* and *A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, both co-authored with Charles W. Kegley, Jr.

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Charles Krauthammer, "is the fastest road to national disaster." For a statesman, "thinking with one's heart is a serious offense. Foreign policy is not social work."[3]

The purpose of this article is to examine the general class of arguments in foreign policy involving necessity. My examination proceeds in four parts. First, I describe the nature of arguments from necessity and show their linkage to the concept of reason of state. Second, I delineate the most common forms that the argument takes in international affairs. Third, I illustrate its use through an analysis of a speech delivered to the Reichstag by German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg at the outset of World War I. Finally, I discuss the dangers that arise when the argument from necessity guides foreign policy decision making.

Necessity and Reason of State

Speaking before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy during the fall of 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz told his audience that a foreign policy based on realism cannot ignore the importance of morality, but it requires us to eschew policies grounded in moral absolutes.[4] The standard of right and wrong that realists like Shultz base their policies on is teleological: it "judges action by its political consequences."[5] An act is praiseworthy if it is more likely than any alternative to maximize national interests, regardless of our moral feelings about the nature of the act. Unlike those who would sacrifice these interests when called upon by moral duty, political realists shrug off ethical considerations whenever it is expedient for advancing them.[6] From their perspective, to ignore vital interests when acting in the name of moral principles is "to confuse foreign policy with philanthropy."[7]

[3] Charles Krauthammer, "How the Doves Became Hawks," *Time*, 17 May 1993, 74.

[4] For a further analysis of Shultz's position and the realist view of international morality, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 30–40. See also in this connection, Max Weber's discussion of the "ethic of ultimate ends" in *Politics as a Vocation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), 46–49.

[5] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 10.

[6] The realist subordination of ethical considerations to matters of power politics has come under criticism from deontologists, who maintain that one should always behave in a particular way under certain circumstances. Moral duty, they submit, imposes an absolute injunction that is independent of any nonmoral value (such as national survival) produced by ignoring moral obligations. An early statement of this position can be found in Cicero's praise of the Athenians for rejecting Themistocles's proposal to launch a surprise attack against the Spartan fleet at Gytheum following the conclusion of the Persian Wars. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis*, Margaret Atkins, trans. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 118. Also see Immanuel Kant's distinction between "political moralism" and moral political leaders in *Perpetual Peace*, Lewis White Beck, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 37.

[7] Charles Krauthammer, "When to Intervene," *The New Republic*, 6 May 1985, 10.

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If realists claim that morality is too important to ignore but nonetheless disregard it when expedient, how do they defend themselves against charges of hypocrisy? Argument theorists credit Hermagoras with developing a scheme for classifying three general types of defense: those that question the factual basis of a charge ("We did not do X"); those that question whether a given action falls under an accepted definition of wrongful behavior ("What we did was not really X"); and those that attempt to justify the action by referring to certain qualities of the situation ("We did X, but there were extenuating circumstances.").[8]

Four approaches have been taken by national leaders to mount a defense based on the quality of the situation. First, appeals to force majeure purport that an irresistible force makes someone physically incapable of complying with an obligation. Second, appeals to duress go one step further by claiming that an obligation was violated due to the use or threat of coercion by another state. Third, appeals to fortuitous events declare that an unforeseen incident made it impossible to know one was acting in breach of an obligation. Finally, appeals to necessity challenge the wrongfulness of an act on the basis that it was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.[9]

References to necessity can be found in various domestic legal traditions (*Kinkyu-hinan* in Japan, *Notstand* in Germany, and *état de necessité* in France) and among the earliest diplomatic records of relations between states. Demosthenes, for example, appealed to necessity in 353 B.C.E. when he called for an Athenian alliance with the Megalopolitans; Hostiensis later used the concept when classifying justifications for war; and, centuries later, Grotius drew upon its practice when formulating general rules to guide such pleas. Throughout history it has been used to justify various policies, including intervening in situations where it was expedient and abstaining from action where it was not.[10]

[8] The intellectual antecedents of this framework have been traced to several ancient Attic orators, including Naucrates and Zopyrus. In their opinion, the arguments applicable to defending one's actions revolve around the status of fact (conjectural stasis), definition (definitive stasis), and quality (qualitative stasis), where the quality of an act pertains to such matters as its practicality or expediency. See Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, H.E. Butler, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), vol. 3, bk. 6, 81–82.

[9] See *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1979*, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its thirty-first session, vol I, part 2, A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (New York: United Nations, 1980), 122–133; Edwardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, "International Responsibility" in Max Sørensen, ed., *Manual of Public International Law* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 544; Jean Raby, "The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1988*, vol. 26 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989), 258; and Alan Wertheimer, *Coercion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 146.

[10] See William Ballis, *The Legal Position of War* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937), 50; Umberto Borsi, "Ragione di guerra e stato di necessità nel diritto internazionale," *Rivista di diritto internazionale* 10 (1916): 157–194; Werner Levi, *Law and Politics in the International Society* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976), 58; Paola Anna Pillitu, *Lo stato di necessità nel diritto internazionale* (Perugia: Universita di Perugia, 1981), 11–65; Andrea Rapisardi-Mirabelli, "Breve nota critica in tema di 'stato di necessità' nel diritto internazionale," *Rivista Italiana per le scienze giuridiche* 62 (1919): 170; Burleigh Cushing Rodick, *The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928),

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Typical expressions of the argument from necessity have the form "Circumstances required that I do X." Realism, as E. H. Carr points out, "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies."[11] These forces and tendencies compel leaders to defend national interests "not as a matter of preference but rather as a regrettable choice forced upon political leaders by the unsavory realities of human nature and international anarchy."[12] Like the dejected Arjuna of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, who must face Dhritarashtra's sons on the battlefield of Kurukshetra, many leaders find it difficult to reconcile what they see as necessary with what they believe is desirable. Yet realists insist that they must, since virtuous behavior can be a liability if it causes leaders to overlook vital strategic interests. Han Fei-tzu, for example, criticized the benevolent King Yen of Hsu for losing his state because ethical considerations prevented him from amassing power and ruthlessly attending to state interests.[13] Thus realists conclude that if a nation is to shed its blood stopping the morally objectionable acts committed by others, there must be a "recognition of its necessity, not the hurling of slogans."[14]

Although references to necessity can be traced back to antiquity, it was not until the sixteenth century that sustained attention was given in realist theory to the maxim that expedience justifies exceptions to morality. Embedded within this maxim was a distinction between private morality, which guided the behavior of ordinary people in their daily lives, and reason of state (*ratio status*, *ragione di stato*, *raison d'état*, *Staatsräson*), which governed the conduct of leaders who were responsible for the security and survival of the state. A prince, advised Machiavelli, "cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against

2–3; and Charles de Visscher, "Les lois de la guerre et la théorie de la nécessité," *Revue générale de droit international public* 24 (1917): 74–108.

[11] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946), 10. Also see Steven Forde, "Classical Realism" in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds., *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 63.

[12] Jack Donnelly, "Twentieth-Century Realism" in Nardin and Mapel, *Traditions of International Ethics*, 96. This conception of necessity is not limited to those who anchor their world views in the rapacity of international anarchy. Many individuals outside the realist camp endow national leaders with prerogative power during emergencies. For instance, David Hume contends that "All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may in particular emergencies dispense with the rules of justice. . . . But nothing less than the most extreme necessity." Similarly, Thomas Jefferson held that strict observance of the law is one of the high duties of a public officer, though not the highest. "The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of a higher obligation. . . ." See Henry D. Aiken, ed., *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy* (New York: Hafner, 1948), 203; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 24–25.

[13] Cited in Evan Luard, *Types of International Society* (New York: Free Press, 1976), 174.

[14] Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Munich After 50 Years," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Fall 1988): 177.

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faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion."[15] From his point of view, mercy,integrity, and sincerity are subordinated to the quest for power. Whatever actions that are in the interest of state security must be carried out no matter how repugnant they might seem in the light of private morality. Even Giovanni Botero, who criticized the Machiavellian interpretation of reason of state, agreed that "in the decisions made by princes interest will always override every other argument."[16] "The princes command people," asserted Henri Duc de Rohan a century later, "and the Interest commands the princes."[17]

By the seventh century the concept of reason of state had become so commonplace that Trajano Boccalini remarked that even fishmongers in the marketplace quoted reason of state in their political discussions.[18] Unfortunately, the concept remains shrouded in ambiguity. Like many of the terms found in realist literature, it has several vague and often incompatible meanings,[19] leading one scholar to conclude that the rich content of reason of state "does not allow itself to be forced into the close fetters of an abstract definition."[20]

Regardless of the elusive nature of the concept, reason of state continues to enjoy a prominent place in realist discourse. For some, the necessities entailed by reason of state pertain to certain broad imperatives of prudent ruler-

[15] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Luigi Ricci, trans. (New York: Random House), 65. An earlier example of this distinction can be found in Aristides, who differentiated "between private morality and public conduct, on the ground that rules of justice were to be observed between individuals, but that considerations of expediency, of general utility should preponderate in matters of a public or interstatal character." Coleman Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome* (London: Macmillan, 1911), vol. ii, 96.

[16] Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State*, P. J. and D. P. Waley, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 41.

[17] Cited in Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations," *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982): 12. A similar position was taken by Maximilian von Montgelas when he advised King Max Joseph of Bavaria that "the interests of state were his only compass." Cited in David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 241.

[18] Cited in Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250–1600* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 266.

[19] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Reason of State* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1957), 31n. The semantic confusion was produced by several factors. First, some writers muddied the definitional waters by echoing Ludovico Zuccolo's contention that there was no single reason of state; every government had its own reason of state. Second, theorists such as Federigo Bonaventura, Girolamo Frachetta, and Ludovico Settala increased the opacity by introducing the notion of "good" and "bad" reason of state, depending on whether the actions violated limits set by divine law. Finally, Scipione Ammirato, Arnold Clapman, and others made the concept even more enigmatic by linking it to mysterious principles on the art of governance that supposedly were taught to ancient rulers. Peter S. Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 111–140.

[20] Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and its Place in Modern History*, Douglas Scott, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 207. For efforts to distinguish among different types of necessity, see Cesáreo Gutiérrez Espada, *El estado de necesidad y el uso de la fuerza en derecho internacional* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1987), 61–63; and Max Huber, "Die Kriegsrechtlichen Verträge und die Kriegsraison," *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 7 (1913): 351–374.

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ship; for others, they describe those forces beyond human control that determine when war must be fought; and for still others, they refer to the demands of extraordinary situations that excuse violations of generally accepted restrictions on how wars should be conducted. Let us briefly examine each of these in turn.

Three Forms of Necessity in Realist Discourse

The first form of necessity is set against the backdrop of a self-help system containing a welter of sovereign, egoistic actors of unequal strength. Within this anarchic environment, the ancient Indian dictum *matsya nyaya* allegedly reigns: the large devour the small so the small must be shrewd. In view of the constant threat of external attack, prudent leaders are said to act in terms of interest defined as power. It is "necessary to watch . . . neighbors closely," Cardinal Richelieu counseled King Louis XIII of France, and "sleep like the lion, without closing one's eyes, so that one may instantly ward off the slightest misfortune which may arise. . . ."[21] Unburdened by the moral considerations that apply to ordinary people, prudent rulers do whatever must be done to protect the state and advance its position within the hierarchy of international actors. Just as an oligopolistic market imposes certain imperatives on firms, the international system creates necessities for states. Businesses risk bankruptcy if they disregard market imperatives and overextend themselves in unprofitable investments. Similarly, states may exhaust themselves and jeopardize their security by pursuing moral goals that are neither strategically necessary nor within their military reach. Realists, therefore, suggest a grand strategy that concentrates on husbanding power, not intervening anywhere a moral wrong has been committed.[22]

The second form of necessity pertains to the role of war within what some observers portray as inexorable historical processes. While some wars may involve choice, others are said to be wars of necessity.[23] Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff during World War I, exemplified this view when he asserted that World War I "came about inevitably and irresistibly as the result of the motive forces in the lives of states and peoples, like a thunderstorm which must discharge itself."[24] As seen through this prism of historical inevitability, leaders appear to enjoy little leeway in following the dictates of moral conviction when deciding whether to wage certain wars. They are buf-

[21] Cardinal Richelieu (Armand Jean de Plessis), *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*, H.B. Hill, trans. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), 81–82, 96.

[22] Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" *The National Interest* 30 (Winter 1992/93): 24.

[23] Friedrich von Bernhardi, perhaps the most strident advocate of wars of necessity, proclaimed that some wars should be provoked, since war is "an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of truth and vitality." Cited in Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 60.

[24] Cited in James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Longman, 1984), 186.

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feted by forces beyond their control, which supposedly make them victims of circumstance. In the words of Frederick the Great, "there are wars of interest, which sovereigns are compelled to undertake."[25]

Finally, the third form of necessity can be found in attempts to justify extraordinary acts that are committed in violation of existing rules of warfare. Since it may absolve a state from the nonobservance of international obligations, pleas to military necessity have been advanced to excuse behavior ranging from belligerent measures taken against an enemy to egregious breaches of neutral rights. For example, military necessity was used by the British to justify the destruction of fishing ships and supplies in the Sea of Azov during the Crimean War; it was invoked by the United States, Great Britain, France, and The Netherlands to defend their bombardment of Japanese shore batteries at the Straits of Shimonoseki; it was conjured up after World War II by several defendants at the Nuremberg trials in an attempt to absolve themselves of blame for reprisals taken against the indigenous population of occupied territory; and it was resurrected by Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens to defend his country's 1960 intervention into the Congo. According to those who accept this interpretation of necessity, whatever justifies resorting to war in the first place justifies the means required for achieving one's military objectives. As expressed in the old aphorism *inter arma silent leges*, any acts of violence are acceptable if they are required for victory. "We can never introduce a modifying principle into the philosophy of war," declared Carl von Clausewitz, "without committing an absurdity."[26]

To sum up, the concept of necessity is elastic. It is used in at least three distinct ways by those who espouse the doctrine of reason of state. In each case, some foreign policy decision is represented as being unavoidable, even if it clashes with moral obligation. Necessity purportedly enjoins one to marshall the wherewithal for defending the state's primary interests, those which cannot be compromised and which must be upheld at any cost. It was in this sense that Winston Churchill, first lord of the Admiralty in 1911, described the German fleet as a luxury but the British fleet as a necessity.

The rhetorical strategy behind the argument from necessity is to frame situations of limited options as situations where no alternatives exist. How a situation is characterized can foreclose certain policy options without ever having them subjected to close scrutiny. When a situation is framed in terms of strategic necessity, political leaders appear compelled to act in a particular way. Since any other action on their part would be pointless, their behavior seems to lie beyond moral judgment.

Framing foreign policy situations with the vocabulary of necessity gives political leaders an opportunity to bypass ethical inquiry by shifting policy discus-

[25] Cited in Henry Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America* (New York: Gould, Banks & Co., 1845), 67.

[26] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, E. Colins, trans. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), 64–65.

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sions from the conditional ("Circumstances constrain my choices to options X, Y, and Z") to the categorical ("I have no alternative but to do X"). In effect, the strategy blurs the difference between true necessity and expediency. Whereas the former implies that one cannot help but to act in a certain way, the latter involves merely doing what is advantageous based on considerations of utility.[27] Such a strategy has two ends. On the one hand, it seeks to free the actor from responsibility ("It had to be done"). On the other hand, it seeks to ennoble the actor by portraying him or her as uniquely qualified to recognize strategic imperatives and singularly capable of responding to their demands ("A lesser person would not have been willing or able to do what had to be done"). As a result of the tension between these two ends, the strategy has been described as a "dangerous optical illusion."[28]

An Example of the Argument from Necessity

To illustrate the nature of this form of argument and rhetorical strategy, we turn to one of the most noteworthy examples in modern history: German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag on 4 August 1914.[29] Approximately seven hours before the chancellor's speech, German forces had crossed the Belgian frontier at Gemmerich in route to France. A year earlier Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow had promised the Reichstag steering committee that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality if war with France occurred. Now the deputies are told that the German army has occupied Luxembourg and perhaps is already in Belgium. Although Bethmann grants that a moral wrong has been done, he asserts that German leaders could not have done otherwise. Reason of state has enjoined them to disregard moral considerations and do whatever must be done to protect national interests. "Necessity," he notes, "recognizes no law."

The speech begins with an attempt to win the emotional support of a tense, patriotic audience. Germany, Bethmann observes, has safeguarded the peace of Europe for almost half a century. Through its own economic effort the country has "become strong . . . and in consequence envied." Despite Germany's having lived in peace with its neighbors, he continues, "hostility toward us was being nursed and chains forged for us both in the East and in the West." To the hearty applause of the deputies, the chancellor insists: "Only in defense of a righteous cause shall our sword be drawn." Yet, contrary to the kaiser's best efforts to avoid it, he reports that Germany has found itself in "a forced war with Russia and France."

[27] Felix E. Oppenheim, *The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), 27.

[28] Luigi Sturzo, *The International Community and the Right of War*, Barbara Barclay Carter, trans. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929), 108.

[29] All references to the text of the speech are from The New York Times Current History, *The European War* (New York: The New York Times Company, 1914), vol. i, 199–122.

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Having thus framed the violation of Belgian neutrality in the language of compulsion, Bethmann proceeds to explain why Germany faces a categorical necessity. His explanation contains two interrelated propositions: it would be fatal to expose a vulnerable nation to a preemptive first strike attack; and military mobilization by one's adversaries is closely akin to such an attack. Both propositions are products of a realist interpretation of international politics, according to which the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile, anarchic environment.

Bethmann's first proposition reflected the widespread belief in Berlin that Germany was locked in a protracted struggle with France and Russia, which could degenerate into a catastrophic two-front war at the very time that Germany was losing its slim margin of military superiority. France would soon be able to match the size of the German army by extending the period of national military service from two to three years; and an ambitious program of Russian railway expansion would make it possible for an even larger army to overwhelm Germany's eastern border in the near future. Each development was viewed with apprehension. From Bethmann's perspective, a window of vulnerability was opening. "To expose Germany to this danger," he maintains, "would have been criminal."

The second proposition in the chancellor's explanation rested on a cluster of assumptions regarding the conduct of modern warfare. Military and civilian elites throughout early twentieth-century Europe assumed that by increasing the speed and maneuverability of military units, the technology of the day gave an advantage to the attacking side. Offense, in other words, was thought to be the best defense. Lured by the presumed superiority of offensive doctrines and fearing that an adversary might move first and capture the battlefield initiative, military commanders across the continent formulated meticulous plans the success of which required rapid mobilization at the instant a conflict began. The relentless pressure of these rigid, intricate military timetables produced an atmosphere of urgency, with a deleterious effect on foreign policy decision makers that was magnified by the presumption that future wars would be short.

For German leaders haunted by the spectre of a two-front war against opponents whose power was steadily growing, it was imperative to develop a plan that would give Germany a chance to achieve a rapid, decisive victory. As Count Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the imperial general staff from 1892 to 1906, put it: "Necessity compels us to think of a way in which to conquer with numerically weaker forces."[30] Schlieffen believed that the solution to Germany's strategic problems could be found in the battle of encirclement and annihilation fought by Hannibal in 216 B.C.E. near the village of Cannae, a Roman supply depot on the Aufidus River in southeastern Italy. Vastly outnumbered,

[30] Cited in Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School" in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 192.

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Hannibal deployed his troops in a convex formation with the apex toward the charging Romans. When the Romans pushed forward, the Carthaginians fell back into a concave formation with outer wings that enveloped the surprised legions and nullified their numerical superiority. Two thousand years had passed since the Battle of Cannae, Schlieffen wrote, "but the principles of strategy remained unchanged. The enemy's front is not the objective. The essential thing is to crush the enemy's flanks. . . ."[31]

In view of the likelihood that France would mobilize more rapidly than czarist Russia, Schlieffen proposed attacking the French first. If they were beaten in a few weeks, Germany could then turn the full weight of its offensive power against the slow-moving Russians and thus avoid fighting simultaneously on both the eastern and western fronts. Only by sweeping through neutral Belgium, Schlieffen reasoned, could Germany hope to follow Hannibal's example of winning a quick, decisive victory through a strategy of maneuver, flanking attacks, and envelopment. To refrain from striking through Belgium would be to doom Germany to an unsuccessful frontal assault on the heart of France's defenses.

Schlieffen's plan influenced an entire generation of German leaders and provided the strategic rationale for the claims Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg advanced in his speech to the Reichstag. For the chancellor and other German leaders, a flanking attack through neutral Belgium appeared to be a true necessity. "Only a dire necessity, only the struggle for existence," he declared, "compelled Germany to march through Belgium."[32] Yet alternatives to Schlieffen's strategic doctrine existed. General Sigismund von Schlichting, for example, proposed drawing upon the earlier war plans of the elder Helmuth von Moltke, which called for a limited offensive in the east and defensive operations along the Franco-German border. Not only did the German General Staff possess such plans, but they had been updated regularly for several years prior to the war. What is more, even after the fighting began, an eastward thrust of this sort was possible. Hermann von Staab, chief of the General Staff's railway section, calculated that as many as four German armies could have been redeployed to the eastern front within two weeks of the onset of hostilities.[33] In short, the German leadership was not compelled by an unavoidable strategic necessity to attack France by way of Belgium. What Bethmann portrays to the Reichstag as an instance of categorical necessity was in actuality a situation of limited options.

In addition to masking the situation that Germany faced as a categorical necessity, Bethmann makes another conceptual shift. He recognizes that Germany's actions are morally wrong and that Germany should "try to make good

[31] Cited in Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell, 1962), 36.

[32] Interview of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg published in Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., *The Great Events of the Great War* (National Alumni, 1920), vol. i, 393–394.

[33] See Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

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on the injustice . . . [it has] committed as soon as . . . [its] military goal has been reached." But after acknowledging that a wrong has been done, he asserts that morality must yield to expedience. Although moral considerations are depicted as residing on the same plane as considerations of expedience, grave foreign policy decisions presumably lie beyond the pale of morality.

To recapitulate: Bethmann presents the course of action undertaken by Germany as necessitated, as unavoidable. But the ambiguities inherent in this form of argument allow him to adopt a rhetorical strategy that entails shifting the discourse from the conditional to the categorical and from the moral to the expedient. All told, Bethmann's ability to play upon the ambiguous nature of necessity permits him to convey the images of a leadership free from responsibility and a country going to the battlefield with "a clear conscience." To the stormy approval of the deputies in the Reichstag, the chancellor asserts that the "hour of trial for the German nation has struck." "We were forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments." "Where the responsibility in this greatest of all wars lies," he later adds, "is quite evident to us. Outwardly responsible are the men in Russia who planned and carried into effect the general mobilization of the Russian army." But the British are responsible as well. "The London Cabinet could have made the war impossible," Bethmann claims, "if they had unequivocally told Petersburg that England was not willing to let a continental war of the Great Powers result from the Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia."[34]

Bethmann's rhetorical strategy ultimately aims at ennobling the very act of going to war. "A mighty fate has descended upon Europe," the chancellor tells the legislature. "Who like we are fighting for the highest [values], must only consider how victory can be obtained." Amidst a wave of enthusiastic applause, Bethmann reminds his audience that they are fighting "for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future." Any injustices that Germany might have committed are only in response to greater wrongs done by its enemies. In a statement issued on 2 September, he reiterates this theme by declaring that Germany "was forced to enter Belgium because she had to forestall the planned French advance," and "contrary to all international law . . . [the Belgian population] carried on in the rear of our troops a terrible warfare with concealed weapons." "Every one who has lived in Germany since the outbreak of the war has been able to witness the great moral uprising of all Germans who, pressed hard on all sides, cheerfully take the field for the defense of their rights and their existence." "We will win," he predicts, "thanks to the great moral strength which our just cause gives to our troops."[35]

By ending with an appeal to justice, Bethmann's narrative comes full circle. What opens as a plea to compelling matters of expedience that weigh against

[34] Interview published in Horne and Austin, *Great Events*, 395.

[35] Statement by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg issued to the Associated Press, published in *New York Times, The European War*, 222.

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opposing moral considerations evolves into a professed categorical necessity that obviates moral considerations. But ultimately Bethmann returns to arguing on moral grounds. Despite his admission of wrongdoing, he implies that Germany's response is necessitated in a moral sense because of the more serious injustices committed by others.

Necessity and Contemporary Discursive Practice

Although publicists in the aftermath of World War I wrestled with ways to restrict appeals to necessity, pleas based on the grounds of compulsion have continued to thrive in realist discourse. Indeed, the concept of necessity is so "deeply rooted in the consciousness of the members of the international community," that Judge Robert Ago of the International Court of Justice once suggested that if it was "driven out of the door it would return through the window."[36] At the core of appeals to necessity is a proclaimed right of self-preservation, which for realists possesses a metalegal quality.[37] Just as Bethmann stressed to the Reichstag in 1914 that certain actions were required to close a window of German vulnerability, many contemporary realists frame decisions based on expediency in the language of compulsion in order to portray situations of limited options as those of categorical necessity. Consider, for example, the justification given for the 1983 military intervention into Grenada, the first U.S. intervention in the Caribbean since troops were sent to the Dominican Republic nearly two decades earlier. Though initially portrayed as a rescue mission aimed at evacuating medical students who were endangered by political turmoil, gradually a more elaborate explanation emerged. "It isn't nutmeg that's at stake," President Ronald Reagan insisted, "it is the United States national security."[38] "Let there be no misunderstanding," he told the American public, the action we have taken "has been forced on us by events." Continuing with the rhetoric of a strategic imperative, the president maintained that he

[36] "Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility," Document A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, *Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980* (New York: United Nations, 1982), vol. ii, 51.

[37] See Barry Feinstein, "Self-Defense and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal," *Israel Law Review* 11 (October 1976): 522. Although scholars like Hall maintain that "almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-preservation," many others agree with Schwarzenberger that "the mischievous notion of 'self-preservation' is overdue for elimination from the vocabulary of the international lawyer." See William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law* (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1924), 322; and Georg Schwarzenberger, "The Fundamental Principles of International Law, *Recueil des Cours*, vol. 1, 1955 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1956), 346. Also see Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of International Law, considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law," *Recueil des Cours*, vol. 2, 1957 (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1958), 165n.

[38] Press conference on 25 October 1983, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 1401. The references that follow are taken from speeches delivered between 25 March and 2 December 1983, as reported in U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1984), *Ronald Reagan, 1983,* 1506, 1521, 1533, 1642.

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"had no choice but to act strongly and decisively." Grenada was not a "friendly island paradise for tourism. . . . It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time."

One possible reason for this tendency to invoke the argument from necessity lies in the nature of human cognitive processes. A growing body of psychological research suggests that rather than being rational calculators who dispassionately weigh the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, national leaders are emotional decision makers who are beset with doubts, struggle with painful trade-offs, and have a limited capacity to process the intelligence reports that they receive about the capabilities and intentions of their rivals.[39] Selecting a course of action in this climate of uncertainty generates stress, which may become acute if a threat endangers important values and a decision must be made in a short period of time. To cope with stress, national leaders frequently adopt low-effort choice heuristics that permit them to make decisions quickly and confidently. Choice heuristics that warrant certain actions due to perceived necessities appeal to the well-documented tendency of decision makers to attribute their own actions to situational factors while attributing the same behavior to an adversary's dispositional characteristics.[40] Given that people systematically overestimate the importance of situational causes when explaining their own behavior, it is not surprising that arguments from necessity are common in diplomatic circles.

The Dangers of the Argument from Necessity

Regardless of the frequency with which national leaders rely on the argument from necessity during stressful times, such appeals create serious problems. In a crisis situation, national leaders tend to perceive their range of alternatives as more restricted than those of their opponents.[41] Often a sense of resignation emerges as they feel swept up in the march of events. Under such circumstances, leaders generally become concerned with the timing of an expected conflict rather than with avoiding its occurrence. Once a situation is framed in terms of *when* action must be taken instead of *whether* it should occur, opportunities are transformed into necessities and pressure seems overwhelming if perceived military advantages appear to be evaporating.[42]

[39] Irving L. Janis, *Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 14–19.

[40] See Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 57–95.

[41] Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis Decision Making" in Philip E. Tetlock, et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), vol. i, 38.

[42] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 254, 264–265. An example can be seen in the 4 April 1961 meeting of the National Security Council. When asked his opinion on the planned Bay of Pigs operation, Adolf Berle argued that a confrontation with the communists was inevitable, so it might as well

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The language of necessity thus conveys the impression that a policy initiative is "an empirical expression of what *is*, rather than a statement of what someone thinks the policy *ought* to be."[43] As a rhetorical strategy, appeals to necessity facilitate shifting foreign policy discourse from this hidden ought to an explicit, forceful *must*. One of the dangers arising from such a shift is the propensity to believe that what is allegedly necessary is also doable. People responsible for designing the policy frequently suppress personal doubts, reject information that contradicts their exaggerated expectations of success, and attempt to marginalize dissenters. Necessity, in the words of an old Russian proverb, demands when it speaks. Unfortunately, the spirit of "can-doism" that may arise to accommodate its demands easily evolves into a false sense of invulnerability.[44]

To make matters worse, once decision makers believe they are compelled to undertake some action, the felt necessity often acquires a quasi-moral quality. For example, shortly after Don Gaspar de Guzmán, the count-duke of Olivares, conceived of a resumption of hostilities in The Netherlands following the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce (1621) as necessary for restoring Spain's military reputation, some of his colleagues on the Council of State interpreted the undertaking as a moral enterprise, one that would purify and reinvigorate Castile.[45] Such ennobling of the expedient is a common, if paradoxical, feature of the argument from necessity. Strategically advantageous policies that run against the grain of prevailing codes of international behavior are portrayed as fulfilling a higher obligation. By appealing to duties of this sort, clever leaders literally make a virtue of necessity, one that can be used to rally domestic opinion on behalf of armed conflict with other states.

Although no polity is immune to such appeals, not every type of government is equally susceptible to the lure of the argument from necessity. Democratic regimes, which are rooted in what Arnold Wolfers calls a "philosophy of choice," appear least sympathetic to attempts at framing the expedient as the

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be precipitated now. Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), 111.

[43] Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 20. (Emphasis in original.) The argument from necessity is closely related to dilemmatization. Arguments from dilemmas involve claims based upon the warrant that a given situation allows for only two difficult choices. As a rhetorical tool, dilemmatic constructions aim to simplify a choice for some target audience, because the either/or conditional in the dichotomized representation is typically set up with unequal weights. See Rivka Ribak, "Divisive and Consensual Constructions in the Political Discourse of Jews and Palestinians in Israel: Dilemmas and Contradictions" (paper presented at the Third Convention of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 21–24 June 1994).

[44] Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception" in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 119; also see Paul 't Hart, *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1990).

[45] J. H. Elliott, "Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain" in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 94.

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necessary. Their members deny that leaders are exposed to external forces mandating some inescapable course of action. On the contrary, they presume that democratic leaders enjoy considerable decision latitude to choose what means to use in accordance with moral judgment, especially when interacting with other democratic leaders.[46] Whereas government officials in a democracy might be able to represent armed conflict with a nondemocracy as the product of strategic necessity, they would find it difficult to do the same when dealing with a kindred regime. Democracies fight regimes that they regard as illegitimate; they recoil against going to war with governments that they believe are lawful representatives of their populace. Shared democratic norms foster expectations that each side in a dispute will explore a wide array of options in order to resolve the conflict peacefully. As a result, neither party feels resigned to bow before forces beyond their control that limit them to a single course of action. But as U.S. policy makers demonstrated during the 1983 Grenada invasion, the argument from necessity retains enormous persuasive power when democracies confront nondemocracies.

In sum, how leaders frame a situation has an impact on the manner in which a foreign policy problem is solved. Several experimental studies indicate that when the same solution is represented in different ways, changes occur in people's preferences.[47] Framing a situation in terms of necessity can make an expedient action seem obligatory. Ironically, what appears to be a strategic imperative obliging one to act in a certain way may actually lead policy makers to commit avoidable errors that weaken their country's international position. By counseling leaders to respect the primacy of necessity over moral choice, political realism offers counterproductive advice. As Wolfers points out, "attempts to evade, silence, or ignore moral judgement merely play into the hands of those who relish the uncriticized use or abuse of power."[48]

Conclusion

Shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General Hideki Tojo advised Premier Fumimaro Konoye that sometimes necessity compels leaders to take great risks, comparable to leaping on blind faith from the temple of Kiyo-

[46] Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 244–246. For a summary of the extensive body of research that indicates democracies rarely fight one another, see Steve Chan, "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (May 1997): 59–91.

[47] George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky, "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice," *American Political Science Review* 82 (September 1988): 719–736.

[48] Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, 63. The importance of normative questions can be see in Robert Kennedy's recollection that in the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. decision makers spent more time on moral issues "during the first five days than on any other single matter." *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1971), 17.

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mizudera into the ravine below.[49] But as the example of Europe in 1914 demonstrates, the so-called dictates of necessity are not self-evident. They do not provide clear, objective criteria for determining how a state should act in any particular situation. National leaders rarely have one unavoidable and indispensable course of action at their disposal. When leaders resort to the argument from necessity, they are generally using it to bolster a personal preference grounded in expediency. Rather than following an absolute strategic imperative that makes it practically impossible to do anything else, they are attempting to buttress a policy option that they believe is more advantageous than any other alternative.

Invoking necessity does not remove foreign policy decisions from the realm of moral judgment. What someone deems necessary will appear compelling only to the extent that certain values are accepted as important enough to warrant sacrificing other values. Accepting the precedence of one set of values over another does not occur in an ethical vacuum. As Arnold Wolfers reminds us, "the interpretation of what constitutes a vital national interest and how much value should be attached to it is a moral question. It cannot be answered by reference to alleged amoral necessities inherent in international politics; it rests on value judgments."[50]

Instead of providing a guide to the proper way of dealing with difficult problems, arguments based on appeals to necessity mislead leaders by short-circuiting the moral dimension of foreign policy deliberation. A thorough evaluation of any policy proposal asks the normative question of what goals we ought to pursue as well as the empirical question of whether recommended actions facilitate attaining those goals. To rely upon the argument from necessity for guidance is simply unrealistic: it ignores the very judgments of moral value that give meaning to a nation's foreign policy.*

[49] Bruce M. Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1974), 216.

[50] Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, 60.

* This research was supported by grants from the Idaho Humanities Council and the Idaho State Board of Education. I am grateful to Alan Brinton for his unflagging encouragement and valuable comments. I would also like to acknowledge the staff at the *Bibliotheek van het Vredespaleis* in The Hague.

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Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s

KAREN ORREN
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK

The days when the New Deal offered scholars a reliable springboard for plunging into an analysis of contemporary American politics are long past. Any number of important changes—the revolution in civil rights, the retrenchment in federal activism, the globalization of economic competition—have served to set current presumptions and practices apart from the governing arrangements ushered in by the Great Depression and World War II. The works assembled for examination here all express this growing sense of distance. They are Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*; Michael Brown, "State Capacity and Political Choice: Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal"; John Coleman, *Party Decline in America: Policy, Politics, and the Fiscal State*; Ira Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski, "Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from the 1940s"; Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950"; and David Plotke, *Building A Democratic Political Order, Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s.*[1]

[1] Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Random House, 1995); Michael Brown, "State Capacity and Political Choice: Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal," *Studies in American Political Development* 9 (Spring 1995): 187–212; John Coleman, *Party Decline in America: Policy, Politics, and the Fiscal State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Ira Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski, "Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from the 1940s," *Studies in American Political Development* 5 (Fall 1991); Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Summer 1993): 283–306; David Plotke, *Building A Democratic Political Order, Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

KAREN ORREN is professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK is professor of political science at Yale University. They are currently collaborating on a book about the study of American political development.

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These authors seek to understand the post-New Deal period of American political development as an historical phenomenon and by implication to clarify its relationship to the different world in which we now live. They describe the consolidation in the immediate aftermath of the New Deal of a distinctive mode of governance, one that would organize national affairs over the ensuing decades, grapple more or less successfully with the challenges of the day, and uphold a particular set of commitments. Scouting the limits as well as the capacities of these governing arrangements, they severally anticipate the circumstances that in more recent years worked to pull them apart.

The idea that the New Deal itself broke decisively with earlier presumptions about government and produced something categorically different is, of course, the way New Dealers themselves saw it. More to the point, much of what has been written about American political development hinges on that idea; without it, realignment theory, for example, probably would not have been thinkable. A central tenet of realignment theory is that the American Constitution has endured not as a single governmental formation but as a succession of relatively distinctive political regimes, each of which has substantially altered the substantive content and practical operations of federalism and the separation of powers. Major reform waves have periodically swept across American national government, and some, like the New Deal, ultimately succeeded in revamping constitutional relationships and installing new governmental agendas.[2] A recent variant of this view has dubbed these regime-building episodes "constitutional moments" to indicate the foundational character of the reconstructions at issue.[3] Suffice it to say that these dynamics remain critical to any understanding of the relationship between order and change in American politics.

To this point, however, far more energy has gone into studying the breakpoints that mark off different regimes in our national history than into studying the actual processes of regime formation. The problem of breaking with old governmental systems has, in fact, seldom been distinguished from the problem of solidifying new ones. When the consolidation of new governing arrangements has been considered at all, it has appeared less as an integral part of the process of regime formation than as a reactionary move backward, a period when earlier, adverse forces reasserted their control over reforms welling up from below and the essential centrism and moderation of the American system were reaffirmed. The new literature on the 1940s makes an especially useful contribution in this regard. Not only does it widen our view of liberal regime formation beyond the New Deal's early years, it attempts to generate through

[2] Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970).

[3] Bruce Ackerman, *We the People: Foundations* (Cambridge, MA: Belnap, 1991); see also Burnham's comment on Ackerman's thesis in Walter Dean Burnham, "Pattern Recognition and 'Doing' Political History" in Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 59–83.

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an analysis of what subsequently took hold a better understanding of the significance of the initial departure.

The analytic challenge taken on by this literature is considerable, so it is perhaps no surprise that the agreement among these authors about the importance of connecting developments in the 1930s and the 1940s does not extend to a consensus on the character of the relationship itself. In fact, the new literature presents a number of rather stark alternatives in this regard, their differences often turning on quite subtle matters of historical interpretation.

Alan Brinkley writes of the New Deal as a potentially radical reform effort that stalled after 1937 and of reformers' disorganized but steady retreat over the next decade from the early promise of economic restructuring. For David Plotke, the New Deal's radicalism lay not in the promise of restructuring the economy but rather in the continuing prospect of fuller group representation and greater amelioration of social ills. Brinkley's disorganized retreat appears in Plotke's work as a series of pragmatic adaptations by dogged reformers to rapidly changing political and material conditions. According to Plotke, the 1940s vindicated the New Dealers' progressive democratic purposes—so much so that the bold new ideas of the 1930s about the role of government appeared by the 1940s as commonsense political assumptions subscribed to by all the major actors in government.

Probing the same sequence on a less global plane, Ira Katznelson and Bruce Pietrykowski suggest a connection between the 1930s and 1940s that is also less straightforward. They argue that the early Roosevelt years offered two separate visions of national economic management, each of them in its own way promising a strong state capable of meeting the New Deal's political commitments. For them, the 1940s was a pivotal decade of political choice during which the alternative of building institutions designed to reach liberal goals by way of industrial planning was sidelined in favor of building institutions designed to reach liberal goals through fiscal planning.

But on this score, Michael Brown remains unconvinced. He questions Katznelson's assumption (and by implication Brinkley's also) that the more radical industrial-planning route was ever a realistic option or one ever seriously pursued during the New Deal years. He is also skeptical of Katznelson's (and by implication, Plotke's) views on the strength and managerial capacities of the fiscal-planning regime that actually emerged. Deeming that regime smart but impotent, Brown sees American liberalism settling into a state constrained to provide a climate for economic growth, one that would regularly subordinate its new pledge of welfare services to the priorities of corporate business.

The nature of the linkage between the 1930s and 1940s is as contentious a subject as it is because the stakes of getting it right are high. At issue is not simply our understanding of the New Deal's own transformation but also our grasp on how and to what extent the governmental forms that liberalism ultimately assumed in the United States are implicated in the eclipse of liberalism in our own day. As the contours of this debate are only beginning to emerge,

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it might seem premature to try to sort through the relative merits of the various arguments in play. It seems to us worth undertaking because the debate has inadvertently served another purpose, which is to bring forward deeper questions at the heart of the study of American politics: What exactly are these political regimes that figure so prominently in American political development? Why do they form in American national government? Why do they fall apart?

Questions like these have remained largely tacit in discussions of American political history, because we have not had at our disposal the kind of sustained commentary on a formative period of regime development that the new literature on the 1940s now provides. In the rest of this essay, we tease out some of the more general insights about regime formation we find prompted by this commentary. Grafting what these authors say about the 1940s onto what is already known about other political regimes in American history, even if a good deal more impressionistically, we educe some generalizations about the character of regimes and their place in American political development. In shifting the inquiry into the 1940s onto this different plane, we have no thought of resolving the many issues the authors individually engage. Our purpose, rather, is to indicate and elaborate upon relevant findings we think they have already uncovered.

Regimes as Elite Arrangements

The first insight to be drawn from these works is found in the basic premise they all share: in the 1940s, New Deal liberalism became a stable system of governance. The point might be sharpened: whether one regards the 1940s as a pull-back from the ideas of the 1930s, a holding action in anticipation of new liberal advances, or a fork in the road to the fiscal state, this was the decade in which modern liberal reform moved beyond political and group confrontation to insinuate itself into the basic arrangements and routine operations of the national state.

John Coleman's book captures the scale and scope of this adjustment to liberal priorities. Presidential authority was recast in the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939; congressional authority was recast in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; judicial authority was recast in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. Across-the-board constitutional adaptations were accompanied by other, hardly less significant changes in the supporting apparatus. The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) was relocated from its original position in the Treasury Department to the newly formed Executive Office of the President (EOP). Coleman underscores the symbolism of this organizational move. The BOB was at the same time being transformed through an expansion of its powers and personnel from a mere housekeeping instrument into the premier manager of the new economy, responsible for initiating and implementing a national fiscal policy. With the passage of the Employment Act of 1946, the BOB was joined in the EOP by a new Council of Economic Advisers (CEA),

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which had the job of providing long-range forecasts of economic performance and helping the BOB keep governmental expenditures in line with the Employment Act's statutory commitment to stable growth and maximum employment.

Regime building appears here as a form of elite engineering. It entails rearranging institutional relationships to stabilize and routinize governmental operations around a new set of political assumptions. From here forward, for the regime's duration, serious national debate about the legitimacy of a powerful and active administrative arm in Washington was effectively foreclosed. These changes not only geared the federal government to control and direct affairs within the broad ambit of the new duties it assumed, they submerged older political concerns and left other institutional mechanisms to atrophy. As Coleman shows, during the 1940s the operations of BOB and CEA began to replace the nation's two major political parties as central mediating instruments of national governance. As he explains it, the parties had been the chief exponents of older political divisions over foreign trade and economic development; as the agreement on the doctrines of fiscal Keynesianism took hold, party conflict was itself marginalized. President and Congress would henceforth coordinate their actions regarding the national economy through the professional expertise and planning capacities lodged in the EOP.

Coleman reminds us that the stable operation of these arrangements in the 1950s and the early 1960s gave credence to broad-ranging theories that conveyed the essentials of American democracy in terms of pluralism, polyarchy, and equilibrium. He observes, however, that by the 1970s, each of the institutions and understandings that had been forged in the 1940s had come under severe strain. At this juncture, the presidency and the Congress reorganized again, this time marginalizing the bureaucratic influence they had so lately embraced. With the crumbling of the Keynesian consensus, the advice of the BOB and the EOP was regarded as neither neutral nor professional and readily rejected. Party divisions revived and ideological debate intensified. In retrospect, what becomes evident is how highly contingent and vulnerable the elite settlements reached in the 1940s were. This was no simple reaffirmation of the verities of American democracy; it was the institution of a novel set of ideas that held sway for a time under quite specific circumstances.

It is, therefore, all the more significant that with the liberal regime—however understood—now eclipsed, virtually all the institutions liberals are credited with establishing remain today in operation, albeit less imperiously than before. Like the party machinery created by the Jacksonians during the antebellum years to service discrete localities, and the apparatus created by the Republicans after the Civil War to promote and regulate the various sectors of the national economy, the institutions created by the liberals for managing national economic demand were carried over after the regime's collapse and adapted to new governing modes. Regimes, it would seem, are not synonymous with institutions or even sets of institutions they themselves might establish;

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institutions like the BOB may characterize, even symbolize America's political regimes, but they do not in themselves comprise them.

Plotke, whose work represents the most self-conscious effort in this literature to find in the experience of the 1930s and 1940s general lessons about political regimes, is concerned to specify defining characteristics more closely. He locates regimes in the linkages that elites forge between governing institutions and political commitments. These linkages are composed of political norms, public discourses, decision-making procedures, and modes of intervention into socioeconomic relations. The formative element in any given regime is, in his view, not its trademark institutions but the governing cadre that manages them and that acts within an intellectual milieu, infusing institutions with meaning, purpose, and direction. American liberalism throughout this century, he argues, has been premised in particular on the empowerment of an urban-professional cadre committed to achieving progressive and democratizing ends through government. In fact, just these cadres gained ascendancy during the New Deal and forged the linkages of a distinctly liberal regime. This view of the matter is compatible with much of John Coleman's analysis, and it gains further support from what Brinkley tells us about his own reasons for focusing on elite debates: "[Q]uestions of political economy, the questions that preoccupied liberals in the latter years of the New Deal, and that, for many . . . represented the essence of liberalism existed largely within the world of elites—intersecting networks of liberal policymakers, journalists, scholars and intellectuals" (p. 13).

All told, political regimes appear in this literature as working arrangements among institutions fashioned by new governing cadres to elaborate their particular political commitments. As regimes transform new ideas about the purposes of government into governing routines, they carry on the reformer's central contention as the political common sense of a new era, a set of base assumptions shared (or at least accepted) by all the major actors in the period. In this way, political regimes come to exercise an overarching influence over the affairs of state.

It is apparent, however, that these formations are not nearly as flexible as they are, for whatever time, hegemonic. Notwithstanding the strong element of human agency at the heart of regime building, regimes emerge as highly articulated, interdependent elite formations, vulnerable, and directly so, to shifting currents below. As elites are the forward column, they become time and again the targets of new political competitors: in the 1970s, they were the "pointy headed intellectuals"; in the 1850s, the "slaveocracy"; in the 1920s, the "economic royalists." Such challenges do not go unnoticed by coalition partners; and once called into question by a shift in political mood, America's political regimes have uniformly succumbed. Operating at the highest level of political organization, regimes and their managers have little capacity to hold things in place when rhetorical conditions begin to change.

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What emerges if you look closely at this new literature is a picture of regime politics in which the governmental system, rather than staying fixed for a period of time, operates in a greater or lesser degree of constant transformation. By all these accounts, the liberal regime was long in forming (1932–1946); it reached a critical turning point around 1966; and it lingered on through (depending how you count) one or two decades of disarray. The cycle of formation and disintegration, in other words, extended roughly a half century, from 1932 to 1980; and yet, the liberal regime appears to have functioned in full flower only for about twenty years, from 1946 to 1966. That the New Deal was not aberrant in its protean nature is supported by what we know of other eras. Jacksonian scholars are fairly agreed that it was not until 1840 that the political and institutional disruptions that rumbled out of Jackson's presidency crystallized into a coherent system of national governance and also that by 1850 this system had fallen into deep disorganization. The Republican party guided by the watchword of black freedom in the 1860s and 1870s did not consolidate its hold on power until 1896, and did so then only by eliminating the former slaves from its agenda; by 1908, its coalition of northern farmers and businessmen had fractured, though this regime too had a considerable run in disarray.

To a degree, the intellectual and organizational coherence we ascribe to political regimes in America is deceptive. For all their prominence as organizing devices, these formations remain surface—indeed, rather passive—phenomena. An established political regime may be expected to articulate and police the terms under which routine governance is possible given certain prevailing conditions, but its capacity to persevere and adapt appears strictly bounded by its inability to prevent changes that will render it obsolete.

Regime Building As Social Accommodation

A second insight into the significance of political regimes in America is to be found in what our authors have to say about the social and political basis of the settlement of the 1940s. All agree on the proposition that what in 1936 had seemed an irresistible and thoroughgoing reform drive was arrested between 1937 and 1939 by a coalition of southern conservatives and anti-New Deal Republicans, and that after that time the political momentum lay with factions that restricted the liberals' ambitions. Thus, they are in accord on the perception that the liberal regime, even during the time of its fullest sway over government, incorporated within its institutional arrangements and working assumptions antagonistic social interests. More than that, the literature suggests that several critical developments of regime building in the 1940s took the form of liberal accommodation to the regime's least liberal, indeed avowedly antiliberal, elements.

Brinkley identifies the "end of reform" with liberal elites' reluctant but steady coming to terms with corporate business autonomy, and he traces the rise and fall of leading figures and administrative agencies according to an

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agenda that promised to check the ambitions of government at a good distance from the doors of production. The imperative of active business cooperation in wartime mobilization is, of course, critical in this telling; but the war only solidified ambiguities in an overall pattern evident from the start. As Michael Brown points out, American liberals at no time gave wide or stable approval to the idea that corporate leaders were part of the problem and not part of the solution; even Brinkley concedes that from the beginning of the New Deal it was a matter of lively debate precisely how much governmental intervention in business was necessary or desirable in order to achieve progressive ends.

An equally portentous tension is described by Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, namely the need to maintain cordial relations with the racist South. Documenting southerners' participation as full partners in the economic reforms of Roosevelt's first term, these authors show that support for new public spending projects was underwritten by a disproportionate share of public investment in that region and that Dixie's vote for the centerpiece initiative of social security was retained only through the careful exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from the new program's coverage. Mobilization for war further complicated this balancing act. Trade unions, exploiting their advantage in the wartime labor market, relied on provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Act and of the National War Labor Board to make inroads into southern industry. Republicans joined northern Democrats to pass a Selective Service Act that prohibited racial discrimination and gave soldiers absentee voting rights, directly challenging the South's own patented methods. By the war's end, the southern block had narrowed its support for reform in a way that would delimit liberalism's future advances. Apart from an occasional willingness on the part of northern Democrats to join Republicans on civil rights bills, postwar liberalism was largely confined by the South to new spending for government services.

The role of southern power and interest in cutting off prospects for more social-democratic alternatives offers an insight into regime formation and maintenance quite apart from the timing and exigencies of World War II. It will be observed that the accommodation of important social interests opposed to the reform thrust of regime-builders has been an integral part of the consolidation of regimes in every period of American political history. The maturation of the Jacksonian regime in 1840, for instance, refers to a process by which those interests most obviously menaced by the triumph of Jacksonian democracy—nationalists and nullifiers—adopted their adversaries' methods of organizing and campaigning and thereby gained the capacity to contest federal power for themselves. Similarly, the Republican triumph of 1896 climaxed the gradual substitution after 1877 of abolitionism with the acceptance of an unreconstructed South as a working assumption of future political action. Regimes, we may conclude, are among other things mechanisms for holding together in the same orbit interests and ambitions that in other circumstances could be expected to be regularly at loggerheads.

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Given this characteristic, it is not difficult to understand why regime consolidation so often looks like reactionary politics. Old players are in fact resurgent, and as contrary social forces they work to moderate, delimit, and to some extent redirect the democratic reform drives associated with the initial political departure. The conceptual difficulty posed by this aspect of regime building is evident in the efforts of our authors to reckon with the regime's incongruities without abandoning their contention that it represented something genuinely new. Brinkley's account stops just this side of describing developments in the 1940s as a full capitulation to the opposing forces, and his story of failures and shortfalls, of reform visions diverted and promises broken, has an obvious parallel—the now standard history of Reconstruction after the Civil War.[4]

Plotke, alert to the problem, takes pains to defend the vitality of reform principles in the 1940s against charges of liberal surrender. Reformers' retreats were limited, he insists; their accommodations were strategic, their core ideas intact. He is undoubtedly correct that much of what is written about the 1940s' reaction overlooks the advanced positions upon which even the New Deal's fallback policies were based. But even if we grant that critical skirmishes, like that over the Taft-Hartley Act, were fought out on liberal ground—here of collective bargaining, one of the New Deal's first principles recently annexed as common sense—we are still left to confront the motley composition of the regime as it finally emerged. How to reconcile the bold political departure effected by New Deal reformers with that regime's acknowledgment and protection of illiberal social interests is the knotty question that causes these authors to stake out such starkly different positions over relatively subtle matters of interpretation. At stake is the integrity of the regime concept itself.

It can be speculated that the reason both Brinkley and Plotke fail to fully exploit their shared insight—that the liberal regime was a composite of contending social elements—is the prominent role both authors give to the regime's "principles." Their preoccupation with what happened to the reformers' original ideas, visions, and discourses tends by its nature to consign debate largely to whether the realization-glass is half full or half empty: Exactly how far did liberal reformers retreat from their initial aims? Just how much of their vision survived intact? Apart from the difficulty of establishing stable reference points—which ideas? which leaders? which policy shortfalls?—this lost-and-found approach to political history is bound to lead to a morass of comparative counterfactuals, where disparate inferences all but eclipse factual validation of a regime's true features. With that in mind, it may be more fruitful to agree in advance that political regimes will never be as coherent as the ideas that inspire them. The clearest and most arresting of reform ideas are likely to be those that are universal and holistic, while the accomplishments of even the most radical reform episodes are likely to be specific and partial.

[4] Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York: Harper, 1988).

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Along these lines, it would appear that there is more to be learned from what our authors provide in the way of concrete historical evidence of change in the 1930s than from their debate over how fully the liberals' ideals were realized in the 1940s. As Brown makes clear, there is little to support the claim that New Dealers in government ever seriously intended to go after corporate control of production; there is much evidence, in fact, to support the contrary proposition. Similarly, as Katznelson and his colleagues make clear, there is little evidence that New Dealers ever seriously intended to go after southern apartheid; and there is much to support the contrary proposition. On the other side lies a strong consensus on the proposition that New Dealers did take aim at the institutions governing relations between employers and workers, that they succeeded in substantially transforming those, and that the new political and social power of the labor movement contributed importantly to what was distinctive about the new regime.

Regime Building and Institutional Dismantling

A third insight into the nature of regimes and regime building follows closely on the above. Two distinct phases of regime formation are now in evidence: one of institutional dismantling and another of political rearrangement. The first phase is radical, effecting a deep but localized dismantling of received authority; the second stage is synthetic, accommodating incongruous elements, old and new, and effecting in the process a comprehensive reconstruction of political action at the center. The literature on the 1940s points to what happens once the reformers have spent their most radical energies. But subjecting the arrangements that shake out in the second phase to normative standards derived from the first obscures the operative relationship between the two. Consistent with all these works is a claim that regime building in the 1940s did not extend or reverse the reform efforts of the 1930s so much as it sought to come to terms with that first phase's accomplishment. And once these phases are distinguished, we see that the critical findings of this literature no longer undermine one another: we are able to understand the liberal regime as both a radical departure and a haven for unreconstructed elements.

Reflecting backward in American history to earlier episodes, it can be observed that elite rearrangements of the apparatus of government have regularly followed in the wake of social reform movements that battered against the institutional foundations of earlier politics. A pattern is readily identified: the Jacksonian revolution as a culmination of a broad democratic rout of institutions that had reserved access to credit, the professions, corporate business, the franchise, and government office to a family-based partriciate; the Republican party as the instrument of abolition and of a commercial system no longer attentive to slavery's needs; the New Deal as the spearhead of the labor movement and the removal of what had been a constitutional firewall between business and public policy. In each of these instances, reform dislodged one particular form

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of institutional authority from a complex mix. By the same token, regime-building episodes in which the dismantling phase has been less decisive in cutting out received forms of authority have yielded political formations that are less distinct. The Jeffersonian era with its latitudinarian approach to federalist institutions is a suggestive case in point; even more so, the never quite "progressive" regime of the early twentieth century, which for all its creativity in rearranging institutions never finally dismantled any important one, not even the urban machine. One indicator of the difference between elite rearrangements that fill voids left by the dismantling of old forms and those that merely shuffle existing authority around is the more decided drift back into old ways notable both in the late Jeffersonian era after 1815 and the post-progressive period after World War I.

The precise relations between social movements and governmental elites have been insufficiently studied; but the first phase of regime building seems to be formed by that association. Social movements also appeal to universal values at the same time they direct their reforms at some particular subset of institutions said to be most corrupt or at odds with stipulated ideals of private or public behavior. Our authors capture different aspects of these relations between elite politics and movement politics and between the expansive rhetoric and focused action that go into regime formation. Plotke invokes the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 as the signal triumph of this regime-building episode. He shows how the transformative demands of the labor movement facilitated (though they did not entirely determine) the work of elites who crafted the legislative specifics around radically new ideas about government. Brinkley, in contrast, organizes his study around a widening shortfall, especially after 1937, between the elite's "concrete achievements" and the "ideological rationales that supported their creation." It does not strain either interpretation to suggest that the profundity of the achievement of regime building's first phase prepares the way for ideological disillusionment in the second, however justifiable that disillusionment might be deemed by subsequent observers. In the case of the New Deal, the Wagner Act and also its companion Fair Labor Standards Act uprooted ancient foundations of government, and did so notwithstanding the New Dealers' ambivalence about monopoly or their eventual accommodation of it.

These considerations bring us back to an institutional view of regime change, but the perspective afforded is now decidedly different from the one with which we began. A regime's radicalism may be difficult to find in the institutional arrangements generated to facilitate its operation, for, as we now see, these reflect the imperatives of accommodating things that the reformers have not been able or concerned to change. But if we are attentive to what is missing from those new arrangements—older forms of institutional authority that were vital to governance in the previous period but are no longer in play—the decisive character of the departure will be unmistakable. No political change, not even revolutionary change, is likely to dismantle and replace all aspects of gov-

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ernment at once; thus, older forms of governance are likely to be seen in every effort to rearrange governing relationships and secure new governing priorities. However, whenever one of these older forms of institutional control is decisively eliminated from the mix—as the common law system of labor relations was in the New Deal and slavery was in the Civil War—the change effected goes to the constitution of government itself. To take account of what is missing from the new mix is to make the process of regime construction in the American context both more concrete and more tractable. When once-insulated social hierarchies become subjects of positive law making and when new laws fill the voids in governance left by the displacement of these long-sanctioned forms, there is little chance of sliding back into old ways.

These results are registered in the characteristic social formations of the three political regimes: for liberalism, a dominant coalition without the industrialist factions that had been central to both party leaderships since 1896; for Jacksonism, a dominant party without the umbrella of a national patriciate, now dedicated to the separate agendas of diverse regions; for Republicanism, a reigning party dominant with no southern wing. The absence from each regime's dominant coalition sets the stage for subsequent politics, which confirm rather than confront what has changed: The Whig party gave patricians, North and South, reentry into national politics; but the need now to resort to mass mobilization and coalition building meant that their core concerns would operate on the periphery of the new democracy. The compromise of 1877 promised the South increasing autonomy over domestic institutions, but the price paid by 1896 was the relegation of that region to the periphery of the new industrial economy. World War II affirmed a business autonomy beyond public control, but now government was attentive to public interests beyond business control. In each case, the terms of accommodation bore clear marks of a decisive change effected by the antecedent institutional displacement; a different platform for political competition had been established.

There is no reason to expect that these processes will always work in the same way. Dismantlings may be more or less thorough in the first phase; rearrangements may be more or less robust in the second. But if we are correct, the politics of regime formation should be illuminated in all instances. The 1960s, to take one last instance, witnessed a decisive dismantling of the institutions of southern apartheid. The thing that stands out here, however, is that the elites at the forefront of this first stage of the process of regime change failed to retain their privileged position during the second. The civil rights movement devastated the constituent structure of the New Deal regime as it had been consolidated in the 1940s. But in the critical years after 1968, it found its opponents in charge of arranging a new settlement. Thus, the tortured, often stalemated course of regime construction over the past few decades seems a particularly striking confirmation of the central contention of the new literature on the 1940s. The precise character of the new regime is set in the rearrangement

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phase and does not necessarily follow as a matter of course from the initial break with the past.

Regimes and the Constitution of American Government

The terms political "regime" and political "order" are used interchangeably in the new literature on the 1940s. But if we are correct in our assessment, there is a useful distinction to be drawn between them. We have seen that the governing arrangements of the liberal regime actually assumed a polity composed of multiple orders; they accommodated several relatively separate spheres of authority, each with its own institutional supports. Some of these orderings, like labor relations, were new, products of the recent reform drive; others, like southern apartheid and corporate control over production, were older, carryovers from the prior state of affairs. Each of these orders operated on different principles and thus in a potentially contentious relationship with the others. It should be obvious that in any polity thus composed, routine governance will be facilitated by some higher level of management. That is what America's political regimes have provided. In their most precise signification, they have accommodated the simultaneous operation of several incongruous orderings of authority.

The new literature on the 1940s portrays fiscal Keynesianism in just this way: it was a governing formula as essential for political management as it was for economic management. A peculiarly American brand of Keynesian economics, it represented a distillation of the terms under which liberalism's new social priorities could accommodate southern, corporate, and labor power. Indeed, by all accounts, fiscal Keynesianism emerged in the 1940s as the only terms under which the multiple orders mobilized under this system could be brought into alignment and routine governance established at the center. Not surprisingly, this settlement worked only so long as those elements remained as they were at the time they signed on.

Notwithstanding this moment of alignment, we are left in the end with a more disjoint, out-of-synch picture of the relationship between political order and political change than received theories of American political development have suggested. Realignment theory challenged the equation of the American regime with the Constitution and replaced the notion of one overarching institutional frame encompassing the whole of our political experience with the conception of a succession of historically distinct political formations, each with its own political base, policy matrix, and constitutional arrangements. The view presented here is consistent with the realignment imagery to this extent, but careful attention to the process of regime formation itself suggests a substantial modification of our understanding of order within these historical periods. The periods themselves now appear less holistic, the political regime less of an integrated system. There is no single ordering of authority relations dominating these eras, no political synthesis created all of a piece and persisting until the electorate sweeps it away.

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Our alternative proposition is that American government has been characterized by a succession of political regimes, because it has from the very beginning incorporated different and contending orderings within its basic constitutional frame. Changes in the mix of elements, typically in the form of an expansion of positive law making over systems of control previously outside the reach of democratic legislatures, have amounted to changes in the government's constitutional foundations. New regimes register these changes in new governing arrangements, but they remain surface and instrumental things. They are essentially devices for holding in some balance the contentious operations of their constituent parts. As such they sit rather high on the political food chain. At any given point, they may figure prominently in the practical operations of American government and in the orientation of political debate, but this instrumental coherence is built on underlying dissonances. The regime may hang together for a time, but it never really fits together, and the contentious interaction of old and new elements keeps in it in a more or less constant state of transformation.

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Book Reviews

Italy Since 1989: Events and Interpretations *by Vittorio Bufacchi and Simon Burgess. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998. 275 pp. $65.00.*

The Italian Guillotine: Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy's First Republic *by Stanton H. Burnett and Luca Mantovani. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. 304 pp. Cloth, $62.00; paper, $22.95.*

More than most democracies, Italy lends itself to the Rashomon effect: what you see there depends not only on where you stand and on what else may govern your perceptions. The Italians, and notoriously those who control Italy's mass media, are masters at creating illusions that they themselves come to confuse with reality.

So it has been these last several years in the matter of corruption. The Italian press, readily joined by its counterparts abroad, has depicted Italy as perhaps the most corrupt democracy in modern history. Readers worldwide have come to believe falsely that several thousand Italian politicians, industrialists, and other citizens have been duly arrested, tried, and convicted of corruption. The mass media and social scientists have used words like "revolution" and "Second Republic" so repeatedly that it is necessary to remind everyone that the First Republic is still very much in place.

Both of these books place Italy's recent political history in better perspective. Burgess and Bufacchi provide a parsimonious overview of the tumultuous last decade. Bufacchi nicely delineates why democracy Italian style warrants the label "particracy" or "party state." These authors are correct in their surmise that, despite recent upheavals, Italy is unlikely to develop as a democracy of more "liberal" leanings—that is, one of individual rights and limited government.

No better evidence for this conclusion is available than what we find in the pages of *The Italian Guillotine*. By far the most pernicious aspect of the break-up of Italy's discredited political parties is the power vacuum it created, into which a hard-lining group of leftist magistrates has moved with Machiavellian resolve. It may be exaggeration to claim, as do Stanton Burnett and Luca Mantovani, that the Clean Hands campaign amounts to a coup d'etat. Nevertheless, few readers of these riveting pages will fail to understand how deep the threat to democracy is now represented by the Clean Hands investigators themselves, not by corruption.

As the authors show, these magistrate-prosecutors brook no criticism from the press or prime ministers, from MPs or ordinary citizens, or indeed from presidents of the republic. Politicized many years ago, the magistrates involved are almost exclusively members of *Ma-*

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gistratura Democratica, that branch of the judicial system identified with the former Communist party. Silvio Berlusconi, himself not fully in touch with the basic canons of democratic governance, is on solid ground in his claim that the prosecutors have gone after him overwhelmingly for highly partisan political reasons.

The magistrates practice one of the most vicious forms of preventive detention found anywhere. Their modes of interrogation of those jailed (but not formally charged with any crime!) would be denounced anywhere else as human rights violations. They systematically leak to friendly newspapers material that should legally remain under lock and key until (if ever!) formal charges and a trial ensue. It is not uncommon for citizens harried by these inquisitors to take their own lives.

According to Burnett and Mantovani, a political assault of the magnitude represented by the Clean Hands campaign would be unthinkable were it not for the assistance and/or collusion the magistrates have received from two specific sectors. The first would be some of Italy's leading industrial families and the newspapers and magazines they control. The second is the PDS (Democratic party of the Left), the former Italian Communist party, now in power at Rome. Any objective reading of the political events of the last decade would lend support to both these claims.

Exposures of the darker side of the Clean Hands magistrates have been painfully slow to materialize. Journalists of Italy's leading newspapers with rare exceptions have not rocked the boat. Members of parliament who speak out are quickly denounced by both political opponents and magistrates as being soft on corruption. In recent weeks, the magistrates have also succeeded in torpedoing a much needed reform of the judicial system, which had earlier been approved by both Silvio Berlusconi and Massimo D'Alema.

Italy's social scientists have also given the magistrates a very wide berth. Political scientists and political sociologists tend to associate political corruption, police brutality, violations of human rights, and arrogance regarding due process of law with right-wing politics. Furthermore, because the exposure of corruption, especially in a democracy, tends to be judged an absolute good, the means to this desirable end will often be glossed over or ignored. Until recently at least, too many political scientists were ready to admire and applaud Antonio Di Pietro and others in the Clean Hands group, rather than turn a critical analytical eye in their direction.

Factors of this kind, I believe, have greatly obscured our understanding of what triggered the Clean Hands investigations in the first place, and what the process itself may imply about both the nature and the future of Italian democracy. Italy's condition cries out for more warnings like Angelo Panebianco's. He finds the usurped political power of the magistrates "so frightening that democratically elected politicians must, willing or not, submit to it" (*The Italian Guillotine*, p. 268).

The closing pages of the Bufacchi and Burgess, as well as their chapter on corruption, are curiously uncritical of what they euphemistically dub "judicial activism." Their hope too is that institutional renewal may yet place Italy on a firmer democratic footing. Their rational-choice mode of explanation, however, is unconvincing. Among other things, it runs against the most striking aspect of the Italian political system: It remains far too baroque and otherwise nuanced to be neatly explicated on a matrix extrapolated from something called the market.

As for the Burnett and Mantovani volume, the authors are probably correct in their claim that a book carrying this kind of indictment would not easily find its first publication in Italy. When it does appear there, the heaviest artillery will be mounted to deny its contents and discredit its authors. If I am wrong in this prediction, it will mean, as I deeply hope, that

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more of the Italian political, economic, and academic elites, however belatedly, have lined up to bring magistrates within the realm of effective democratic oversight.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 *by Geir Lundestad. Westport, CT, Praeger Press, 1997. 176 pp. $55.00.*

Students interested in the complex history of America's role in the development of postwar European integration can draw on an ever increasing body of excellent books concerning particular topics, such as the Marshall Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community, or the Treaty of Rome. What has long been missing from this body of literature is an interpretive survey of America's policy toward European integration since World War II. Geir Lundestad's *"Empire" by Integration* should be warmly welcomed by both specialists and general readers, precisely because it provides a concise overview of American foreign policy and European integration, as well as an incisive critical assessment of the major scholarly debates within the field over the last two decades.

Lundestad's central theme will come as no surprise to readers familiar with his previous books. Building on the idea that America's postwar relationship with the states of Western Europe is in many respects comparable to other empires in history, Lundestad examines how and why this empire developed in the form that it did after World War II. While America's support for European integration was rooted in many different factors, Lundestad correctly emphasizes that the critical factor driving Washington's policies was the need to resolve the classical German problem in a way that both the Germans and the Western Europeans could voluntarily accept. If America's only objective during the formative period of the cold war was the containment of the Soviet Union, it is quite likely that sponsoring European integration would never have been perceived to be as crucial an objective as it obviously was to policy makers for much of the postwar era. The fact that American and Western European policy makers saw two interconnected threats—an actual Soviet one and a potential German one ominously lurking in the background—explains why supranational mechanisms were seen as the only viable and permanent path to a peaceful and prosperous future. While some scholars may still quarrel with Lundestad's view that the containment of Germany was a more important factor behind European integration than the containment of the Soviet Union, it seems quite likely that future historians will increasingly follow him in placing more emphasis on the German part of the equation.

Rather than debating the relative importance of the German or Soviet component of the motivations behind American support for European integration, future scholarship should be focused on Lundestad's conception of empire. His definition of the concept is less than clear and many scholars will question exactly how much his "empire" differs from what other scholars have described as an American hegemony or sphere of influence. The key issue to be worked through both conceptually and historically revolves around how much control the United States wanted to exert over the states of Western Europe. Lundestad emphasizes how European integration was intended from the start as a way to guarantee America's leading role in the West, although he acknowledges that such a policy clearly ran the risk of creating a supranational Europe that might be able to challenge American

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dominance. The dilemma that remains unanswered in his analysis, however, is why America would sponsor European integration if leadership was such an important objective, since it was only the creation of a supranational Western Europe that could possibly have created an entity capable of challenging American leadership. One way out of the dilemma posed by Lundestad's analysis would be to argue that, at least in the late 1940s and early 1950s, American policy makers valued a supranational Western Europe far more than they worried about the creation of a possible rival. Nevertheless, while specialists will not find every argument advanced by Lundestad persuasive, this book will be of great value in sparking interest in a research field too often dominated by narrow and dull scholarship.

JAMES MCALLISTER
Williams College

The Political Participation of Asian Americans *by Pei-te Lien. New York, Garland Publishing, 1997. 200 pp. $48.00.*

Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience *by Angelo Ancheta. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1997. 224 pp. Cloth, $47.00; paper, $18.00.*

For much of this century, America's "other" minorities—Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and others—have been ignored in scholarship and public discussions about race. Yet as immigration flows initiated by the Immigration Act of 1965 continue to dramatically transform the U.S. population, scholars have begun to recognize the increasing complexity of racial matters and the need to go beyond a bipolar black-white framework in talking and thinking about race. These two books on Asian Americans reflect this trend toward taking other groups' experiences more seriously—although they are strikingly different in emphasis, method, scope, and style.

Pei-te Lien's book sets out to explain the putative underparticipation of Asian Americans in electoral politics—what Lien calls the Asian American "participation deficit" (p. 13). The puzzle, according to Lien, is that Asian American population numbers, education levels, and, especially, median family income all predict higher levels of electoral engagement than actually occur. If conventional sociodemographic factors fail to explain the level of Asian American electoral participation, then what does? Lien attempts to answer this question through regression analysis of data from two *Los Angeles Times* telephone polls (a 1993 survey of Asian Americans in Southern California and a 1992 survey of Korean Americans in Los Angeles). Her main argument is that "sociopsychological indicators of panethnicity" (p. 68) are the key to explaining the low level of Asian American electoral participation. Included, but not limited to, are attitudes about whether or not Asian Americans suffer from discrimination, level of knowledge of Asian American history and community leaders, and level of social integration with whites through marriage and friendships.

Three central aspects of this book are problematic. First, Lien may exaggerate the magnitude of the Asian American participation deficit. Students of the Asian American experience have argued for decades that median family income figures are unreliable as indicators of Asian American socioeconomic status, since Asian Americans tend to live in larger families with several working adults, concentrate in metropolitan areas with high costs of living, and are internally stratified according to class and national origin/ethnic lines. Once we

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question the reliability of median family income figures, we must also wonder to what extent the Asian American participation deficit (the gap between actual electoral participation and that predicted by socioeconomic status) is a misleading artifact of the way that aggregate income data is collected. Second, the underparticipation that Lien describes as a distinctive characteristic of Asian Americans may in fact be a characteristic of immigrants per se. The survey data Lien cites suggest that Asian Americans and Latinos (the two racial/ethnic groups with the highest proportions of immigrants) both underparticipate relative to blacks and whites. Finally, Lien presents "sociopsychological indicators of panethnicity" as an unsatisfying black box explanation of Asian American underparticipation. The data clearly do not permit her to disentangle the disparate elements of this category and trace the mechanisms by which they might influence participation decision making. The stringent limitations of Lien's data make themselves felt throughout the book, from the construction of the research question to the main findings.

Angelo Ancheta's book examines how American law has at different historical junctures facilitated, constrained, and/or permitted the racial subordination of Asian Americans. He makes two main arguments. The first is that anti-Asian subordination via the law was historically different than anti-black subordination, because it was based upon citizenship status not color, upon imputations of foreignness rather than of inferiority. Since American jurisprudence predominantly operated within a black-white framework, this difference placed Asian Americans in a "racial limbo" (p. 2) in terms of their overall political and juridical status. Ancheta's second argument is that this peculiar status persists today in so far as contemporary antidiscrimination laws ignore the distinctive problems facing immigrants and noncitizens, including Asian Americans. In chapters four and five—the most important chapters of the book—Ancheta explains that nativist and xenophobic measures against Asian Americans and others routinely escape judicial censure, both because the century-old "plenary power doctrine" grants federal bodies greater leeway on immigration issues than states and because antidiscrimination laws do not address language minority status, immigrant status, or citizenship status, as opposed to suspect classifications such as race, national origin, etc. Drawing upon his experience as a civil rights lawyer, Ancheta proposes first that federal immigration policies be subject to heightened judicial review; second, suspect classifications (which trigger heightened judicial review) be broadened to address language minority status, immigrant status, and citizenship status. His goal is to rescue Asian Americans from their imposed racial limbo and address their needs directly through legal reform.

Ancheta's insightful, thorough, and highly readable book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of both the Asian American experience in particular and the persistence of racially subordinative policies in the post-civil rights era in general. Ancheta's effort to "move beyond a black-white model of racial jurisprudence" (p. 15) while still respecting the distinctiveness of the black experience demonstrates his unusual ability to push the theoretical envelope in a historically sensitive and sophisticated manner. Drawing upon a wide range of legal, social-scientific, and ethnic-studies scholarship, Ancheta's book is interdisciplinary in the best sense of the word: it brings together and integrates the most important insights of various fields to yield a coherent and powerful narrative about Asian Americans and the law. Overall, it is an ambitious book that delivers on its promise. I do think that Ancheta downplays the extent to which Asian Americans were seen as racially inferior in addition to being seen as foreign. I wish he had moved further toward theorizing about how nonwhites were historically racialized in a comparative, interactive fashion. But

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these are small criticisms of an otherwise excellent book that deserves to be read by students, researchers, and laypeople alike.

CLAIRE JEAN KIM
University of California, Irvine

Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany *by Charles S. Maier. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 440 pp. $29.95.*

This broad-gauged yet sharply focused, cogently argued, and copiously documented study by Charles Maier, Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies at Harvard, exemplifies the writing of contemporary history at its best. Maier has mined the East German archives that were thrown open following the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990 and also draws upon his own experiences as a participant observer during the first five years of German reunification. Maier's approach is at once personal, synthetic, comparative, and, above all else, supremely analytical.

The study consists of six meaty chapters. Chapter One, "Losing Faith," presents a synoptic view of the late GDR in comparative historical perspective as well as in the requisite German and communist contexts; it offers a host of insights into constraints and consent, the exercise of power and the loss of authority. Chapter Two, "The Economic Collapse," is easily the most impressive; it argues that the system's failure was not necessarily inherent in the command economy per se but must rather be traced to the specific circumstances of the 1970s, when the world market began to encroach upon a hidebound regime fettered by onerous obligations to the Soviet Union and COMECON but nonetheless seeking to slake its subjects' consumerist appetites without countenancing political relaxation. This was a situation that no amount of West German economic assistance, massive though it became, could permanently alleviate. It led the Honecker regime to stonewall serious reform, cook the books, and thus court its own downfall. There follow chapters on "The Autumn Upheaval" (Chapter Three) and "The Protagonists of Transition" (Chapter Four), which cast in bold relief, but with all the necessary subtle shadings, the social forces and individual personalities that burst upon the East German scene in 1989-1990. Chapter Five, "Unification," deals with both the economic and diplomatic aspects of a process that began in earnest after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Chapter Six, "Anschluss and Melancholy," examines the consequences of reunification with special reference to the impact of capitalist market policies on East Germany, the western purges of eastern academic institutions, and the settling of scores with the once omnipresent East German security service, the Stasi. An Epilogue plays with the metaphor of Berlin's massive old Reichstag building wrapped up in the silvery shroud fashioned by the artist Christo as a possible harbinger of a lighter, more airy future to ameliorate Germany's heavy-laden past.

Maier's study is so rich and complex that a brief review can do little more than mention a few highlights. One of these is Maier's measured celebration of collective action on the part of the East German population. His treatment constitutes a powerful defense of agency in history, as against the approach that dismisses the dissolution of the GDR (or, for that matter, the Soviet Union) as having been caused by some sort of mechanistic implosion. In this connection, Maier's comparison of the role of the crowd in German history with crowd behavior in the French and other European settings is instructive. Much the same feel for

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comparative history prompts Maier to depict the Stasi as heir not of the Nazi Gestapo but rather of eighteenth century cameralistic *Polizeywissenschaft* and further to suggest that Stasi officials typically viewed themselves "as much as social workers as policemen" (p. 48). All this and so much more is presented with nary a factual flaw. (In fact, this reviewer spotted only one: the reconstituted *Länder* [states] of the GDR had not been "dissolved by the regime in the 1960s" [p. 280]; they were abolished in July 1952 with the introduction of the Stalinist forced draft, "construction of socialism" in the GDR.)

In sum, Maier's balanced and nuanced study constitutes first-rate scholarship; it is also a good, if demanding, read. The book deserves wide readership in Germany itself to counter that country's double mood swing since 1990—in West Germany from triumphalism to dejection, in Eastern Germany from euphoria to nostalgia. After all, Maier is guardedly optimistic; he believes, as does this reviewer, that the process of German unification has started "to take."

MELVIN CROAN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan *by Sarah E. Mendelson. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 140 pp. $35.00.*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a watershed event in the last stages of the cold war. Almost as dramatic was Moscow's decision to reverse policy and pull Soviet forces out of the country. This study, based on a wide array of primary sources, examines the effects of internal Soviet politics on the decision.

Mendelson's aim is to fathom how Mikhail Gorbachev and his followers beat the old guard in the domestic struggle for power. She argues that the Gorbachev coalition shifted the domestic balance of power in favor of the reformists by encouraging the growth of new constituencies such as think tanks and the press pushing reforms while disempowering old constituencies advocating the status quo such as the Communist party. This internal competition for power produced the conditions necessary and sufficient for change in foreign policy. Mendelson argues that internal rather than external factors were the determinants of Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev and his allies were able "to change foreign policy despite and not due to the fact that the rhetoric and policies of the United States in the early 1980s confirmed the perceptions of the most confrontational old thinkers in the Soviet Union" (p. 9).

The study uses three times periods as case studies to test its hypothesis. In the first, 1979–1980, Mendelson points out that decision making was dominated by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Minister of Defense Dmitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and then KGB Director Yuri Andropov and that the balance of power among them played a crucial role in determining Afghan policy. They decided to intervene even though there were disagreements at the highest levels of the General Staff and in the KGB. "Soviet escalation in Afghanistan was the result of a domestic balance of power that favored traditional notions of empire and commitments to client states" (p. 62).

In the second time period, 1982–1984, Andropov created important permissive conditions for the institutionalization of new thinking. "In the years before Gorbachev became general secretary, reform-minded members of the Central Committee, with Andropov's

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blessing and Chernenko's benign neglect, cultivated reformist analyses and a consultative approach to policy making" (p. 81). Gorbachev reached out to the expert community and formed a tacit alliance whose members grasped the realities of the Soviet state better than the old guard.

In the third period 1985–1989, Gorbachev and his cohort made personnel changes in the central institutions of power and cultivated support for reform by empowering experts and a more independent press, which marginalized the party structure. Gorbachev seized the internal balance of political power to convert reform agendas spawned in the expert community into policy.

The study has some shortcomings. Introductory and theoretical material appears disproportionately long and is too often repeated throughout the study. More significantly, many readers will not be persuaded that the foreign policies of Western states played an "indeterminate" role in the Soviet decision. Without American and other foreign support—above and beyond the Stinger missiles that Mendleson's discussion focuses on—the Afghan rebels would not have been able to drain Soviet military resources to the extent that they did, which in turn forced Soviet leaders to triage a losing battle in order to concentrate on domestic problems. Had the costs of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan been tolerable, even Gorbachev might have stayed the course there.

On the other hand, Mendelson's use of Kremlin archival material as well as her personal interviews with key Soviet civilian and military advisers and decision makers is interesting reading. This study should serve as an antidote to the argument that the cold war was won by American foreign policy, a position that mistakenly dismisses the critical importance of domestic Soviet politics that Mendelson skillfully treats.

RICHARD L. RUSSELL
Washington, DC

Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow *by Dennis J. Dunn. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1998. 349 pp. $29.95.*

Controversy over President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Soviet policy has always been fierce, starting when FDR personally negotiated recognition of the Soviet Union with Maxim Litvinov in 1933. From recognition to wartime alliance, and from victory in World War II to the start of the cold war, Roosevelt's views about Russia dominated American policy. His decision to pursue cooperation with Stalin in order to defeat Hitler and his fatally naïve search for postwar security through continuation of the wartime alliance in a new collective security arrangement cast the basic framework for American-Soviet relations that undergirded much that followed in subsequent decades. Yet, Roosevelt's decisions were often made in the face of strong, even vehement, opposition from his ambassadors in Moscow, who with one exception drew a much darker picture of Stalin and gravely doubted that sustained cooperation with a starkly totalitarian state was possible. Who was right? This is the main question addressed in this well-researched but strident book. Dunn utilizes much newly available Soviet archival material.

Roosevelt and his closest aides, says Dunn, espoused an amalgam of strategic Wilsonian idealism, tactical Machiavellianism, and an entrenched ideological belief that the New Deal in the United Sates and communism in Russia were converging into a form of welfare state

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democracy. This convergence would ultimately triumph over laissez-faire capitalism and totalitarianism alike, as well as over bad Old World security habits like maintaining spheres of influence and relying upon a balance of power. This ideological viewpoint supposedly caused Roosevelt to "tolerate and excuse Stalin's extreme measures because Stalin was attempting to modernize a 'backward' country and was moving ineluctably toward democracy" (p. 4). Dunn even argues that FDR saw Winston Churchill on an atavistic continuum represented at its worst by Hitler, while he and Stalin represented a new era continuum in both domestic and international affairs. This ideological perspective, and not some character flaw or failure of judgment, is what led Roosevelt to set aside short-term moral and political concerns when it came to dealings with Stalin. Dunn sees this amoralism as the singular difference between the president and four of his five ambassadors.

This polemical thesis is too often presented with angry exaggeration. Thus, Roosevelt and his close confidants, most notably Harry Hopkins and Joseph Davies, are repeatedly charged with having "tolerated *and supported* [emphasis added] the expansion of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia because they believed that such expansion was advancing the cause of democracy and collective security" (p. 6). But elsewhere, Dunn records that Roosevelt was "opposed to working out territorial agreements before the end of the war" (p. 134), even while he was "simultaneously sensitive to Stalin's security needs and the danger of pushing Stalin to work out a separate peace . . . by failing to meet his territorial demands" (p. 165). Available evidence supports Dunn's first claim, that FDR tolerated Soviet expansion, but it is laid out without a proper accounting of mitigating circumstances, especially the pressing task of defeating the Axis alliance. The evidence does not support the more incendiary charge, however, that Roosevelt actively sought an enlarged Soviet empire because he believed that Stalin was actually a democratic sheep in wolf's clothing.

Dunn is more balanced and persuasive when discussing the five ambassadors whom Roosevelt sent to the Moscow embassy: William C. Bullitt (1933–1936), Joseph E. Davies (1936–1938), Laurence A. Steinhardt (1939–1941), William C. Standley (1942–1943), and W. Averell Harrimann (1943–1946), and the key roles played by supremely able embassy staffers, especially George F. Kennan and Charles "Chip" Bohlen. But this is ground that has been ably covered before, for example in David Mayers's prize-winning book *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy* (1995). Dunn makes use of new archival evidence not available to Mayers, but for the most part this reinforces a widely held view that as a group (always excepting Joseph Davies, who was by most accounts an inept reporter and even dishonest observer), the ambassadors were mostly right in their dire assessment of Stalin and arguments in favor of a policy of firm quid pro quo toward the Soviet Union. Whatever their views upon first heading to Moscow, again with the exception of Davies, Roosevelt's ambassadors all came to see Stalin as driven by deep ideological beliefs as well as coarse nationalist ambitions and clinical mental disturbance. Dunn demonstrates that these were men of considerable political courage and independent standing who made their views plain to Roosevelt. Hence, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Davies are correctly held accountable for a persistent refusal to listen to criticism of more benign views of Stalin. It follows that they are also held responsible for the many dire consequences that later resulted from pursuing a policy of close cooperation with Stalin well past when that was necessary to defeat Hitler. Most importantly, but also most controversially, they are charged with failing to give due regard to the long-term consequences of not resisting earlier and more firmly opportunistic expansion of the Soviet empire into central Europe and northeast Asia. Dunn goes even further, con-

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cluding that among the major consequences of FDR's Soviet policy was a strengthening of Stalinism in the Soviet Union itself.

In the face of such enormous charges one must ask: did Roosevelt have any other choice? Yes, says Dunn, a clear one offered consistently by his best advisers on Soviet affairs, his own ambassadors, of realistic tit-for-tat responses to Soviet provocation or concession. This policy was blindly and willfully resisted by the president, writes Dunn, mainly for ideological reasons that were encapsulated in a putative belief in the eventual convergence of Soviet and American society. That is a conclusion that goes well beyond the evidence marshaled to support it. Dunn especially overreaches when he suggests that a firmer policy might have led to a great diminution of the extremes of Stalinism or even the outright collapse of the Soviet empire. That exaggeration is unfortunate, because otherwise Dunn's portrait of FDR's Soviet policy is sound: Roosevelt was deeply naïve about Stalin, did not listen adequately to news or advice that was contrary to his own views, failed to consider sufficiently the significance of the internal character of the Soviet system for postwar security cooperation, and out of a misguided distrust of the American people consistently misled them about what "Uncle Joe" was up to at home and in the liberated territories of eastern Europe.

CATHAL J. NOLAN
Boston University

Chronic Condition: Why Health Reform Fails *by Sherry Glied. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. 279 pp. $45.00.*

Political scientists who study political elites largely concentrate on the processes of institutional dynamics and policy making. Much attention has been devoted to the processes of agenda setting, law making in Congress, and policy implementation. In all the attention to process, public policy is treated as simply an output that can be measured simply—whether, for instance, the legislation passed or not.

For political scientists, the big lesson of *Chronic Condition* is that the substance of public policy is critical. Policy substance influences the political process and does not simply reflect it. Glied has admirably used her training in economics to address an audience wider than her own profession. Her particular focus is health policy and in particular the stark divide between "medicalists" and "marketists." The organizing focus of *Chronic Condition* is the policy jihad that has split health policy analysts into irreconcilable warring camps. "Medicalists support a government-run system that is centrally organized and financed" (p. 13). Health care is not like other goods and services that are allocated by the market; instead, it should be controlled by the decisions of doctors and distributed in an egalitarian manner through government intervention. By contrast, marketists hold that health care is like other goods and services and should be controlled by the "unfettered" decisions of consumers and markets; they accept the unequal distribution of health care as unavoidable. It is the "single-minded responsiveness to the flow of dollars. . . . [that] permits the unregulated market to identify and exploit opportunities rapidly in an ever changing health care system" (p. 185).

Glied's second major contribution is to the swelling literature on the Clinton health reform episode. *Chronic Condition* is the only sustained study of this episode that focuses on the political implications of polarized policy analysts. Glied, who was a staff economist for

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Clinton's health reform task force, argues that "the spectacular failure of the Clinton administration's attempt at health reform cannot be blamed on the missteps of this particular administration" (p. 2). Instead, the root of the problem lies in irreconcilable differences in beliefs and the impossibility of "combin[ing] the conflicting visions of marketists and medicalists" (p. 210). The Clinton administration tried to meld the two models, but its efforts were doomed because the fundamental assumptions of each side were both open to credible challenge and so far apart that compromise was all but impossible. In the end, the Clinton White House satisfied neither group even as it caved in to the big government crowd and "transformed the apparently marketist health plan into a highly regulatory medicalist plan" (p. 208).

Glied's third contribution is to health policy research. In mapping the two worlds of medicalists and marketists, Glied challenges two common assumptions among American policy analysts; she argues that the United States is not burdened by far more excessive administrative costs than other countries and that it can afford the continued increase in health care expenditures. Dramatically lowering administrative costs offer "limited" financial savings. The American economy could devote, without serious adverse consequences, up to 30 percent of national income to health care. Although each of these arguments is subject to challenge, they are refreshing invitations to rethink widely accepted claims about excessive administrative costs and fixed economic limits on health care expenditures.

Chronic Condition not only describes the cause of the current deadlock over structural health reform but proposes a solution: taxing health care spending by imposing a levy on all suppliers of health services and using the revenues to fund health care for the poor. In addition to expanding access to people with low incomes, taxing the more affluent would make them more sensitive about the economic consequences of their decisions to choose more costly health care. The provider tax is particularly attractive, because it is likely to solve the political problem of providing a "stable, growing source of funding"; its advantage is that it "fits popular perceptions. . . [that] the beneficiaries of modern medical care [should] share its rewards" (p. 231).

Despite the book's clear contributions, it raises four questions. First, Glied's contrast between medicalists and marketists helpfully highlights two quite different paradigms but at the cost of caricaturing each. Although Glied repeatedly equates Canada's health care system with the medicalists paradigm, it is not a "government-run system that is centrally organized and financed" (p. 13). The slip between reality and the caricature presented throughout *Chronic Condition* is most clearly exhibited in Glied's own discussion of Canada's system. Chapter 6 describes it as a decentralized financing system in which the provinces negotiate with providers and health care is provided privately on a fee-for-service basis. The characterization of "marketists" also assumes a strawman quality. The managed competition approach that Glied analyzes has always assumed a significant government role in preventing well-known market failures and establishing a framework for competition. A sustained discussion of Alain Enthoven's models for consumer choice dating back several decades would reveal a persistent reliance on government. What is missing here is an intellectual engagement with the work of economic historians, political economists, and others who have established that an autonomous free market is something of a fiction. Legal rules, contractual arrangements, and other government interventions are necessary in a private enterprise system to protect property, assure reliable economic transactions, secure socially desirable outcomes, and promote profitable economic production.

Second, Glied's discussion of the polarization of health policy analysts is surprisingly silent on the origins of this split. Did the policy polarization stem from such professional de-

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velopments as the increasing prominence of health services research and applied economists? Why is it that today's analysts share less and less in common with the diverse experience and committed pragmatism of such reformers as the late Wilbur Cohen?

Third, Glied convincingly argues that the policy polarization contributed to the political stranglehold on Clinton's health plan. What is not considered is how the dramatic ideological polarization in Washington may have encouraged or accelerated a similar split among policy analysts over the role of government. Glied's discussion would have been strengthened by considering the politics of policy analysis and incorporating a growing body of political science research on just this topic (including the political origins of Clinton's health reform proposal in his 1992 campaign).

Finally, aside from Glied's optimistic expectation that provider tax will happily satisfy "popular perceptions," there is no serious discussion of why provider tax will avoid the conservative posse that has been hunting down any tax. Why does a provider tax stand a better chance than other kinds of taxes against the anti-tax crusade throughout the country? In Minnesota, for instance, the state legislature has cut its provider tax partly because of the decidedly conservative shift in national and state politics. It is unclear why Glied's proposed provider tax would avoid a similar political fate.

LAWRENCE R. JACOBS
University of Minnesota

Rethinking Health Care Policy *by Robert B. Hackey. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1998. 253 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $23.95.*

Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s *by Mark E. Rushefsky and Kant Patel. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1998. 312 pp. Cloth, $62.95; paper, $24.95.*

These two books seek to tackle the complex topic of health care reform through the use of comparative case studies. Rushefsky and Patel's *Politics, Power and Policy Making*, which concerns national-level policy, employs the issue of health care to explore various aspects of American politics and government, including agenda setting, the presidency, Congress, interest groups, and public opinion. The two cases studied are President Bill Clinton's Health Security Act of 1993 and the 1995 congressional Republican plan to reform Medicare. Both efforts proved to be political debacles for their advocates, and Patel and Rushefsky seek to account for how each rose to the policy agenda and what went wrong.

Their answers come as little surprise to those familiar with the health policy literature. Indeed, with the exception of their chapter on public opinion, Patel and Rushefsky's book is largely a summary of the scholarship in this area. Thus their discussion of how the Clinton plan evolved begins with the frequently told story of Harris Wofford's surprising victory in the 1991 Pennsylvania Senate election. Wofford raised the health care issue by cleverly arguing that if an accused criminal is entitled to an attorney so too should someone who is sick be entitled to a doctor. With millions of Americans lacking health insurance and many more fearful of losing their benefits in the early-1990s recession, the issue caught the attention of national politicians including Bill Clinton.

The story of the Clinton plan and its demise has been told by numerous scholars and journalists. Patel and Rushefsky's unique contribution is collecting such explanations and

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putting them in one place where they can be easily accessed. Thus, for example, readers wanting to know the role of President Clinton in the failure of his health plan need only turn to the chapter on presidential leadership. There they will find a myriad of explanations including the administration's rocky beginning, its delay in introducing legislation to Congress, Clinton's "undisciplined" leadership style, the absence of an electoral mandate, and the institutional weakness of the American presidency. Consult the chapter on Congress, and the absence of a working majority in support of health care reform is emphasized. Those interested in the role of the media in the plan's demise will turn to the appropriate chapter to find the authors blaming "fragmented" coverage that emphasized the politics of health reform rather than explanation and analysis of the issue. The authors' discussion of the subsequent Republican proposal to reform Medicare follows a similar outline.

While Rushefsky and Patel's approach is informative to those unfamiliar with health care politics, it also suffers from the authors' unwillingness to delineate which of these many explanations best account for the demise of the respective measures. The result is a book that is well-organized and comprehensive, but appears to lack a distinctive theme or larger point.

In contrast to the well-trodden terrain of federal health care policy, Robert B. Hackey's *Rethinking Health Care Policy* takes on the much less discussed but no less important topic of state reform. Indeed, "In the absence of comprehensive national health care reform," notes the author, "state governments [have] emerged as the principal source of policy innovation in health care policy-making" (p. 2).

States, however, "have followed markedly different routes in their efforts to control costs, increase access to health care, and monitor the quality of services" (ibid). Hackey's study develops an analytical model to compare differences in such health care policies. Specifically, he seeks to explain why some states choose to enact extensive regulations on health care while others work with private interests to control costs and still others cede power to the marketplace.

According to the author, the key to understanding this variation in policy making lies in the concept of policy regimes that encompass not just interest groups and politicians but also the institutions, rules, and norms that affect policy making. In asserting the importance of political culture in public policy, Hackey's research provides a badly needed antidote to those analyses of health care policy that neglect this crucial factor. The four northeastern states in Hackey's study include: one imposed regime (New York) defined by extreme centralization of state regulatory authority; a market regime (New Hampshire), where authority is delegated to private groups; and two negotiated regimes (Massachusetts and Rhode Island) characterized by shifting relationships between the public and private sector.

One of the more intriguing findings of Hackey's study concerns how the election in the 1990s of a pair of economically conservative governors, New York's George Pataki and Massachusetts's William Weld, precipitated a fundamental shift away from each state's heavy regulation of health care. By contrast, in Rhode Island, where cooperation between the private sector and state government is the norm, and New Hampshire, where state government exercises little power over health care, each regime remains largely undisturbed.

For his attempt to study health care policy making in a systematic manner, Robert B. Hackey deserves credit. *Rethinking Health Care Policy* represents a solid piece of original research of an often neglected area. Unfortunately, the book's dense prose likely renders it inaccessible to those uninitiated in the nomenclature of health care. The author's work is loaded with references to things like certificates of need, the New York Prospective Hospital

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Reimbursement Methodology, and Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers. Nevertheless, those patient and ambitious enough to attempt Hackey's book will find it illuminating.

RICHARD HIMELFARB
Hofstra University

Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution *by Timothy E. Cook. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 289 pp. Cloth, $48.00; paper, $17.95.*

Precisely the wrong actors—journalists and political leaders—dominate popular discourse regarding the role of media in American politics. The interplay between news making and policy making has grown in both complexity and importance throughout U.S. history. Full appreciation of this relationship requires a detached perspective and also the rare capacity to keep the big picture in sight without looking past crucial subtleties. Timothy E. Cook demonstrates these attributes in *Governing with the News*, an impressive treatise on American news media.

Cook's central claim concerns the political role of contemporary media. Media clearly matter for politics, and the choices journalists make influence how citizens view government and how elected officials perform their duties. But such a depiction, Cook argues, understates media's political role. After carefully tracing the evolution of policy toward media and precisely defining his key concepts, Cook posits that media are a political institution, not merely a collection of politically significant organizations. Instead, media together constitute an institution, and one that like political parties and the interest group system operates simultaneously inside and outside of government.

For a topic to receive news coverage it must be seen by journalists to be both important and interesting. Cook suggests that journalists cede the task of identifying what is important to public officials, whereas journalists themselves determine whether a potential story is sufficiently interesting. Government has more than a hand in shaping what makes the news, but journalists are not the helpless pawns of public officials.

To the contrary, Cook argues that how journalists do their job affects how public officials do theirs. Because journalists determine whether an issue or event is interesting enough to warrant coverage, political actors are encouraged to cast issues in manners consistent with journalistic norms. Press relations today rarely can be separated from policy making; consequently, journalistic norms affect which issues reach the policy agenda. Thus, Cook claims, media have become part of government: they are one of the separated institutions sharing power.

Governing with the News is not a book of bold-but-shallow claims. Cook's arguments are provocative. But he develops them slowly and cautiously, drawing on a staggering wealth of examples and references. Cook's citations are so thorough that I played a game at the end of each chapter in which I awarded myself a point for each relevant work I could identify that Cook had neglected to discuss. There is much more scoring in a typical World Cup soccer match.

Naturally, it is possible to counterargue some of Cook's claims, but this does not undercut the book's central message. For instance, I found Cook's discussion of the Supreme Court's press relations to be unsatisfying in the sense that his arguments seemed to defy falsifiability;

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everything the Court does or could do is interpreted as evidence of image-conscious actors. But while I might insist that David Souter hardly rivals Bill Clinton or Newt Gingrich in media savvy, I am persuaded by Cook's core argument that the media share power with the Supreme Court, just as they do with other political institutions.

A songwriter friend once rightly took it as a compliment when I remarked that his newest piece was too short. I have the same complaint here. Cook develops his model of media so skillfully that this reader was anxious for more. But perhaps the next step should be taken by others. *Governing with the News* deserves to be influential, and readers should respond to it with innovative research and policy.

JEFFERY J. MONDAK
Florida State University

Becoming Citizens in the Age of Television: How Americans Challenged the Media and Seized Political Initiative during the Iran-Contra Debate *by David Thelen. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996. 272 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $14.95.*

This fascinating, provocative, repetitive, and frustrating book argues that we live in an age of opinion management in which the media, with their emphasis on entertainment, their reliance on the views and standards of governing elites and the partisan punditry of Washington insiders, define and limit public debate of issues. They also construct the public as a faceless and abstract mass in part because polls, the media's main way of presenting the views of ordinary citizens, fail to convey people's "questioning, protesting, defending, quarreling, and asserting voices" (p. 9). As for politicians-policy makers, they engage in mass marketing appeals and sound bites instead of listening and responding to Americans' needs, experiences, and preferences.

Occasionally, however, dramatic events, usually shown on television, inspire people to expand the public forum by raising and discussing issues they consider significant, thereby becoming active citizens. The summer of 1987 was one such occasion. In their reactions to the televised Iran-contra hearings, people spoke for themselves, thereby transcending opinion management and rejecting the media's frames (Olliemania) and interpretations. These reactions were displayed in communications to members of Congress in which people raised and discussed such fundamental issues as heroism, foreign policy (should the United States police the world?), and democratic government.

David Thelen read and bases much of his book on several thousand of these letters, mainly ones to Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton, the Democratic co-chair of the hearings. He shows how the writers covered a spectacular range of topics and perspectives and, contrary to news stories about the effects of the hearings, did not focus on Oliver North.

The author's key argument is that the letter writers' interpretations of media contents, the principles and convictions they asserted, and the solutions they offered stemmed from their intimate relationships with other people, mainly their families. In these primary relationships "thinking and acting are inseparable from personal responsibility and everyday needs" (p. 10).

This book is eminently susceptible to criticism. Content analysis of the hearings themselves, their coverage and related stories in the media, and of the possibly unrepresentative letters is impressionistic. The author seems to ennoble the public, over-estimating most peo-

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ple's knowledge about government and public policies. Indeed, some of the quotes from letters show ignorance and cynicism about government, politics, and the media. Conversely, media content is more personalized, diverse, and polysemous than Thelen acknowledges. Public officials are more understanding of and attentive to the views of the public, especially their constituents, than he allows. Moreover, politicians' polls, as contrasted to media polls, can be quite sophisticated in tapping public sentiment; and politicians' responses to the information gained is not inevitably pandering or manipulation. Nor do we learn whether the letters had any tangible effects on the individuals who wrote them, the politicians who received them, or on the deliberations and decisions of the Iran-contra committee.

To this reviewer, the analysis is unconvincing, the argument hyperbolic, and the normative proposals at best undeveloped. Surprisingly, there is no mention of the internet and its potential for facilitating the kinds of interaction between ordinary citizens and with policy makers.

Nonetheless, the devotion to democracy and belief in the importance of individual citizens that animate this book, its challenge to the media and government status quo inspire admiration. By showing active and engaged political participation by the public, the author convinces that a new and more enlightening kind of political conversation is possible.

DAVID L. PALETZ
Duke University

Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns: Ballot Box Warriors *by Robert V. Friedenberg. Westport, CT, Praeger Press, 1997. 221 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

This book describes types of communication consultants and their roles and strategies in political campaigns. Its strengths include extensive point-by-point descriptions of consultant strategies, frequently provided by consultants themselves; an emphasis on applied politics; and many vivid and interesting examples. Its most important weakness is the lack of a theoretical framework, which results in a lack of analytical rigor. The result is a book that is by-and-large descriptive; for political scientists its utility will be found in undergraduate courses on campaigns and elections, in interdisciplinary courses emphasizing political communications, and in academic programs that are oriented toward practical politics. The book will actually be most useful for people facing political campaigns: it is effectively a primer on some of the most important aspects of running campaigns and managing campaign communications.

Campaign consultants have a long history in U.S. politics, and Chapter One provides a colorful crash course on that history, with an emphasis on many of the changes in consulting over time. Most of those changes are a function of changing technologies, and this is a topic that the author, a communications professor, nicely deals with throughout the book. The decline of political parties in contemporary politics is also addressed, but the book talks mostly (and somewhat naively) about changes in party identification rather than changes in party organization, which are arguably more important for the subject at hand.

The two strongest chapters are the second on polling consultants and the fourth on narrowcast media consultants. There is an extensive discussion of the different types of polls, with good treatments of how their results are used, especially those surveys that receive less attention, such as pre-decision and benchmark polls. A host of practical issues is addressed

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here, including poll timing, poll costs, issue development, and the trade-off between the use of surveys and focus groups. This chapter also contains one of the most interesting examples in the book—the campaign to fund stadium construction in Cincinnati. Chapter Four discusses the costs and techniques of effectively using narrowcast media, such as direct mail and phone banks (addressing both persuasion and fundraising), and political videocassettes to target political messages to specific subgroups of the population. A strength of this chapter is the demonstration that changing technology really has enhanced the ability of campaigns to segment and target narrow subpopulations for delivery of high interest/low backlash political messages. Other chapters address speech and debate consultants (giving good pointers, but examples only from presidential and vice-presidential debates), newspaper and radio consultants (with interesting examples of effective advertising in these media), and television consultants.

The book succeeds in providing a vast array of advice, cost information, and examples from local and national elections. There is no theoretical or conceptual framework (except for the ballot box warrior theme) and little or no critical analysis of consultants and their techniques. The book does address negative campaigning as a necessary evil—perhaps an inherent and unavoidable characteristic of campaigns—but no other ethical aspects of campaign strategies, except that if one is going to attack one's opponent, have documentation in hand.

In summary, the book is less a treatment of the effects of consultants in elections (except for the outcomes of the selected examples) than it is a handbook for potential combatants in the political realm. If I were running for office, I would like this book; but it would also convince me, as most candidates already realize, of the need to hire a consultant (or four or five).

PETER W. WIELHOUWER
Spelman College

Networks of Champions: Leadership, Access, and Advocacy in the U.S. House of Representatives *by Christine DeGregorio. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 160 pp. $39.50.*

Christine DeGregorio has succeeded in illuminating policy leadership across the entire pressure community operating in and around the U.S. House of Representatives. By crossing subfield specialties, she produces an unusually complete portrait of legislative influence dynamics. The range and depth of inquiry easily compensate for a deliberate decision to exclude the Senate. Original and sensitive methodology reveals the relative leadership potential of elected officials and staff, and various advocacy advantages found among an array of differential interest groups and executive branch officials. With this innovative approach, the author debunks popular myths such as the overwhelming advantage private-sector groups hold over citizen groups, that staff is too powerful compared to elected representatives, or that only relatively few House members should rightfully be considered leaders. The myths do not fall because conventional wisdom is always proven wrong; rather they succumb to the complexity of the findings.

The central distinguishing aspect of this work is its innovative look at legislative leaders. Cleverly, the research design had ninety-seven well known advocates identify those in the

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House whom they considered to be leaders on six bills that became law. All these individuals—House members and staff (36 percent)—were able to attract followers and therefore qualify as leaders. No other approach to legislative leadership better captures actual leaders. From this solid starting point, the author is able to examine personal characteristics, positional advantages, and situational conflagrations. While she finds, not surprisingly, "a strong link between those who are identified as leaders and those who hold duly elected positions of leadership within the institution" (p. 40), leadership is determined by personal recognition for both political and substantive expertise, and the combination of committee seat assignments, not the institutional post. All staff identified as leaders operate in narrow scope and all are dominated by officials. Hence, fear of their power is greatly exaggerated. This study confirms, broadens, and complicates our understanding of legislative leadership.

Interest groups differ greatly in terms of resources, and clearly all members of the executive branch are not alike. This work tackles these variations directly by adopting Jack Walker's scheme for classifying interest groups and then expanding it to the executive branch in a way that captures distinctions among presidential appointees, congressional liaisons, and other civil servants. Although the weakest of aspects covered, executive branch analysis greatly enriches insights in the book. Through profiles of six bills, we see how advocates effectively used resources available to them, and we come away reassured that occupational groups and for-profit groups do not unduly dominate participation. In the theoretically important question of access, far more similarities than differences emerge across advocates. Advocates manage to gain satisfactory access. Most advocates are pleased with the policy outcomes they have pursued. Access is not a problem, because all advocates consistently size up the situation, persist, conform to the process, and continually build their House leadership base. Bound by an asymmetry of resources, advocates assist House members who then can better gain followers. Collaboration in any instance depends more upon who participates than the issue itself. Ironically, changes made by the 104th Congress may ultimately prove counterproductive.

This book is well organized throughout and is written in lucid prose with an articulate voice. Despite its empirical complexity, advanced undergraduates could readily use this text. Christine DeGregorio is to be commended for producing a clear but complicated rendering of House policy leadership. She uses a methodology that is sure to be emulated.

GEORGIA DUERST-LAHTI
Beloit College

The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour *by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys. New York, Verso Press, 1997. 341 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.00.*

The arrival of Ralph Miliband's *Parliamentary Socialism* in 1961 reopened the decades-old question of whether the British Labour party could ever serve as a suitable vehicle for socialist activism. Miliband located himself in the camp of the skeptics, arguing that "the belief in the effective transformation of the Labour Party into an instrument of socialist policies . . . is the most crippling of illusions to which socialists in Britain have been prone" (quoted on p. 3). Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, two distinguished Canadian political scientists who broadly share Miliband's skepticism, conclude in this book that any remaining ambiguity about the leftist potentiality of Labour has evaporated. Dismayed by the emergence of

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"New Labour" under the leadership of Tony Blair, Panitch and Leys insist that what has "come to an end in Britain, we might say, is not socialism, but a particular kind of 'parliamentary socialism'—and the idea that a party dedicated to it can be changed into a party of a different kind" (p. 263).

According to the authors, the constituency party revolt of the early 1980s, which coalesced around the leadership of Tony Benn, represents an ideal test case of the Miliband thesis. Benn himself raised provocative questions about free speech, constitutional reform, the concentration of economic and political power, and foreign policy. He and his rank-and-file allies also found success in reaching out to social movement activists outside the party. But the Bennite movement peaked as early as 1981, splintered by 1982, and dispersed in time for Margaret Thatcher's first reelection triumph in 1983. The fate of Labour's new left was sealed, they suggest, with the defeat of the miners' union in 1985 and the abolition of several local government authorities the following year. More recently and quite remarkably, the party has been reinvented along pro-market, "post-ideological" lines, and the Labour left has become a shadow of its former self. For Panitch and Leys, the chief lesson of the ruination of the party's new left, and the rise of New Labour, is that "new organizational forms must be developed, and a new conception of parliamentarism and extra-parliamentary politics needs to be worked out" (p. 268).

In the preface, the authors acknowledge that this book was "originally conceived over a decade ago" (p. vii), which may help explain why more than two-hundred pages elapse before much of substance is said about Blair's tenure as party leader. In fact, most of what Leys and Panitch have to report about Blair and Blairism has been squeezed into a single penultimate chapter that runs twenty-four pages. Revealingly, the index lists more citations to one-time Labour MP Reg Prentice than current Foreign Secretary Robin Cook; and Cook and Prentice combined receive fewer citations than Trotskyists, even though the authors are keen to distinguish their somewhat elusive conception of socialism from more sectarian varieties. Since their manuscript was completed "on the occasion of Labour's landslide election victory" (p. vii), 1 May 1997, Leys and Pantich are unable to reveal anything about the actual policies and practices of the Blair government. No doubt they would be disheartened by Blair's current position of strength, both as head of state and as party leader, but their book would have been more interesting had it incorporated the experience of a rejuvenated, but deradicalized, Labour party in office.

The End of Parliamentary Socialism is clearly aimed at a politically engaged readership that shares the authors' concern with the prospects for leftist renewal and advance. For this reason, their aggrieved account of the contemporary transformation of the Labour party may strike some readers as excessively fixated on issues of doctrinal fidelity. The book offers a coherent account of three decades of labourite infighting, and it advances a plausible, if overlong, defense and elaboration of the Miliband thesis. Its appeal will be limited by two factors: first, the book has relatively little to say about recent developments; second, it measures social progress, and political innovation in terms of a formal identification with a particular brand of socialist politics. In short, this is a book that longs to refight yesterday's battles.

KENT WORCESTER
Marymount Manhattan College

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Partisan Politics in the Global Economy *by Geoffrey Garrett. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 185 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $17.95.*

This book, which examines the effect of global economic integration on partisan politics with OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, makes an important contribution to two scholarly literatures as well as an important policy debate. By focusing on the manipulation of policy instruments, it extends the analysis of important causal links between partisanship, the structure of labor market institutions and macroeconomic performance that were established in a series of influential papers that Geoffrey Garrett wrote over the last decade. More importantly, it explores the extent to which our understanding of the domestic politics of macroeconomic policy choice is influenced in important ways by changes in the way these countries are integrated with the international economy. Finally, it challenges popular press punditry about the inexorable effects of globalization with solid empirical evidence and sophisticated, but straightforward, econometric techniques.

In prior work, Geoffrey Garrett and his co-authors (principally Peter Lange) provided the theoretical and empirical foundations for the prevailing understanding of the domestic politics of macroeconomic policy in advanced industrial countries. There are two roads to strong macroeconomic performance. The combination of Left governance and strong and centralized labor unions provides fertile soil for growth-oriented policies that rely on coordinated wage bargaining for price stability. Alternatively, when labor unions are weak and decentralized, right-wing governments can use market-oriented policies to deter nominal wage claims and encourage investment. Other, "incoherent" combinations of labor market institutions and ideological orientation of government result in suboptimal macroeconomic performance.

Garrett asks whether this picture of the domestic sources of macroeconomic policy is disturbed by the increased integration of goods and capital markets that has occurred over the last decade or so. He wishes to examine critically the common wisdom that the integration of national markets liberates capital from its national moorings and unleashes competitive pressures that erode the organizational strength of labor unions. And because they render commitments to welfare spending and other state centered policies unsustainable, do they erode both the policy efficacy and electoral appeal of Left parties.

Garrett argues that such conclusions do not follow logically and are not supported empirically. He explores the theoretical implications of increased capital mobility and concludes that Left governments may be uniquely positioned to offer policies that help shield groups that are placed at risk by the forces of integration. Extending a line of reasoning that Peter Katzenstein and others applied to the effects of the increasing importance of trade a decade ago, Garrett argues that not only does globalization not imply a convergence around the market-oriented policies of the Right, it creates new demands for the interventionist policies of the Keynesian welfare state.

The author marshals an impressive array of evidence, both descriptive and econometric, to support his argument and challenge the prevailing wisdom. He argues that there has not been a marked decline in the organizational capacity of labor unions or Left participation in government since the rise of global capital. In addition, Garrett uses pooled cross-sectional time series data from fourteen OECD countries to show that the increased importance of trade and the liberalization of capital controls has not diminished the correlation between Left governance or strong and centralized unions and solid macroeconomic performance. Neither has it led Left governments to mimic the policies of the Right. If anything,

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partisan differences in government spending, choice of tax instruments, and overall macroeconomic posture have increased, rather than decreased.

Readers can and will take issue with the microanalytics underlying the theoretical argument, particular research design decisions, or specific inferences drawn from Garrett's results. Inviting such criticism is, after all, the primary strength of quantitative analysis. But Garrett's broader message—that the common wisdom about the effects of globalization is logically flawed and empirically unjustified—is likely to stand up to future analysis. In addition, the clarity of the book's organization and the breadth of its analysis are likely to make this volume a focal point for research in the politics of open economy macroeconomic policy for years to come.

WILLIAM ROBERTS CLARK
Georgia Institute of Technology

Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict *by David Callahan. New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1997. 273 pp. $24.00.*

We are being deluged by new books on ethnic conflicts and civil wars as our profession retools to face a whole new set of foreign policy problems. I for one find it very difficult to sort out the ones worth reading from those that can safely be relegated to the decent obscurity of the library shelves. There seem to be two versions, studies of the countries where the violence is occurring and analyses of the process by which various institutions respond to such problems.

This book is an impressive example of the second type. Its subject is how the United States government has responded to ethnic violence as a foreign policy problem in the past and how it should do so in the future. It has several virtues. It is not an edited volume. Edited books are very useful for exploratory studies of new problems, but we now have a plethora of redundant collections of short studies of the same cases of internal violence. Like most Twentieth Century Fund books, it is on the border between scholarly study and policy analysis, addressing a sophisticated analysis of a complex problem to a fairly wide audience. You can read this book without a lot of knowledge about, say, the tribal structure of Nigeria. It is also clearly written and would be a perfectly reasonable text for undergraduates. It does not conclude with a completely unrealistic set of recommendations involving the consolidation of organizations, changing public values, and increasing resources by several orders of magnitude. The author assumes that neither organizations nor resources are likely to change much and that the analytic problem is to suggest how they can be used more effectively. Callahan takes seriously the problems of the American policy maker, the shortage of time and the lack of incentive to expend resources on early warning and preventive diplomacy, while not being cynical about these activities. He seriously addresses the political culture of the United States, discusses the implication of Republican control of Congress for policy, and makes a plausible case for limited humanitarian intervention in terms of U.S. national interests. By focusing on prediction and prevention as well as intervention, he notes several cases where U.S. efforts seem to have helped delay or prevent large-scale violence (Kosovo, the Baltic States, Burundi). The serious analysis of these lesser-known cases is an important contribution.

As with most ambitious books, many readers will have reservations about particular points. My own complaint is that it sometimes gives too much credence to conventional

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wisdom while ignoring contradictory scholarly research. I think that the exclusive focus on ethnic conflict is a mistake; ethnicity is less important in many of the most important cases of civil war (Cambodia, Haiti, Colombia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua). Ethnic conflicts that escalate into large-scale violence are actually the exceptions rather than the norm. Internal violence surged in the 1960s, not after the cold war. Governments that violate minority rights internally are not necessarily externally aggressive. The discussion of U.S. public opinion ignores the analysis by Steven Kull, which suggests that policy makers are fundamentally misreading the general public, which supported escalation rather than withdrawal in Somalia, for example.

Nonetheless, on balance this is an excellent book on an important topic. If you have several books with similar titles on your desk, you may want to start with this one.

ROY LICKLIDER
Rutgers University–New Brunswick

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems *by Gary W. Cox. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 340 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

This book is a unique contribution to the fields of comparative politics and formal political theory. It offers a model integrating many diverse aspects of electoral competition that together bring into existence systems of national political parties. Gary Cox combines social choice theory, public choice theory, spatial theory, and the institutional approach to electoral studies to reach a new level of understanding of political competition in democracies.

Cox's general model of a polity organizing itself for partisan political process consists of two principal political interactions. The first one is the coordination "game" among voters. Unwilling to waste their votes, voters with somewhat similar preferences coordinate to support fewer but stronger parliamentary parties representative of their interests. This is the process behind Maurice Duverger psychological effect, described as electoral abandonment of weaker contestants. The second interaction is among politicians or parties. Things to be determined there are the number and platforms of parties and alliances on the ballot, the order of candidates' names on parties' lists, the number of nominees in multicandidate districts, etc. These choices by politicians account for the "mechanical" effect of Duverger. The two games among voters and among parties are connected in the general model through parties' expectations regarding the vote and voters' knowledge of parties' programs or candidates' platforms.

To complete the main theoretical framework, in any specific country the exact game form is determined by a set of institutional variables (magnitude of electoral districts, formulaic structure in elections, separate election of the executive, etc.), while preferences of the participants are modified by structural parameters (ethnic, demographic, or linguistic composition of the electorate).

A general model produces tangible predictions only in the context of specific parameter values. Thus, the author goes on to develop it separately for different institutional environments. Resulting applied models are based on the typology of electoral systems offered in Chapter 3 and show a substantial variation in equilibrium predictions under different institutional and structural constraints. Chapters 4-7 address voters' choices in different electoral systems, while Chapters 8-11 are devoted to politicians' strategies under alternative district

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and national-level institutional constraints. Throughout these chapters, the reader will find an array of formal constructs leading to testable propositions. Along the way, the author tests many of these theoretically obtained propositions with national and cross-country data on parties and elections.

This book is of potential interest for readers in all fields of political science. It epitomizes the balanced use of formal theory and comparative method as an approach to developing general understanding of diverse political phenomena. *Making Votes Count* will certainly become a required reading in many graduate and undergraduate seminars on comparative political institutions and positive political theory. Two other things that deserve special emphasis and praise are an encyclopedic survey of electoral mechanisms offered in Chapter 3 and an extensive data appendix.

Gary Cox's new book is not only a theoretical study, but also a useful reference on comparative electoral institutions. The list of countries included in the data is unusually broad (seventy-seven democracies), and the set of institutional variables is more detailed than in any other related source. Table 3.2 shows exact magnitudes of all districts in each electoral system. The data on formulaic structure contain such variables as restrictions on preelectoral coalition formation and connection between different tiers of seat allocation, while the author also draws attention to such often overlooked institutions as rules of candidate nomination and party registration.

OLGA SHVETSOVA
Washington University

Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations *by Peter Mair. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 244 pp. $65.00.*

Peter Mair seeks to understand the sources of party system stability and change. The point of departure here is the conventional argument that Western European party systems froze around a stable set of cleavages after suffrage had been extended to male citizens early in the twentieth century. Mair notes that current literature on European parties points to a "crisis of party," characterized by declining party identification and support among voters and the erosion of mass party structures that link party leaders with civil society.

Mair's initial response is twofold. First, he rightly notes that political scientists are perpetually prone to diagnose crises, probably because reports of stability attract little attention. More importantly, Mair suggests that loosening the links between voters and party leaders actually allows politicians increasing flexibility in crafting issue positions and coalition strategies. He contends that Western European parties are as central as ever to governing and that they are internally disciplined at the parliamentary level. This implies that paradoxically the atrophy of the mass party could be a successful evolutionary response to the decline of the cleavages that drove party system stability throughout most of the century. Parties can thrive in changing electoral environments, but they must free themselves of vestigial organs such as powerful party congresses comprised of sectoral representatives rather than more pragmatic parliamentarians.

The latter part of the book addresses the prospects for party system stability in new postcommunist democracies. Here, Mair's argument departs from its original course in a curious way. The author regards East European parties as feckless and their systems as unstable

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precisely because of most parties' rootlessness in the electorate. According to Mair, postcommunist parties tend to be top-down organizations, created by a handful of elected officials with weak links to civic organizations, prone to fissures and mergers, confronting fickle voters—and indeed contributing to electoral volatility by their own impermanence. He goes on to speculate that party system instability in postcommunist East Europe heightens the risk of regime instability.

What is puzzling is that Mair regards the disconnection between party elites and party members in the electorate in its Western European version as a ticket to party system stability in established democracies. In its eastern incarnation, however, he regards such disconnection as a threat to the survival of new democracies. It would appear that the relationship between a party system's rootedness in civil society and its stability is either subject to interactive effects with other variables or is nonlinear. The interactive story would be that the effects of rootedness on system stability are opposite in new democracies versus established ones. If this is the case, it would be critical to determine at what point a political system graduates from "new" to "established" status. The nonlinear story, on the other hand, resembles Goldilocks's dilemma. Here, some high level of rootedness in civil society (the traditional mass party of the 1950s–1960s) is too much for the maintenance of modern party systems; some low level (postcommunist systems in the 1990s) is too little; and the implication is that there is a level that is "just right" for stability.

Perhaps that target level was hit in the 1980s by the established systems that are Mair's focus throughout much of the book. In closing, however, the author suggests that increased electoral volatility and coalitional opportunism, even in some of Europe's most traditionally stable party systems, may signal a new era of party system change. The possibility may not yet warrant diagnosis as a crisis, but it warrants close attention. Mair's argument suggests that a narrowing ideological spectrum of partisan competition in the 1990s, coupled with the decline of mass party organizations, encourages partisan promiscuity, both in voter loyalties and elite coalition building. If further erosion of mass party organizations generates party system instability even in established democracies, then this would support the nonlinear, rather than the interactive, account of the relationship between rootedness and party system stability. Resolving that question would justify a follow-up to the important advances Mair has already provided in this book.

JOHN CAREY
Washington University

The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995 *by Paul C. Light. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 290 pp. $35.00.*

With this book, Paul Light completes his trilogy about change in American government. This is a sweeping examination of postwar reform in the public sector, based upon his identification of some 141 major legislative changes. Light argues that there have been four principal "tides" in reform, all of which have appeared and reappeared in American government for decades, if not centuries. The oldest of these tides is "war on waste," followed by scientific management, "watchful eye," and finally liberation management. Although one tide or another may dominate during a period, they continue to appear again and again,

This is an interesting but also somewhat maddening book. On the more positive side, it is an important cataloging of reform efforts and a useful delineation of the factors that can

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define those tides. Each one of the reforms is classified as belonging predominately to one tide or another with most belonging entirely to one tide or another. Further, Light analyzes those reforms along a number of dimensions. For example, the changes are classified by the scale of the reform considered, the timing of the reforms, and the impacts of the changes.

The most maddening part of the book is that there is little or nothing done to explain or justify the analysis that is presented. One of the standard canons of social science is that the work we do should be replicable. Even the most careful readers of this book can not, however, determine how the various reform laws were coded or even what criteria were used to assign a reform to one category or another. Indeed, we do not know in any definitive way why these particular reforms were selected for the sample. Were there objective criteria of some sort for the selection and classification, or only the author's own wisdom in such matters? I have little doubt that the coding that has been done is reasonable, but no one else could use this otherwise impressive collection of information to apply other independent variables to attempt to explain the pattern of reform in the American public sector.

The other maddening aspect of this work is its parochialism. This problem is perhaps best seen in the need to add a fifth "tide" or reform—the market (p. 85). Even casual attention to reform in the rest of the industrialized world should have led the author to expect more of this style of reform in the United States, and to wonder at its relative absence. The United States has appeared exceptional in the path it has taken in recent changes in the public sector, but the nature and source of these differences is not explored or even recognized.

In summary, Light has helped advance the understanding of administrative reform in the United States, but only part of the way. We have a good enumeration of reforms undertaken in American government and some ideas about their characteristics. What we do not have, however, is any compelling explanation of the patterns observed or any way of knowing how the patterns were identified.

B. Guy Peters
University of Pittsburgh

Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision
by Steven Pinch. New York, Routledge, 1997. 167 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $20.99.

This book begins with three objectives: first, to examine recent changes in the welfare states of the English-speaking world; second, to explain how those changes have manifested themselves differently in different countries and different parts of the same country; and third, to present some explanations for both the changes and their geographic manifestations.

The major changes in welfare states covered are: rationalization, privatization, voluntarism, deinstitutionalization, deregulation, investment and technical change, intensification, "flexibilization," contracting out, development of internal markets, commercialization and corporatization, devolution, and decentralization. Together these changes add up to two major trends in the recent development of Anglo welfare states: a decline in direct provision of services by the state; and a move toward more efficient service provision.

The parts of the book that deal with the different geographic manifestations of these changes are the most interesting. The author points out, for example, that government contracts with private firms are much more prevalent in the southern regions of the United Kingdom than in the north. Also, in both the United States and the UK, private-sector orga-

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nizations have proliferated as the publicly financed welfare state has shrunk. In the UK, at least, local authorities have taken advantage of this development by relying on volunteers to compensate for staff reductions.

The least successful part of the book is the second half, which offers several theoretical frameworks to be used in analyzing changes in the structure and geography of the English-speaking welfare states. Recognizing that many readers will be encountering this material for the first time, the author commendably claims, "I have tried to convey . . . ideas in an accessible manner, using technical jargon only when it is necessary to understand the basic ideas" (p. xii). Yet the discussion of theory too often reads like this: "it is not only language but culturally signifying practices in general that are arbitrary, i.e., they derive their meanings from sets of differences within other discourses" (p. 115). Such a passage, and the entire theory section in which it appears, needs to convey much more intuitive meaning than it does.

Readers also may be hard-pressed to understand what the theory presented has to do with changes in the Anglo welfare states. Though the author claims that his discussion of theory "looks at some of the explanations that have been advanced" to account for the changes discussed in the book's first half (p. xi), the theories presented have not been used extensively for that purpose. The author presents "regulation theory" in great and painful detail, for example, though he also acknowledges that "there have been few attempts to extend regulationist ideas to the geography of the welfare state" (p. 82). "Structuration theory" receives the same detailed treatment, yet the author writes, ". . . there have been relatively few attempts to apply the theory empirically" (p. 100). He also devotes a chapter to "cultural studies," but notes at the beginning of the chapter, "this trend has so far had relatively little impact upon study of the changing geography of the welfare state" (p. 112). Again, given that this book will be an introduction to the material for many, why not explore those theories that have been more extensively applied to the subject matter?

To his credit, the author does present a summary explanation of the major changes in the welfare states in the introductory chapter (see pages 21–26), and the discussion of the changes themselves is detailed and interesting. All of that makes this a moderately useful treatment for beginners, and perhaps very useful for experts.

DAVID DODENHOFF
Wisconsin Policy Research Institute

The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?
edited by Libby Rittenberg. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1998. 240 pp. $59.95.

In September 1980, the Turkish military government launched a comprehensive program of economic liberalization and structural adjustment that continued after the return to democracy in 1983. By the end of the decade these reforms had liberated domestic market forces, opened Turkey to foreign trade, and unleashed an impressive boom in manufactured exports. Observers hailed Turkey as a model for other developing nations and rewarded Turkey with the designation "Big, Emerging Market." Since that time, however, reforms have stalled, and the failure to privatize the large public sector or to contain macroeconomic instability has produced deteriorating economic performance and a sense that although once a pioneer, Turkey was now bringing up the rear.

While numerous studies document these trends, less attention has been paid to Turkey's involvement in numerous regional cooperation schemes designed to complement the trans-

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formation of its domestic political economy. In 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal applied for full admission to the European Community (EC), hoping to gain access to development assistance, but also to expose Turkish industrialists to competition that would force them to sink or swim. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 heightened Turkey's regional ambitions. But just as enthusiasm for Turkey's domestic reforms waned over time, initial confidence that its ambitious goals could be achieved was soon replaced with more realistic expectations and proposals.

The essays in this volume, divided between discussions of Turkey's relations with the European Union and the former Soviet Union, survey the rise and fall of Turkey's regional integration schemes in considerable detail and hold out guarded optimism for the future success of more modest goals. Atila Eralp provides a concise overview of the political dimensions of Turkish-European relations during and after the cold war, including the reasons for the rejection of Turkey's application for full membership in the EC. Canan Balkir considers the mostly negative implications of the Turkish-EU Customs Union, which began in 1996. Bahri Yilmaz rounds out the discussion by comparing Turkey's international competitiveness with Greece, Portugal, and Spain, an analysis that may surprise many readers with its conclusion that in raw material-intensive, labor-intensive, and some capital-intensive industries Turkey has achieved a higher degree of competitiveness than either Greece or Portugal.

Five chapters then explore Turkey's relations with the former Soviet bloc. Following Gareth Winrow's survey of Turkey's evolving political role in the region, Serdar Sayan and Osman Zaim discuss the numerous obstacles to economic cooperation among members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project. Gulten Kazgan's chapter on Turkish economic relations with Russia points to successful and growing economic cooperation despite deteriorating political relations. The politically sensitive nature of Turkey's still-limited involvement with the transhipment of Eurasian oil is considered by Meliha Altunisik. Finally, Gul Turan and Ilter Turan analyze the evolution of Turkey's relations with the Central Asian Republics, emphasizing the factors limiting Turkish influence in the region.

Missing from the volume is discussion of recent trends in Turkish politics and the political underpinnings of continued economic distress in Turkey, a glaring omission given the conclusion of several chapters that Turkey's future capacity to play a significant role in the region is contingent upon putting its own house in order. Moreover, Faruk Selcuk's brief account of economic trends over the past decade will be more useful to economists than to political scientists seeking a concise introduction to the Turkish economy. Despite these gaps in the coverage, the volume presents well-informed analyses that will be of interest to scholars researching the interplay of domestic and international political economy, particularly those interested in regional integration schemes and the conditions for their success or failure.

DAVID WALDNER
University of Virginia

Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis *by H. D. Forbes. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 291 pp. $30.00.*

The contact hypothesis—the claim that increased contact between different ethnic groups undermines mutual stereotypes and thus reduces tension—is a much-cited but poorly-ana-

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lyzed tenet of modern social science. In this pithy and insightful work, H. D. Forbes provides a valuable and long-overdue assessment of the contact hypothesis and the conditions under which it holds. Forbes explains the puzzling and seemingly paradoxical question of why contact can improve individual relations but often worsens group relations. Forbes's work is valuable not only for students of ethnic relations but also for scholars concerned about methodological and epistemological limits in the social sciences.

After describing the intellectual history of the contact hypotheses, Forbes goes on to test and reject its more sophisticated variants. Using the work of Gordon Allport and his disciples, Forbes examines the supposed conditions under which contact reduces prejudice. Allport and his school argue that successful contact is more likely when the parties have equality of status, are cooperating in pursuit of common goals, and have strong normative support behind positive relations. Forbes takes on each point. Using both observational and experimental studies and logic, he shows that these conditions do not always or even regularly make contact more successful in promoting ethnic harmony.

Forbes relies heavily on racial relations in the United States to show the mixed impact of increased racial contact. For the most part, this approach works quite well. This emphasis, however, is surprising to the unprepared reader. The book's title creates an expectation that the work will focus primarily on ethnic war, while in fact it focuses largely on ethnic prejudice.

In place of the Allport school approach to contact theory, Forbes offers his own language-based model that shows how contact can simultaneously improve and worsen ethnic relations. In making his argument, Forbes distinguishes between ethnic relations at the individual and at the group level. At an individual level, contact often makes ethnic relations more harmonious. At the group level, however, contact can stimulate efforts to preserve a separate group identity and leads groups to shun the heavy costs inherent in assimilation. Thus Forbes solves his own puzzle. Contact is a process, not an event. It can break down stereotypes and reduce cultural differences, but this modest assimilation in turn threatens a group's existence and thus increases tension. Not surprisingly, ethnic differences often are both rational and unavoidable causes of conflict.

Although the bulk of Forbes's attention is devoted to assessing the contact hypothesis and his language-based alternative, he also offers insights into the limits of testing complex social science theories and into even broader questions on how to study value-laden questions. Forbes takes issue with his own work, noting that many of the variables that he posits are important (for example, assimilation and identity) are difficult to measure and test. In addition, the processes he identifies, such as integration and competition, are hardly value free despite his attempt to remain objective. Because of these and many related insights, Forbes's work illustrates nicely how useful rigorous social science can be and the questions it cannot answer fully. Would that other scholars were both so thorough and so modest.

Perhaps the greatest joy of Forbes's work is that his prose is both erudite and chatty. He makes a highly complex subject not only comprehensible, but also enjoyable to explore. As such, his book is useful to instructors as well as scholars in the field: despite the book's complex and narrow topic, students can learn about ethnic relations and social science methodology without slogging through many broader, but painfully turgid works on the subject.

DANIEL L. BYMAN
The RAND Corporation

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Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991 *by John Young. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 270 pp. $59.95.*

The revolution in Ethiopia (1974–1991) was one of the most important events in postindependence Africa. John Young has presented an intensive study of the movement, the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) which ultimately triumphed in the revolution and the special relationship that it cultivated with the peasants of Tigray.

Making an important contribution to comparative politics, Young convincingly demonstrates the importance of agency in the Ethiopian revolution. In defeating the dictatorship of the Derg (provisional military government) and outcompeting other movements in a struggle for state power, the TPLF rose from a small band of students by successfully mobilizing peasants. Evidence of agency is coupled with an examination of a range of structural factors, such as the commercialization of agriculture, which are shown to be relatively unimportant. Also, Young demonstrates that peasants can be mobilized through the prospect of fulfilling their self-interest, thereby taking issue with Norma Kriger and others who contend that mobilization invariably involves coercion.

In making his case, Young combines a variety of sources, including an impressive array of primary material. These include interviews with hundreds of peasants at different points in time and in several locations, as well as with a broad range of actors from the TPLF, other movements, government institutions, and civil society. Of interest to field researchers is Young's choice for cultural reasons to conduct group interviews rather than one-on-one sessions.

Peasant voice in Africa has been disregarded by most regimes and movements, culminating in urban bias. The TPLF represents one of a handful of cases where movements have intentionally mobilized peasants and in the process paid close attention to their voice. In turn, peasant voice helped to shape the TPLF. Young shows how the TPLF's commitment to first a Maoist, then an Albanian brand of Marxism-Leninism was tempered once the movement came in contact with the peasants of Tigray. For example, the TPLF tread carefully in relations with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and on issues of land reform and women's rights. As in Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Eritrea, the TPLF developed a commitment either to reorient or dismantle the Ethiopian state to render it more receptive to the demands of peasants for lower taxes and increases in services. The TPLF's struggle against the state and urban bias brought it remarkably into line by 1990 with the World Bank and other proponents of Western liberalism.

While Young's history of Tigray and the TPLF is most illuminating, the most important chapter of the book is Chapter 7, "The TPLF and the Peasants." Here the author presents an intensive explanation of why the TPLF was more successful at mobilizing the peasants than other revolutionary movements in Ethiopia. Of all factors involved, Young identifies the development of peasant administration as the key, especially the process of the TPLF encouraging peasants to wield power and manage their own affairs.

Ideology was a secondary, but important factor in the success of the TPLF. Young attributes the success of the TPLF in peasant mobilization and military campaigns to the application of Mao's teachings on handling contradictions among the people and on people's war. In Ethiopia, as well as Eritrea, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, African Maoism led to peasant power without the massive human rights abuses committed in Cambodia and elsewhere. A related issue concerns the quickness with which the TPLF jettisoned Marxism-Leninism-Hoxhaism. Young attributes the TPLF's ideological somersault to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and particularly in Albania. However, the author should also have

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mentioned the impact of peasant voice on weakening the ideological rigidity of the TPLF's leadership.

Ethiopia and Eritrea appeared to be unshakable allies in 1991 with the victory of their respective revolutions. However, in 1998 the two countries have been at war. Young points to a number of significant differences between the TPLF and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) that help to explain why two seemingly close allies are now in conflict with each other. These differences have included ideological issues, especially the "national question," and military doctrine. Perhaps more important was the struggle of the TPLF to be recognized, from 1975–1991 as a force that was equal to the EPLF. Suddenly, in 1991, the TPLF assumed control of a country that was far larger and more powerful than Eritrea. As a consequence, the EPLF government has been trying to assert itself in relation to its former junior partners in Ethiopia.

The TPLF army started from scratch to become, Young asserts, one of the strongest, if not the strongest, armed force in Africa. The reason lies in the early affinity that the army developed with the peasants, as well as its discipline and fighting ability, developed through numerous campaigns of people's war. The quality of the TPLF army explains the extraordinary decision to totally disband the previous regime's army, which had been responsible for widespread human rights abuses in Tigray and elsewhere. The strength and quality of the new Ethiopian army, for Young, helps to account for the relative peace and stability that Ethiopia has enjoyed since 1991.

Devolution into a federal structure has been one of the most remarkable accomplishments of the new Ethiopian government since 1991, with Tigray and other ethnically-based regions receiving real autonomy and power. The Ethiopian experiment is a rarity in Africa. Young explains the roots of the federal experiment in terms of the TPLF's early identification of Amhara ethnic chauvinism as the root cause of the problems of Tigray and its peasants. Subsequently, one of the goals of the TPLF became the ending of Amhara dominance and the devolution of power to the various ethnic groups to Ethiopia. In the same way that the TPLF followed through in its promise to give power to the peasants, it gave power to the "nations" that live within the borders of Ethiopia.

In conclusion, the TPLF, the peasants, and the Ethiopian experience represent a model that the rest of Africa and political scientists should study. John Young has done a fine job presenting a most fascinating case.

STEPHEN F. BURGESS
Hofstra University

Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation *by Edward P. Weber. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1998. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $23.95.*

Edward P. Weber examines the prospects for effective environmental governance based on collaboration among public officials, environmental groups, and business interests in national pollution control politics. While the author contends that collaboration among opposing interests sometimes produces "institutional arrangements that are more effective at resolving the complex regulatory dilemmas found in a traditionally adversarial policy arena" (p. xv), he does not promote collaboration for its own sake. To be sure, collaboration prom-

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ises lower transaction costs than adversarial approaches to pollution control, but the conditions conducive to collaboration are seldom in place. Under what conditions can collaboration serve environmental goals in a manner that is both cost-effective and democratic? To answer this question, Weber examines three recent collaborative games: reformulated gasoline, acid rain, and the Yorktown Pollution Prevention Project. The first two of these experiments were successful insofar as the recommendations they produced became the blueprint for subsequent agency rulemakings. The Yorktown Project, however, ran into a fundamental barrier against collaboration: the fragmented, open nature of American government that encourages political actors dissatisfied with a decision to keep shopping around for a more favorable outcome.

The incentives of pluralism, Weber argues, prevent the realization of gains to be derived from collaboration. The inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation, as well as a political context in which major business and environmental interests routinely frustrate one another's goals, create a demand for institutional alternatives to no-holds-barred pluralism. Stakeholders nonetheless shun collaboration, because they distrust their opponents' commitment to collaboration. Pluralism pushes stakeholders toward conflictual strategies, because it cannot prevent end runs by dissatisfied participants, guard against sabotage by outsiders, or guarantee that political principals will honor the results of regulatory negotiations. Weber's solution to this collective action dilemma is pluralism by the rules, whereby stakeholders play collaborative games that provide them with "assurance in the form of rules which structure how the game of pluralism will be played" (p. 105). For collaboration to work, several conditions need to be in place, including among others a credible commitment to collaboration by entrepreneurial political leaders and the inclusion of all stakeholders in a position to block or effectively undermine outcomes.

Collaborative games, however, raise potentially troubling questions for democracy. Weber discusses three areas of concern: bureaucratic accountability, inclusiveness, and democratic legitimacy. First, in defending pluralism by the rules against the objection that institutionalized collaboration undermines the classic ideal of bureaucratic accountability, Weber proposes a public-sector professional ethos guided by an environmental ethic that seeks to balance environmental and economic concerns. Thus, administrators should be judged on their ability to broker collaborative solutions that create equal or better environmental results than are required by the statute in question. Second, Weber admits that the collaborative decision making he envisions falls short of democratic ideals of inclusiveness, because only "those with the power to block or impede policy outcomes are invited to sit at the negotiating table" (p. 235). This condition favors the inclusion of established national environmental organizations over that of politically radical but locally-based and thus relatively powerless environmental justice movements. Such groups, moreover, have few discernible interests in long-term collaboration at the national level and, unlike national organizations, are usually not capable of making their members abide by negotiated agreements. Finally, Weber concedes that "what may look, smell, and feel like good public policy" (p. 241) in the nation's capital often fails to find favor with the American people, who care less about the distinction between collaboration and no-holds-barred pluralism than about a given policy's impact on their lives and pocketbooks.

Weber concludes that the prospects for collaboration in environmental policy making at the national level are quite limited insofar as the conditions that make success possible are extremely difficult to meet. In spite of this sobering conclusion, or perhaps because of it, this book makes a welcome contribution to a literature that extols the benefits, but often

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ignores the drawbacks, of attempts to create win-win solutions to every conceivable policy problem.

CHRISTIAN HUNOLD
Drexel University

Environmental Federalism *edited by Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill. Lanham, MD, Rowan and Littlefield, 1997. 304 pp. Cloth, $63.00; paper, $23.95.*

The question of whether or not to devolve responsibility for environmental programs to state governments is not the focus of this edited book. The authors already agree: for a variety of environmental programs, states are more effective at program implementation than the national government. Given that state and local control is preferable to our current system of command and control regulations from the federal government, the focus of the book is to explore viable alternative approaches and to make the case that states are better equipped to protect water, wildlife, land, and other resources.

That the authors take as a foregone conclusion the need to give more programmatic authority to state and local governments is not surprising. Except for one chapter, the book contains papers from a forum on environmental federalism sponsored by the Political Economy Research Center, a nonprofit organization that has championed property rights, voluntary action, and market-based approaches to environmental protection. Still, this volume is worth reading not only for its provocative ideas but also because its topic couldn't be more timely.

Take, for example, David Schoenbrod's recommendation for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). He suggests that the country's major oversight agency for environmental programs should be "stripped of its power" (p. 268). The EPA would be stripped of its regulatory duties, but left with responsibility for gathering and reporting information; proposing "rules of conduct" for interstate pollution and goods and services, such as new cars; and drafting model state environmental laws. As a counter to critics who argue that states may not be willing to produce (or enforce) competent environmental regulations, Schoenbrod replies, "The language that the EPA produces is—and I mean this—worse than the babble that comes from the Internal Revenue Service" (p. 269).

Karol Ceplo and Bruce Yandle's examination of water quality control efforts of eight western states suggests that states have positive histories of protecting water quality. Moreover, the administrative and common law records of states like California and Oregon suggest that these states are more capable, more innovative, more responsive to individual citizen concerns, and more cost-effective guardians of water quality than the current federal top-down, command-control regulatory apparatus. While the study is limited, the author's considerations of the relationship between federal law, state administrative and common law, and private property rights is intriguing.

Many of the arguments of other authors are also worthy of review. The question of how to improve environmental protection without incurring unjustifiably high costs is enormously important. Few serious environmental policy scholars would argue that states have not developed viable environmental programs, and many recent studies suggest that some form of devolution is needed. (See, for example, the National Academy of Public Administration's report to Congress, *Setting Priorities, Getting Results: a New Direction for EPA*, 1995).

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However, this reader regrets the decidedly western flavor of the article topics (public lands, wildlife conservation) and the failure to include a discussion of the Clean Air Act or any of the hazardous waste laws, most notably the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Finally, some of the statements in the book, such as "The history of water policy shows that states managed their water resources effectively until the federal government intervened to expand its control" (page xvii), suggest that readers review other studies of environmental protection prior to reaching the same conclusions as these authors.

DENISE SCHEBERLE
University of Wisconsin–Green Bay

The Farrakhan Phenomenon: Race, Reaction, and the Paranoid Style in American Politics *by Robert Singh. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1997. 352 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $17.95.*

The thesis of this book is that the Nation of Islam minister, Reverend Louis Farrakhan has had a phenomenal rise to national African-American leadership ranks and once in those ranks has become a phenomenon in and of himself. This being the case, he deserves close scrutiny and very careful analysis. Robert Singh states his motives thusly: "Farrakhan represents an appropriately menacing, divisive, and sharply polarizing political figure for the fin de siecle and, hence, an especially rich and compelling subject for study" (p. x). To capture this phenomenon, the author uses uncritically historian Richard Hofstadter's conceptualization of the paranoid leader in American politics along with historical, documentary, rhetorical, polling, and theological data. From these data sources comes a characterization that is part populism, part authoritarianism, part African-American conservatism, part modified Islamism, part individualism, part capitalism, completely paranoid and completely extremist. This is the phenomenon that this leader can be all of these paradoxical things at the same time and in the same moment. Such a leader bodes ill for the African-American community, the white community, and the nation-state.

But the mere characterization of this phenomenal leader is only part of the thrust of the book. In point of fact, the paranoid conceptualization comes in chapter four, the midpoint of the book. The first part of the book (chapters 1–3) is devoted to how this phenomenon rose to national leadership, while the second part of the book (chapters 5–7) discusses how he stays in power by analyzing his base of followers and supporters. The logic and the argument of the book is clear, and it is the binding theme of the work: without African-Americans, the American political scene would not be burdened and threatened by such a troubling presence.

As the author sees it, despite a host of other independent variables, Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign, the Congressional Black Caucus 1993 covenant with the minister, the 1993-1994 NAACP recognition, Malcolm X's wife Betty Shabazz's reconciliation with him even though the evidence points to his having a role in murdering her husband, and the Million Man March on 16 October 1995 gave Farrakhan a mass base and led to his becoming a national leader and phenomenon.

Likewise, using a panoply of survey and polling data, the author asserts that Farrakhan is widely loved, honored, and worshipped in the African-American community. In fact, the author reveals that although the minister constantly and continually demeans, stereotypes,

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and reviles African-Americans and does it with relish, the African-American community still loves and cherishes him. Ultimately, the book is poorly conceptualized and is not conversant with the literature on African-American leaders; it omits the seminal insights of noted historian Nathan Huggins, who penned the central theoretical piece on African-American leadership. Singh is subjective in picking and choosing between independent variables. He makes faulty use of polling and survey data, where he refers to African-American polling data in one instance and that of white conservative polling data in another, as if they are both of equal value and explanatory power, to say nothing of the small subsamples that exist in such data and the interpretation of this material by using repetitive statements. The end result is that instead of being a useful critical assessment of the Farrakhan phenomenon it is a work that makes African Americans responsible for their own victimization.

HANES WALTON, JR.
University of Michigan

Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963–65 *by Taylor Branch. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1998. 720 pp. $30.00.*

Thirty years after orchestrating America's greatest civil rights victories, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Lyndon B. Johnson continue to fascinate scholars. Numerous authors have tried to make sense of these two complex individuals whose private behavior did not always conform to their public actions. The architect of the Great Society had an abusive streak of pettiness and hypersensitivity in him, and the civil rights icon suffered from bouts of depression and committed adultery. Both understood the need to use power to bring about social change, though Johnson did so in conventional ways through established political processes, whereas King worked outside traditional channels to force reform.

In the second volume of his projected trilogy on America in the King years, Taylor Branch devotes considerable space detailing the relationship between the president and the civil rights leader. This volume tracks the black freedom struggle in several southern communities from 1963 to the spring of 1965, as well as reporting corresponding events in Washington, DC. In addition to covering struggles in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, St. Augustine, Florida, and Mississippi, Branch describes the Byzantine politics within the federal government as officials tried to contain the protest movement. The author explores the dark side of this effort by detailing the surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Dr. King. Driven by J. Edgar Hoover's obsession with destroying King, the agency fed the president, politicians, and journalists damaging material about the minister's personal life and alleged connections to communism. This book renews admiration for King in his ability to absorb such brutal psychological punishment, though it certainly took its toll on him and the movement. One also comes away with a better understanding of how Johnson tolerated Hoover's blandishments, while at the same time he manipulated the reluctant FBI chief into taking stronger action to pursue Ku Klux Klan murderers in Mississippi and Georgia. Johnson and King engaged in similar balancing acts: the president made overtures to keep the right wing of the Democratic party behind him, and King attempted to harness the movement's left wing. Differences in style and outlook, however, kept the two leaders from trusting each other.

This is no ordinary biography, and Branch focuses more on the times than on the life of King. There are scores of pages in which King disappears while the travails of community

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activists such as Bob Moses, Vernon Dahmer, Hollis Watkins, Amelia Boynton, James Bevel, and Diane Nash take his place. Moveover, Branch writes what amounts to a parallel book on the internecine war within the Nation of Islam between Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X. The book begins with the shootout between Muslims and the police in Los Angels in 1962 and virtually ends with Malcolm's murder three years later.

Though covering only a few years, *Pillar of Fire* is majestic in scope, the product of intense archival research and oral history. In describing conversations between Johnson and Hoover that the president taped or in recounting the ironic last words spoken by Mickey Schwerner confronting his murderers in Mississippi during the summer of 1964—"Sir, I know just how you feel" (p. 509)—the author draws vivid pictures of heroism and intrigue. His narrative is at once complex and cluttered. As he lurches from topic to topic within each chapter, Branch provides both more and less than satisfies the reader. At its best, this sprawling chronicle shows a deeply textured movement and how messy it was in making headway against entrenched racism and governmental inertia. Nevertheless, the book falls short of providing a coherent interpretation of King, the movement to which he belonged, and the alternatives available to him. Despite more than 600 pages of text, it is an incomplete effort.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
Rutgers University–New Brunswick

Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America *edited by Henry A. Dietz and Gil Shidlo. Wilmington, DE, SR Books, 1998. 298 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $18.95.*

Latin American politics and its study are changing. After the extended preoccupation with the transitions away from blatantly authoritarian central power, there is a new concern with decentered politics, with changes at the local and international levels and in civil society. Whereas "democratization" seemed the right word for describing the departure of the military and the return of elected governments, "privatization," "decentralization," and "internationalization" try less coherently to capture the rapidly changing and complex political institutions that share only the quality of not being significantly less dependent on the residency.

This book addresses one small but important piece of that change—local electoral politics. Local elections have long existed in many Latin American countries, but they have often been strictly controlled either by the central government or by local bosses. As the evidence in the book shows, autonomous and competitive local elections are becoming more frequent in many countries. The book offers good information about electoral results and the varying and changing links to national political struggles in ten broadly distributed Latin American countries written by experts on each. From the references and appearance of postscripts in several chapters, it appears that most articles were written before 1994 and then brought up to date for this publication.

The book reflects the reality it is describing not only in what it says, but in how it says it. Just as the significance of local elections is uncertain, there is an uncertainty in what a study of local elections ought to be or what is their most important role. The chapters are very diverse in structure and are ordered alphabetically by country name. The most consistent element is a discussion of recent national electoral results, which one imagines is dictated by the availability of the data, not the purposes of the book.

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The editors attempt to give the essays common focus by posing three topics: the presumably varying pattern of elections in different cities, the contrasts and relations of national and local elections, and the influence of what they call informal elements—social movements and civic organizations. Very few of the articles address all three, with many only talking about the politics of the national capital in its links to national elections. But consistent adherence to the three-question model would not accomplish much. Neither editors nor authors suggest the importance one way or the other of linking civil society to local elections, delinking national and local elections, or more or less homogeneity across localities. Meaningful comparisons would be left to the reader even if the authors had addressed each question.

Another limitation of the book is that most of the analyses of local elections are carried out in a fashion one might call top-down. In many of the articles, we get a sense of what the election means to national politics and what nationally focused observers think about them. We don't get very much in the way of the campaign strategies in the streets or the impact of local issues—say public security, which has become a central issue in many cities in the region. Most authors document the shift from the center, but not the obviously more complicated local reality that local elections are likely to reflect.

In the end, the book is a useful interim compilation, offering some useful information from a fresh perspective. It is important because it helps to identify one piece of the newly de-centered Latin American politics. We will need more work before we can begin to assess its significance.

DOUGLAS CHALMERS
Columbia University

Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitan, Mexico *by Jeffrey W. Rubin. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1997. 316 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $17.95.*

In *Decentering the Regime*, Jeffrey Rubin gives a nuanced account about how and why local conditions shape politics in a country such as Mexico, where a single political party has ruled for more than half a century. He focuses on Juchitan, the first locale in Mexico where the Left won power electorally against all odds, given the PRI's (Institutional Revolutionary party) national political hegemony. Though grounded in a case study, Rubin provides a frame for demystifying the state and democracy as commonly understood.

Rubin's analysis of Juchitan is historically grounded. He points to politically consequential forces that are masked by corporatist, modernization, rational choice, and conventional democratization paradigms. He highlights how Juchitan electoral democratization is rooted in nineteenth-century "tropes of barbarism," in longstanding practices and conceptions of female independence, and in cultural "domains of sovereignty." He also traces democratization to 1930s to 1960s *caciquismo*, which allowed for a modicum of local autonomy from central government domination, to the unintended socioeconomic consequences of 1970s and 1980s federal government-initiated development projects that polarized local socioclasses previously allied and to federal government repression of the 1968 student movement far away in the country's capital, which induced Juchitan students to form the Left-leaning Zapotec political movement, COCEI, the Coalition of Workers, Peasants and

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Students, back home. Even COCEI, which served to democratize Juchitan electoral politics and address poor and indigenous people's concerns, deployed nondemocratic means for democratic ends. The party did not operate democratically internally. And while the Mexican government currently views Juchitan as a model for democratic politics, COCEI faced regime-sanctioned killings and military occupation for fifteen years. The democratization of local politics is shown to be rooted more in cultural and social conditions outside of formal political institutions than in the extension of democratic procedural rules tied to federally-instituted political reforms.

To bolster his contextual analysis, Rubin compares political developments in Juchitan with regional political developments elsewhere in Mexico. He shows how different combinations of local forces have given rise to different political outcomes. The lenses through which Rubin ably analyzes shifts in postrevolutionary Juchitan politics are decidedly postmodern. Terms such as "spaces of voice," "decentering," "border-crossing," and "discursive" punctuate the pages of the book. Whether such terminology is enlightening is questionable. As convincingly as Rubin demonstrates that models of politics viewed from above and outside leave much of what transpires locally both unaccounted for and unexplained, such jargon distracts from his otherwise tell-it-as-it-is approach. Such a sensitive and perceptive analyst as Rubin has succumbed unnessarily to academic trendiness. There is no reason why everyday life and politics cannot be both described and analyzed in everyday parlance. In the process of demystifying the state, corporatism, and democracy, Rubin has put forth postmodern mystification.

These reservations aside, readers interested in Left politics, in democratization (and its real meaning, at the grassroots level), in state/society relations, in general as well as specifically in Mexico, have much to learn from *Decentering the Regime*. Even activists, if they can make their way through the jargon, can learn the importance of grounding movements in local culture, and not simply impose political concepts formulated elsewhere under different historical conditions.

SUSAN ECKSTEIN
Boston University

Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa *by Merilee S. Grindle. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 243 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

This carefully researched, admirably structured, and persuasively argued book is a welcome addition to the literature on the comparative study of state power. Merilee Grindle's temporal focus is on the "third wave" period of efforts at democratization, but her concern is with the broader question of the impact of this period for state-society and state-economy relations. Grindle characterizes the simultaneous and related crises of politics and economics in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s as a "critical historical moment" and posits that while these crises had the effect of eroding established arrangements, they simultaneously opened up opportunities for redefining new linkages among state, economy, and society (pp. 3-4). State responses to the challenges of this period, she argues, will thus shape political systems for some time to come.

Grindle's concern is with how the crises of the period have affected the capacity of states—that is, their ability to "encourage economic development and provide effective gov-

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ernance for their societies" (p. 1). In addressing this issue, she distinguishes among four dimensions of state capacity: institutional capacity—the ability to effectively impose political "rules of the game"; technical capacity—the ability to manage an effective macroeconomic policy; administrative capacity—the ability to administer basic social and physical infrastructure in such areas as education, health, and transport; and political capacity—the ability to channel societal demands and allow societal participation in decision making. In three of these domains, she hypothesizes, crises have eroded the capacity of states. Only in the technical domain can capacity be strengthened by crisis, an effect largely produced by the imperatives of managing the demands of international financial institutions.

Using a wide variety of indicators from a set of sixteen countries, eight from each of the two regions, Grindle largely confirms her hypothesized consequences of crisis on state capacity. She then turns to the central question of what determines variations in state responses to the erosion of capacity and hence in the redefinition of new patterns of relations between states and societies. Here the answers are more contingent and ambiguous: the longer-term impact of crisis "depends in large part on the strength and durability of existing institutions for conflict resolution and the skills and orientations of political leaders in using the expanded space available to them to define new strategies for economic development and to build new and durable coalitions of political support" (p. 46). The bulk of the book then undertakes a detailed analysis of the effects of these factors on each domain of state capacity in one case from each region—Mexico and Kenya. The empirical discussion of the two cases, based on a wide variety of sources and extensive interviewing in both countries, is rich and convincing.

The conclusions Grindle draws from her analysis may seem cautious and even a bit elliptical at times: "In 1993 the *clearest* way to describe the future of state-economy and state-society relations in Kenya was to argue that they were *ambiguous*" (p. 181, emphasis added). But on the whole, they are solid and reasonable. And Grindle brings much evidence to bear in making her principal arguments: leadership matters, institutions matter, civic society matters. Her somewhat paradoxical final conclusion that "fully capable states may therefore be most likely to emerge and persist where civic society is capable of contesting the state and its leadership" (p. 194), suggests an alternative to much of the literature on state-society relations that tends to see such relations as a struggle in a zero-sum game. On the contrary, as Grindle suggests, strong societies may engender capable states.

In addition to its interest to scholars, this book has the added advantage of lending itself well to classroom use for advanced undergraduates and graduate courses, and its admirable (and unfortunately rare) cross-regional comparative nature adds to its methodological interest.

LEONARDO A. VILLALÓN
The University of Kansas

Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security *by John M. Owen IV. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 246 pp. $35.00.*

John Owen's book is distinguished from other works on democratic peace by its emphasis on the role of liberal ideas; by in-depth case studies, carefully qualified; and by a distinctly Hegelian thread in the analysis. Owen finds liberalism to be the most significant (though

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not the only) factor contributing to liberal states' decisions to avoid war with other liberal states on the one hand, and to their willingness to engage in war with nonliberal states on the other. A liberal state's propensity to identify with other liberal states is matched by its propensity to perceive illiberal states as threatening. In a nod to Hegel, Owen argues that a liberal state needs the "other" of a nonliberal state to identify itself against; he calls this the "dialectic of negation" (p. 41). His framework thus explains war as well as peace.

The primary mechanism in accounting for peace appears to be identification, but Owen acknowledges that this mechanism does not apply to nonliberal states' international relations. What then makes liberal states identify *peacefully* with one other? Owen focuses on the rational and constraining forces of liberal ideology and institutions.

The substance of liberalism must be carefully delineated if it is to explain the ideas side of why liberal identification breeds peace (or war for that matter), but Owen's short review of liberal discourse yields few specifics aside from identifying a liberal commitment to individual autonomy and toleration. In the case studies, his delineation of how liberal ideas shaped foreign policy at any given time is reduced almost entirely to determining whether or not key elites defined a foreign state as liberal. Thus he falls back on the mechanism of identification or the dialectic of negation, which in themselves are insufficient to explain the choice of peace or war. Delineating the precise effects of liberal ideas would involve deeper analysis of the political discourses of the periods studied.

Owen's discussion of liberal institutions, defined as freedom of discussion and regular competitive elections, is also somewhat thin. For example, Owen conflates Immanuel Kant's republicanism with liberalism, although Kant's criteria for a proper republican constitution—separation of powers and the rule of law—do not match Owen's. If liberal institutions are so crucial to liberal peace, a deeper critical discussion of the literature on both liberal and republican institutions would be illuminating.

Owen systematically analyzes American foreign policy in ten crises from the founding until the 1890s, each case consisting of either a liberal-liberal dyad or a liberal-illiberal dyad. His method is structured, focused comparison; he also generates alternative explanations from competing theories, most notably Stephen Walt's "balance of threat" theory, which arguably explains a couple of the cases. Owen briefly sketches two further cases (India—Pakistan and Japan—South Korea) in a concluding chapter to probe whether his findings apply to nonwestern contexts, a question he tentatively answers in the affirmative.

In adhering to his analytical framework and methodology, Owen risks sacrificing attention to significant details, possibly presenting a skewed picture of some cases. For example, the Anglo-American crisis leading up to the Jay Treaty was not primarily about whether Americans perceived Britain as liberal; it was about the struggle over the future shape and political foundations of the U.S. economy, a question deeply linked to republican identity. Clearly, Owen's purpose is to test hypotheses, not to provide rich narratives.

This addition to the burgeoning literature on democratic peace holds forth the distinctive promise to attend to the role of ideas, but maps these ideas somewhat crudely. The book satisfies mainstream methodological criteria and contributes distinctively to the growing body of evidence on democratic peace. How to address the competing imperatives of developing a simple causal model, and addressing a complex, nuanced political discourse remains a challenge to be met in future scholarship.

MLADA BUKOVANSKY
Dartmouth College

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Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict *by Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 242 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

Book-length studies in the young science of international conflict typically either look ahead—propounding novel arguments or providing new data—or they look backward—engaging in intellectual hand-wringing about the path of evolving research or self-conscientiously defending that path. Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer choose to do both—and neither. The authors "offer a coherent synthesis of research findings leading to an explanation of interstate war" (p. 9). The book is a rare meta-analysis, compiling results from a large portion of the quantitative literature on international conflict. Factors associated with war initiation or war intensity are organized into chapters by state, dyadic, regional, or systemic level of analysis. There are also two case studies—one of the 1980 Iran/Iraq War, the other of World War I—and a discussion of models of decision making.

The book constitutes something akin to the ultimate comprehensive exam answer to any question involving the quantitative study of international conflict. With a few notable exceptions, the review of the scientific literature on war is encyclopedic and will be valuable to researchers and students for this reason alone. Of course, the book is more than a literature review, but this aspect of the study is a decided strength. In particular, the levels of analysis chapters admirably organize and summarize the empirical case for a wide variety of factors thought to cause or exacerbate war. At the state level, for example, only variables related to capabilities are found to contribute to conflict. "Population pressure, geographic size, economic development, business cycles, national culture, and political system-type appear to be unrelated to state-level involvement in militarized conflict or war" (p. 67).

The authors are unabashedly scientific. They embrace the term and include a discussion of the application of scientific methodologies to the study of international conflict. They compare and contrast deductive and inductive approaches to inference and then favor induction. They argue that "an event is explained by subsumption under a set of intersecting probabilistic laws" (p. 28). Surely correlation is not causation. The text does not seem concerned with the inference problems associated with inductive analysis. Suzy's mother tells her not to go out in the rain, else she will catch cold. Is Suzy's mother implying that getting wet predicts or causes illness? While the distinction is purely academic to Suzy and her mother, it may be important for those seeking to understand the causes of war. Explanations may be implied by statistically significant relationships. However, it is difficult to ascertain the theoretical significance to relationships ex post. To be disprovable, theories of war must be articulated in advance of statistical tests. Correlations are valuable, but they do not constitute explanations in themselves. It is therefore perhaps more accurate to characterize the book as a summary of the correlates—rather than the causes—of war.

The authors note that war is the result of interactive decision making within and between states. They describe two categories of explanations for the decision to go to war—rational and nonrational—and seek to identify the more plausible set of explanations in their meta-analysis. The discussion of rational and nonrational theories of decision making is interesting, but the basis for distinguishing between the theories is assailable. The authors themselves acknowledge that most of the nonrational explanations can be subsumed by instrumental rationality. Comparison of the sets of explanations actually appears to be of passing interest to the test, and by the conclusion the explanations are barely mentioned.

The two case studies of the Iran/Iraq War and World War I are informative, but they are of limited use in verifying the conclusions of the book, for they sample on the dependent

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variable. It is intriguing that such a method of analysis is adopted, given the prominent position of the authors as proponents of large-sample quantitative social science.

This is a book that students of international relations at all levels will want to consider adding to their shelves. The authors provide an excellent synthesis of what quantitative research—particularly the Correlates of War Project—has learned. Indeed, anyone who wonders at the contribution of the scientific study of war to international relations will benefit from reading *Nations at War*. The book falls short in providing an analytical framework, but this, of course, is a shortcoming of the literature as a whole.

ERIK GARTZKE
Pennsylvania State University

The Political Institution of Private Property *by Itai Sened. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 204 pp. $54.95.*

Sened's exploration of the foundation of property rights is both self-evident and proactive. Few scholars familiar with the new political economy would contest his argument that property rights originate in political bargaining between state and private actors. Yet Sened makes the case with great precision and improves work by his intellectual predecessors—Ronald Coase, William Riker, and Douglass North.

Sened argues that property rights are not embodied in moral codes or the invisible hand of the market, but in a political process. They emerge from a bargaining game in which self-interested rulers write and rewrite contracts with their constituents in exchange for economic and political support. The impetus for defining property rights comes not from social actors trapped in a state of nature, but from rulers seeking reelection and revenue. Sened uses an array of formal theory and political philosophy to make the argument. This broad approach allows him to provide an account of how states develop incentives to promote both civil rights and property rights.

Sened's main case study is a fascinating and convincing account of the origins of property rights in airport slots in the United States in the 1980s. He recounts how state actors created and enforced rights to land planes at airports in Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Washington DC. The case may seem somewhat unique, but the theory and insights can be generalized across a broad range of cases.

Sened's work advances the property rights' literature in several ways. First, Sened builds on Coase's familiar problem of ranchers and farmers by introducing into the analysis state actors with the power to tax. One wonders why this logical and clever addition to Coase's work was not taken years ago.

Second, Sened provides a novel interpretation of why states sometimes grant and respect inefficient property rights by introducing imperfect information into models of exchange between rulers and ruled. Inefficient property rights are not necessarily due to the political power of rent-seekers or the transaction costs of enforcing property rights, but to the difficulty of transmitting credible information between political and economic actors.

Third, this focus on the informational component of interactions between rulers and ruled sheds light on the relationship between civil rights and property rights. Sened argues that rulers may create and respect civil rights for a purely instrumental reason: civil rights, such as free speech, promote more efficient economic decision making by both rulers and

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ruled. This provides a microfoundation for a link between democracy and growth—a useful note for rulers in developing countries.

Two minor criticisms deserve mention. First, Sened claims that by publishing laws, rulers can commit themselves to enforcement. Publication may raise the costs of not enforcing a law but seems insufficient to tie the hands of rulers. Many published laws often go unenforced.

Second, the presentation is at times theory-rich and data thin. A few examples drawn to illustrate theoretical points permit multiple interpretations. For example, Sened cites the example of Russian privatization to support his case, but many have argued that enterprise managers in Russia seized property rights from below and forced the state to recognize their gains, rather than vice-versa.

This is a very timely work. Actors in the postcommunist world are creating, altering, and redistributing property rights on a scale rarely seen. Sened provides a very useful approach to study these cases. Moreover, these cases offer the opportunity to build on Sened's impressive work.

TIMOTHY FRYE
The Ohio State University

Growth, Debt, and Politics: Economic Adjustment and the Political Performance of Developing Countries *by Lewis W. Snider. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996. 242 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $24.95.*

With its strong reliance on quantitative analysis to measure the political capacity of heavily indebted developing countries to undertake sustainable programs of economic adjustment, this book offers a very creative approach to this subject. While the field is admittedly crowded with comparative political economy studies of developing country restructuring since the 1982 debt crisis, the bulk of these studies have relied on qualitative and descriptive analyses. In contrast, by quantifying the key variables involved in the stabilization and adjustment process, the present study both complements and confirms some of these earlier findings.

The author defines "successful adjustment" as a necessary set of economic corrections that are both technical and political in nature. A government with strong political capacity to implement economic reforms is one with the proven ability to extract, allocate, and reallocate revenue from one sector to another. Similarly, strong political capacity requires that leaders are able to compensate effectively the losers in the adjustment process, and not just cater to the political and economic whims of the winners. Other components of political capacity include the extent to which economic decisions are explicit and transparent, as well as the credibility of political and economic institutions.

Three main variables are used to measure the ways in which political capacity, as defined above, correlates with successful adjustment. The first is the annual rate of economic growth, as reflected in the average change in nominal gross domestic product (GDP); the second is a country's credit rating in international capital markets, as measured by the *Institutional Investor*; the third is the percent share of GDP that goes toward government consumption. In short, the author argues that the stronger the political capacity of the state, the more buoyant the pattern of economic growth and development. Conversely, states

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plagued by low political capacity will suffer economically. Apart from poor economic performance, the latter are usually characterized by a lack of transparency in the policy-making process, by the ability of social forces to basically capture the state, and by the inability of decision makers to shift tracks and embrace new economic strategies when old ones are no longer viable.

How convincing is the evidence to support these claims? Based on a sample of thirty-eight developing countries from 1969-1992, the evidence is actually quite compelling. Each of the five chapters that follow the introductory chapter tackle the argument from a different angle, all of which fit nicely together and allow for a concise synthesis at the end. In sequence, the political capacity variables are further refined and then elaborated on, for example, from the standpoint of institutional integrity, political regime type, and a government's choice of economic strategy. At the most general level, the findings reflect the extent to which successful economic reforms depend on simultaneous political reforms, and the degree to which economic adjustment in the developing countries in the 1990s involves redefining the role of the state in the society and the economy.

More specifically, countries that group together on the independent variable in terms of strong political capacity are more adept at controlling inflation, restricting rents, liberalizing trade, and restricting profligate government consumption. Moreover, countries that fit this profile also tend to be governed by established democratic regimes. On its own, this analysis is probably too aggregate to yield precise insights on why a given country or group of developing countries might not entirely fit the author's explanatory framework. But given that much of the descriptive case-study literature errs in the opposite direction, this book serves as an excellent reliability check on much of what has been written on this subject since the early 1980s.

CAROL WISE
Johns Hopkins University

Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis *by Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 296 pp. $65.00.*

Political movements struggle to change both substantive policies and the rules for making claims on the state. Their chances of succeeding, indeed even of mobilizing, are affected by the policies they challenge and the rules that govern the boundaries and conduct of challenges. In Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman's terms, the extension of citizenship rights can make it easier to mobilize social movements and for those movements to succeed in generating reforms that further encourage other movements. A government's recognition of democratic rights can embolden activists and afford them the political space needed to create movements. Social scientists then confront their version of the chicken-and-egg question: Which came first? Liberalization or mobilization?

Clearly, as numerous case studies of movements show, there is an interaction between conventional, institutionally-oriented politics and protests in the streets, and between the extension of citizenship rights and citizens' use (and testing) of those rights. Foweraker and Landman want to do more here than describe another movement, instead hoping to build theory by analyzing and comparing the relationships between citizenship and social movements in four countries that share numerous characteristics, but nonetheless have carved

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out distinctive paths on the road to democracy—Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Spain. Their choice of cases reflects a step forward in the literature on movements, in which the dominant political process tradition of analysis is based mostly on accounts of social movements in developed democracies.

Although the authors offer thumbnail sketches and brief chronologies of the movements and citizenship struggles in their cases from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, the heart of the book is comprised of quantitative comparisons among the four, and within each country over time. Given the large and important questions the authors engage and the widely varying stories with which they are confronted, much of the book necessarily entails describing available (and new) measures of key concepts in the book, particularly social movement mobilization (with special categories for labor action), rights in principle (that is, formal citizenship protections), and rights in practice (actual government conduct), and explaining a variety of methods for analyzing these quantitative data. The complex stories in each country mean that quibbles about the operationalization and measurement of key variables are inevitable. Nonetheless, the choices are thoughtful, the searches rigorous, and the explanations thorough and intelligible. The volume is an honest and intelligent attempt to use quantitative methods to address questions generally only approached in narrative case studies—including regression, two-stage least squares nonrecursive models, multiple interrupted time series analysis, and qualitative comparative analysis.

And the payoffs? The numbers point out patterns and paradoxes in the process of democratization in each of the four countries. In each case, labor unrest preceded broader social mobilization, ultimately provoking reform in rights-in-principle. The gap between formally guaranteed rights and the actual exercise of rights in practice proved to be an opportunity for social movements to exploit as opportunities for mobilization, lodging claims for progressively greater citizenship rights in principle and practice. Timing and sequence varied from state to state, presenting interesting findings. For example, social protest appears to be inversely related to citizenship reforms in Spain, where Franco's authoritarian regime held fast against rising discontent; yet the democratic reforms occasioned by Franco's death were rapid and extensive. Clearly, labor and social movement unrest in the prior years had conditioned the populace and the government for substantial changes as soon as possible.

A grand theory does not emerge, nor a universal template for studying social protest and citizenship. But the importance of rigorously studying the relationship between the rules of governance and participation and social protest is firmly established in this book. The application of a political process approach to less developed countries is a much needed contribution.

DAVID S. MEYER
City College of the City University of New York

International Theory: To the Brink and Beyond *by Andrew P. Dunne. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 200 pp. $55.00.*

This book seeks to advance the study of international politics by delineating seven "basic standards" which any scientific theory of international politics must meet. The point of such a theory would be "to explicitly state hypotheses of optimal behavior, for specific types of

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international structures" (p. 104). Dunne applies these standards to the work of classic authors such as E. H. Carr and Kenneth Waltz and concludes that none of them has quite managed to cross over the "brink" separating approaches to international relations from a scientific theory of international politics.

In explicating the seven basic standards, many of which are incontestable in the abstract, the author makes a number of unsupported assertions. His first, the focal standard, might simply be a call for theorists to specify the domain of their explanations were it not for the fact that he then declares that "three sets of variables seem relevant" for a theory of international politics: "international structure, the regime characteristics of the international actors, and the optimal action patterns" (p. 11). At no point in the book is the choice of these three sets of variables (and the consequent exclusion of other variables) justified either empirically or theoretically. Indeed, in his third standard, the author lists further subdivisions of these variables, which presumably must all be addressed in order for a theory to be a truly scientific theory. Substance and form seem to be entangled here: does the scientific character of a theory depend on which variables it chooses to include? In fact, the concepts the author deploys as general scientific standards seem to be distilled from the substantive work of Morton Kaplan, and thus it is not surprising that Kaplan emerges as the theorist whose work has moved beyond the brink into truly scientific international theory.

Standard number five holds that the motivations of actors need to be considered when attempting to test a theory, as behavior alone is not sufficient evidence. Hence international factors only matter in a given historical situation if those factors actually motivated the action in question, something the analyst should be able to determine empirically. As any decision-making theorist or biographer would point out, this is no easy task; one cannot take an actor's self-assessment at face value because of the benefits to be gained from certain self-presentations. For instance, a cold war political leader consistently advocates a hard-line defense policy and bases her arguments on the bipolar nature of the international system: is she motivated by international factors (bipolarity) or domestic political factors (getting re-elected)? The author offers no advice for such situations.

Another issue that the author leaves untouched is the question of identifying the units in a given international system: how should an analyst decide what the relevant units are and how the boundaries between domestic and international factors are to be drawn? In his brief empirical discussion, the author seems to stick pretty close to the formal political delineation of units and discounts the possibility that the relations between formally independent actors might be affected by norms that help those actors to regard themselves as part of a community. It is therefore odd to find the author declaring that, in the early days of the cold war, "the Soviet Union imposed a mixed-hierarchical bloc on the Eastern European states. The West had to defend itself" (p. 149): not because the Soviet threat wasn't real, but because the West is not an international actor, but a cultural community spanning several international actors. No theoretical rationale for this slippage is provided.

In fairness, this book is more of a theoretical prolegomenon than a fully-fledged theory of international politics. The author provides some insightful criticisms of existing theories, even if he does have a tendency to conflate basic scientific standards and assertions which should be empirically tested.

PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON
Columbia University

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What's Wrong with Liberalism? A Radical Critique of Liberal Political Philosophy *by Maureen Ramsay. London, Leicester University Press, 1997. 271 pp. Paper, $21.95.*

For at least a quarter of a century the principles and practices of liberalism have been besieged by full-scale critiques of conservative, socialist, anarchist, communitarian, poststructuralist, and feminist stripes. One would think that by now adherents of various non- or even antiliberal perspectives would devote their considerable energies to the development of positive political alternatives to their resilient if beleaguered opponent. Maureen Ramsay's recent book proves that this is, unfortunately, far from the case. In fact, this professedly "radical" critique of liberalism is rather conventional in approach. In essence, Ramsay combines traditional arguments against liberalism popularized by Leo Strauss and Michael Oakshott of the Right, and C. B. Macpherson and Sheldon Wolin on the Left, with more recent ones by feminist critics such as Susan Okin, Carole Pateman, Carol Gilligan, and Catherine MacKinnon. But Ramsay adds little refinement to the arguments of these serious liberal critics and offers next to nothing by way of programmatic prescriptions.

Ramsay examines the views of liberals such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin on familiar topics such as human nature, freedom, equality, justice, rights, the public/private distinction, as well as topics that have recently taken center stage in political theory, such as women's and children's rights. Her conclusions are of little surprise: liberals are excessively individualistic and tend to overemphasize the maximization of self-interest, most often understood in terms of the development of private property. These characteristics make a liberal understanding of the public good shallow at best and shut out other important aspects of the human experience such as empathy and caring. Ignoring years of research on substantive notions of social obligation and the origins of socioeconomic redistributional strategies in Locke, Kant, and, especially, Mill, Ramsay advances the obviously untenable argument that these authors have no conception of constructive sociality. In fact, she asserts that for individualistic liberals, "it makes no sense to talk about the public interest" (p. 9). There is no mention of the context of pathological sociality (pogroms, religious wars, virulent nationalism, violent familial rivalries, incipient class warfare, etc.) within which most of these theorists worked and so conditioned their favoring of individualistic strategies. Unlike Ramsay, these liberals did not in fact "ignore the social context" (p. 10) within which humans develop and function, but rather formulated individualism as a safer, more efficient way of improving their social contexts. Liberals understood what many liberal critics underestimate, namely that "social" does not always mean "good." But they also understood that it was indispensable: the individual is not always given what Ramsey identifies as an absolute "priority over collective interest" (p. 8) but is often strategized by liberals as the best route by which to pursue progressive collective interests. Related simplistic claims in the work continually fly in the face of obvious facts: according to Ramsay, "The idea that women as a group have shared gender interests, and require collective action to realize them, conflicts with the liberal idea of the isolated individual acting to maximize their own interests or to achieve their own good in their own way" (p. 30). The recent explosion of literature on "civil society" demonstrates conclusively that liberals have been instrumentally involved in securing freedom of association as the best way for aggregating the common interests of individuals.

Ramsay does often admit after the fact that her characterizations of liberals are exaggerated—that liberals do understand the depth of human relationships, that they do theorize the public good, that there are clear perfectionist strains in the theory, etc. But she generally does so too late and in too unintegrated a manner to enrich her arguments and instead only

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undermines her strong claims. There are other problems with Ramsay's choice and reading of liberal texts: for instance, Ramsay's unqualified use of absolutist par excellence, Hobbes, as a liberal thinker is problematic. Her complete neglect of John Dewey, the twentieth century liberal who best eludes her undifferentiated criticisms is almost scholastically dishonorable. The fact that the book is less than up-to-date on the liberalism literature is another crucial shortcoming: Ramsay makes no note of Rawls's recent sheepish but fundamental reformulation of his theory, nor of the work of Stephen Holmes, which sometimes chauvinistically but quite often convincingly refutes the very charges against liberalism that Ramsay makes.

By the time the reader gets through the chapters related to feminist concerns (chapters 5, 6, and 7), it becomes clear that Ramsay has not examined the concepts that she is negatively contrasting with liberalism's—collectivity, empathy, and nurturing—with nearly as much energy and scrutiny as she does liberalism's. We are offered no proof as to how empathy and care are any less incomplete, "defective" (p. 4), or "impoverished" (p. 22) conceptions than self-interest or methodological individualism. Liberalism is charged with "epistemological inadequacy" (p. 20) because "social phenomena cannot be explained in terms of facts about individuals" (p. 34). But Ramsay never explains in detail how to define or understand groups or collectivities.

Though the author admits that her effort is less than original, Ramsay's title and her frequent categorically dismissive claims about liberalism require something more constructive on her part. Thus, despite an articulate recapitulation of contemporary feminist theory, Ramsay's work again offers little new as a piece of scholarship. Its clumsy handling of the classic texts of liberal political theory limits its usefulness as a student guide to, let alone a substitute for, primary texts.

JOHN P. MCCORMICK
Yale University

The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations *by Brian C. Schmidt. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1998. 309 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

International relations (IR) is a curious discipline. While most social scientists operate with a self-consciously vague understanding of the roots of their discipline (how many economists have really read Adam Smith, how many psychologists, Sigmund Freud?), IR scholars go one better: equipped with a vague conception of the field, they think they know their history. It is usually delivered in one of two versions: either as the triumphal march of realist thought from Thucydides through Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau to Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, or as a series of great debates, the first of which was that between "idealists" and "realists" after World War I.

The great virtue of Brian Schmidt's interesting and important book is that he shows how wrong-headed both of these stories are. His book presents a history of international relations as it was taught and written by its earliest practitioners in the United States beginning (more or less) in the 1880s. In doing so, he traces the development of IR as part of American political science and explores some of the dustier corners of the field through the writings of such scholars as John Burgess, Paul Reinsch, G. Lowes Dickinson, and Frederick Schuman.

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Actually, Schmidt surveys more than fifty different authors (not all American) in chapters that address the central themes he discerns: the nature of international law, the foundations (and justifications) of imperialism and colonial administration, the importance of anarchy and sovereignty, and the role of international organizations.

The way past scholars organized their subject strikes both dissonant and consonant chords with today's scholarship. Schmidt points out, for example, that the importance of "interdependence," a cornerstone of liberal theories, has been long debated alongside the concepts of anarchy and sovereignty. But he also point out the way in which subjects such as international law, imperialism, and state theory also shaped the field, despite their contemporary marginalization. Overall, Schmidt shows us how simplistic and unfair E. H. Carr's characterization of the realist-utopian debate really was, and how impoverished it (and other treatments) have left us today.

The strengths of the book do not prevent one from raising some problematic issues, only two of which I will note. The first is Schmidt's method of "critical internal discursive history" (p. 37), which traces the "history of the conversation" within IR. Although he rightly criticizes scholars who tie all shifts in IR scholarship to changes in the external world for sidestepping "what the *actual* connection between external context and internal conceptual change could be" (p. 35), it is not obvious that a purely internal dialogue works either. In fact, the book itself points out the ways in which authors responded to concerns of the day. More important, however, might be other influences on the agenda of academic IR that are only occasionally noted: the creation and support of major foundations (Carnegie, Rockefeller, World Peace, Ford), and the importance of government support and funding for such early projects as the digest of international arbitration, and more recently, for the entire cold war edifice of strategic studies.

A second quibble is more personal. As a Canadian educated in Britain and teaching in Europe, I can only rue the decision to focus exclusively on the "American conversation about international politics" (p. 14). Although the influences of non-European scholars are well documented in the book, some treatment of how differently (or not) IR evolved outside of America would have highlighted the distinctiveness (and perhaps narrowness) of American concerns. Given that Schmidt is plowing an almost untilled field, however, this book should serve as a point of departure for further reflection and research by IR scholars on their disciplinary heritage.

KEITH KRAUSE
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reforms to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village *by Gerald W. Creed, University Park, Penn State University, 1997. 304 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

This book, an outcome of a socioanthropological study of the village Zamfirovo in Bulgaria, addresses two important issues: first, interfacing transition under socialist, post-socialist/capitalist regimes; second, internalizing or domesticating revolution without dislocating larger identities and categories. At the same time the book tries to demystify the larger conception surrounding the socialist state, which hardly provided enough spaces for autonomy and resistance at the grassroot level.

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This book contains six chapters. The first is about the issues of rural transformation taking place over the years, beginning with the pre-collectivization period of 1945. Collectivization began with cooperative farming. In the initial stages, villagers retained titles to the land. "They could contribute only part of their land and they were allowed to withdraw, mortgage and sell their contribution" (p. 54). Even though some factors like political commitments, and the desire to escape from unhappy households contributed to the initial enthusiasm for joining, the element of forcible acquisition made many resist. Resistance was expressed in the form of "plundering of animals, crops, and equipment" (p. 63) or leaving the cooperatives. This continued even after the introduction of such reforms as consolidation of holdings or size of the farm units, mechanization of technology, crop base of the farm, organization of production, and allowing private plots to operate.

Transition, however, had multiple effects. One was on demography. "During the socialist era extensive out migration became a new fact of life" (p. 121), which affected the fertility rate, household operations, population growth, the meaning of culture and the values, rural working population, and the economy. The state tried to increase fertility as well as stall the migration by providing pensions for the elderly, maternity leave benefits, abortion, and lump-sum payments at birth, quota systems in jobs, taxing the firms employing nonresidents, etc. "All these actions," as Creed argues, "reveal the domestication of socialism at work" (p. 147).

The second important issue that Zamfirovo faced was establishing a linkage between agriculture and industry. Since it was part of the larger ideology of the state to promote industries in villages, Zamfirovo became a target. Zamfirovo, however, faced a peculiar problem of increasing productivity and the life standard in the midst of obstacles placed on the supply of raw materials to village factories or village commercial corporations. Obviously, it led to demand for decentralization and competition among the factories. Nonetheless, all these factories and subsidiary enterprises revolved around personal relationships which ultimately balanced the relationship between agriculture and industries, including minimizing conflicts at different levels.

The crux of the fifth chapter is informal relationships. These relationships provided spaces for flexibility, continuing relationships, stronger kinship ties, informal exchanges of products, sale of subsistence products, and utilization of relatives' lands including "commoditized and uncommoditized relations" (p. 206). This helped establish a large number of sectors conducive to the village economy. In other words, the revolution was the result of such informal relationships, which continued during post-socialist period/regimes.

Paradoxically, strategies that were adopted during the initial stages of the socialist regime were once again reenacted during the post-socialist period. Resistance was quite common and was combined with such multiple issues as lack of investments and labor, limited markets, "price scissors" (p. 248), absence of state protection, increasing inflation, unemployment, and a desire to avoid taxes. Agriculture became the main target of decollectivization.

Finally, the book fills the existing gap in socioanthropological studies of the East European countries. The book is stimulating because it tries to divulge the intricacies of social life within the larger frame work of ideology and political structure. Whether the experience of Zamfirovo will be enough to understand or analyze the whole of Bulgaria is one question that remains to be answered.

MUZAFFAR ASSADI
University of Mysore, India

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 113
1998

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of government, politics, and international affairs.

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Contents of Volume 113

Articles

ABRAMS, HERBERT L.	Bob Dole's Age and Health in the 1996 Election: Did the Media Let Us Down?	471
ADLER, DAVID GRAY	The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye	1
ANDREAS, PETER	The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era	591
ARNOLD, R. DOUGLAS	The Politics of Reforming Social Security	213
ART, ROBERT J.	Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy	383
AVERY, WILLIAM P.	Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining	281
BARBER, BENJAMIN R.	Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy	573
BENEDICT, MICHAEL LES	From Our Archives: A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson	493
BRODY, RICHARD A.	See Abrams, Herbert L.	
CHAMBERS II, JOHN WHITECLAY	Jimmy Carter's Public Policy Ex-Presidency	405
COLAZINGARI, SILVIA	Corruption in a Paternalistic Democratic: Lessons from Italy for Latin America	447
DIVINE, ROBERT A.	Tale of the Presidential Tapes: A Review Essay	307
EDINGER, LEWIS J.	From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Can a Stable Democracy Continue?	179
FISHER, LOUIS	See Adler, David Gray	
HARRIS, DOUGLAS B.	The Rise of the Public Speakership	193
HENDRICKSON, RYAN C.	War Powers, Bosnia, and the 104th Congress	241
JACKSON, WILLIAM D.	Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988	617
JACOBS, LAWRENCE R.	Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion	21
JOHNSON, ROBERT DAVID	The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy during the Cold War	645
KAMPWIRTH, KAREN	Feminism, Antifeminism, and Electoral Politics in Postwar Nicaragua and El Salvador	259
LAWRENCE, ERIC D.	See Jacobs, Lawrence R.	
LEPGOLD, JOSEPH	Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance	43
NACOS, BRIGITTE L.	See Edinger, Lewis J.	
ORREN, KAREN	Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s	689
RAYMOND, GREGORY A.	Necessity in Foreign Policy	673

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RODAN, GARRY	The Internet and Political Control in Singapore	63
ROMAN, PETER J.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness	91
ROSE-ACKERMAN, SUSAN	See Colazingari, Silvia	447
RUSSETT, BRUCE	Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China	361
SCHNEIDER, CATHY LISA	Racism, Drug Policy, and AIDS	427
SHAPIRO, ROBERT Y.	See Jacobs, Lawrence R.	
SHOCH, JAMES	Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years	113
SKOWRONEK, STEPHEN	See Orren, Karen	
SMITH, STEVEN S.	See Jacobs, Lawrence R.	
STAM, ALLAN C.	See Russett, Bruce	
TARR, DAVID W.	See Roman, Peter J.	

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Books Reviewed

Ancheta, Angelo, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience — Claire Jean Kim — 706

Anderson, Terry L. and **Peter J. Hill,** eds., Environmental Federalism — Denise Scheberle — 734

Apter, David E., ed., The Legitimization of Violence — James B. Rule — 148

Barber, William J., Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 — Donald R. Brand — 162

Barkey, Karen and Mark von Hagen, After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires — John-Paul Himka — 336

Bartlett, David L., The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary — Patrick H. O'Neil — 359

Beckett, Katherine, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics — Shmuel Lock — 147

Bennett, Larry, Neighborhood Politics: Chicago and Sheffield — Barbara Ferman — 352

Bennett, Michael J., When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America — Christopher Howard — 167

Bert, Wayne, The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991–95 — James Ron — 135

Birkland, Thomas A., After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events — Frank R. Baumgartner — 516

Blakely, Edward J. and **Mary Gail Snyder,** Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States — Evan McKenzie — 531

Branch, Taylor, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963–65 — Steven F. Lawson — 736

Bratton, Michael and **Nicolas van de Walle,** Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective — Jeffrey Herbst — 555

Bridges, Amy, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest — Clarence N. Stone — 351

Brown, Archie, The Gorbachev Factor — Kathryn Stoner-Weiss — 149

Brown, Nathan J., The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf — Elizabeth Thompson — 335

Broz, J. Lawrence, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System — Peter A. Gourevitch — 356

Bruhn, Kathleen, Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico — Deborah L. Norden — 357

Bufacchi, Vittorio and **Simon Burgess,** Italy Since 1989: Events and Interpretations — Joseph LaPalombara — 703

Bullard, Monte R., The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development — Wey Hsiao — 334

Burnett, Stanton H. and **Luca Mantovani,** The Italian Guillotine: Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy's First Republic — Joseph LaPalombara — 703

Butler, David and **Dennis Kavanagh,** The British General Election of 1997 — Leon D. Epstein — 551

Button, James W., Barbara A. Rienzo, and **Kenneth D. Wald,** Private Lives, Public Conflicts: Battles over Gay Rights in American Communities — Tony Affigne — 170

Callahan, David, Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict — Roy Licklider — 723

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER 139

Clapham, Christopher, Africa and the International System: The Politics of Survival THOMAS M. CALLAGHY 144

Cogan, Charles G., Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO—Then and Now JAMES MCALLISTER 313

Collier, Kenneth, Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs MATTHEW J. DICKINSON 330

Cook, Brian J., Bureaucracy and Self-Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public Administration in American Politics ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN 331

Cook, Timothy E., Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution JEFFERY J. MONDAK 716

Cox, Gary W., Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems OLGA SHVETSOVA 724

Creed, Gerald W., Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reforms to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village MUZAFFAR ASSADI 750

Cumings, Bruce, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* VICTOR D. CHA 545

DeGregorio, Christine, Networks of Champions: Leadership, Access, and Advocacy in the U.S. House of Representatives GEORGIA DUERST-LAHTI 719

Dietz, Henry A. and **Gil Shidlo,** eds., Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America DOUGLAS CHALMERS 737

Donahue, John, Disunited States: What's at Stake as Washington Fades and the States Take the Lead SUSAN B. HANSEN 527

Dunn, Dennis J., Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow CATHAL J. NOLAN 710

Dunne, Andrew P., International Theory: To the Brink and Beyond PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON 746

Edin, Kathryn and **Laura Lein,** Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work RALPH DA COSTA NUNEZ 350

Eichengreen, Barry J., European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice, and Analysis THOMAS OATLEY 338

Farnham, Barbara Readen, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making RICHARD NED LEBOW 523

Ferejohn, John and **Barry R. Weingast,** eds., The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? STEVE SOLNICK 529

Forbes, H. D., Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis DANIEL L. BYMAN 729

Foweraker, Joe and **Todd Landman,** Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis DAVID S. MEYER 745

Friedenberg, Robert V., Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns: Ballot Box Warriors PETER W. WIELHOUWER 718

Garrett, Geoffrey, Partisan Politics and the Global Economy WILLIAM ROBERTS CLARK 722

Gartner, Scott Sigmund, Strategic Assessment in War ROBERT JERVIS 134

Geller, Daniel S. and **David J. Singer,** *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict* ERIK GARTZKE 742

Glied, Sherry, Chronic Condition: Why Health Reform Fails LAWRENCE R. JACOBS 712

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Goddard, Taegan D. and **Christopher Riback,** You Won—Now What? How Americans Can Make Democracy Work from City Hall to the White House — John J. Smee — 534

Goldman, Sheldon, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt to Reagan — Charles Cameron — 324

Grindle, Merilee S., Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa — Leonardo A. Villalón — 739

Grovogui, Siba N'Zatioula, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans — Linda J. Beck — 143

Hacker, Jacob S., The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security — Michael S. Sparer — 323

Hackey, Robert B., Rethinking Health Care Policy — Richard Himelfarb — 714

Hamilton, Dona Cooper and **Charles V. Hamilton,** The Dual Agenda: The African-American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality — Katherine Tate — 327

Hammond, Susan Webb, Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making — Jeffery C. Talbert — 326

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and **Volker Rittberger,** Theories of International Regimes — Joseph Lepgold — 556

Hertzog, Mark, The Lavender Vote: Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals in American Electoral Politics — Robert W. Bailey — 354

Hirschbein, Ron, What if They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises — Robert Jervis — 514

Hochschild, Arlie Russell, The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work — Monica McDermott — 169

Kahn, Jonathan, Budgeting Democracy: State Building and Citizenship in America, 1890–1928 — James D. Savage — 159

Kaplan, Temma, Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements — Lynn Stephen — 348

Katzman, Robert A., Courts and Congress — Ronald Kahn — 320

Kemp, Geoffrey and **Robert E. Harkavy,** Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East — Andrew Flibbert — 339

King, Anthony et al., New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls — Leon D. Epstein — 551

Koistinen, Paul A. C., Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865–1919 — Michal Hershkovitz — 542

Kwong, Julia, The Political Economy of Corruption in China — Mark A. Groombridge — 316

Lantis, Jeffrey S., Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements — Brigitte L. Nacos — 560

Larson, Deborah Welch, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.–Soviet Relations During the Cold War — Kimberly Marten Zisk — 146

Lendler, Marc, Crisis and Political Beliefs: The Case of the Colt Firearms Strike — David Brian Robertson — 347

Lien, Pei-te, The Political Participation of Asian Americans — Claire Jean Kim — 706

Light, Paul C., The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995 — B. Guy Peters — 726

Lublin, David, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress — Frank J. Macchiarola — 533

Lukacs, Yehuda, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process — Laurie A. Brand — 154

Lundestad, Geir, "Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 — James McAllister — 705

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Maier, Charles S., Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany MELVIN CROAN 708

Mair, Peter, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations JOHN CAREY 725

Maltzman, Forrest, Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress L. SANDY MAISEL 530

Mansfield, Edward D. and **Helen V. Milner,** eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism DAVID M. ANDREWS 137

Marshall, Susan E., Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign against Woman Suffrage GRETCHEN RITTER 333

Maxfield, Sylvia, Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries HERMAN M. SCHWARTZ 340

Maxfield, Sylvia and **Ben Ross Schneider,** eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries DAVID WALDNER 559

McFerson, Hazel M., The Racial Dimensions of American Overseas Colonial Policy BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER 329

Mello, Michael, Against the Death Penalty: The Relentless Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall LAURENCE A. BENNER 163

Mendelson, Sarah E., Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan RICHARD L. RUSSELL 709

Michaels, Judith E., The President's Call: Executive Leadership from FDR to George Bush G. CALVIN MACKENZIE 318

Milner, Helen V., Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations MARK R. BRAWLEY 524

Moise, Edwin E., Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War JAMES J. WIRTZ 145

Nathan, Andrew J. and **Robert S. Ross,** Great Wall, Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security JOHN W. GARVER 547

Noble, Charles, Welfare As We Knew It DAVID DODENHOFF 153

Nordin, Dennis S., The New Deal's Black Congressman: A Life of Arthur Wergs Mitchell DIANNE M. PINDERHUGHES 536

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and **David C. King,** eds., Why People Don't Trust Government GARY WASSERMAN 141

Offe, Claus, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience ANDERS ÅSLUND 155

Osborne, David and **Peter Plastrik,** Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government CHERYL M. MILLER 168

Ottosen, Garry K. and **Douglas N. Thompson,** Reducing Unemployment: A Case for Government Deregulation GARY MUCCIARONI 165

Owen IV, John M., Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security MLADA BUKOVANSKY 740

Page, Benjamin I., Who Deliberates? BRIGITTE L. NACOS 140

Panitch, Leo and **Colin Leys,** The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour KENT WORCESTER 720

Parikh, Sunita, The Politics of Preference: Democratic Institutions and Affirmative Action in the United States and India MICHAEL F. THIES 550

Pinch, Steven, Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision DAVID DODENHOFF 727

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Poulton, Hugh, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic — Ben Lombardi 554

Ramsay, Maureen, What's Wrong with Liberalism? A Radical Critique of Liberal Political Philosophy — John P. McCormick 748

Rejai, Mostafa and **Kay Phillips,** Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research — Patrick J. Wolf 538

Richardson, Bradley, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance — Nathaniel B. Thayer 544

Rittenberg, Libby, ed., The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East? — David Waldner 728

Robinson, Glenn E., Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution — Joost R. Hiltermann 343

Robnett, Belinda, How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights — Yvette Alex-Assenoh 537

Rochlin, James F., Redefining "Mexican Security": Society, State, and Region Under NAFTA — Peter Andreas 552

Rosenau, James N., Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World — Craig N. Murphy 522

Rosenthal, Alan, The Decline of Representative Democracy: Process, Participation, and Power in State Legislatures — Kim Quaile Hill 535

Ruane, Joseph and **Jennifer Todd,** The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland — Robert W. White 548

Rubin, Jeffrey W., Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitan, Mexico — Susan Eckstein 738

Rushefsky, Mark E. and **Kant Patel,** Politics, Power, and Policy Making: The Case of Health Care Reform in the 1990s — Richard Himelfarb 714

Savage, Sean J., Truman and the Democratic Party — Allan J. Cigler 325

Schaeffer, Robert K., Power to the People: Democratization Around the World — Tony Smith 525

Schaller, Michael, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation — Akira Iriye 133

Scheberle, Denise, Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation — William R. Lowry 543

Schmidt, Brian C., The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations — Keith Krause 749

Schoppa, Leonard J., Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do — Ellis S. Krauss 314

Sened, Itai, The Political Institution of Private Property — Timothy Frye 743

Shipan, Charles R., Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy — R. Shep Melnick 540

Sinclair, Barbara, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress — Colton C. Campbell 136

Singh, Robert, The Farrakhan Phenomenon: Race, Reaction, and the Paranoid Style in American Politics — Hanes Walton, Jr. 735

Sklar, Kathryn Kish, Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work — Nancy Woloch 355

Smith, Rogers, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History — Jennifer L. Hochschild 321

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Snider, Lewis W., Growth, Debt, and Politics: Economic Adjustment and the Political Performance of Developing Countries — Carol Wise — 744

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

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

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

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